


CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY



Political Science Student Journal 1980-1981

INTRODUCTION

The Political Science Student Journal, throughout its five year history, has published the more exceptional essays which have been submitted to the department's professors. This year's essays reflect current interests and issues in the field of Political Science written in a good scholarly manner as to inspire us all. Indeed, it is hoped all students will strive to achieve the same standard of excellence in the pursuit of their studies.

In making this journal possible we must first and foremost thank the contributors without whose efforts none of this would have ever been realized. The valuable assistance rendered by the faculty and its chairman, Dr. Everett M. Price, served to make the journal an easier task than it might have been. As well, we recognize the important contribution of the secretaries on both campuses, Jeannie Krumel and Mrs. Blanche Gilligan, who painstakingly typed the whole project. Last but not least, we acknowledge the financial help of our sponsors whose unreserved support we have come to rely on over the years.

Tim Morson
Doug West
EDITORS

NOTE FROM THE VICE-RECTOR ACADEMIC
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE

It is my special pleasure to acknowledge once again the outstanding efforts of our students in the Department of Political Science in publishing this Journal.

I congratulate the authors of these essays for their academic achievements. Each of you has demonstrated an interesting grasp of your subject matter. You can, indeed, be proud of your success. To the editors of the Journal and the faculty advisors, I want to extend the gratitude of the University community.

This Journal attests to the creative role of the Department of Political Science within the Faculty of Arts and Science, and I wish you continued success in this important and commendable undertaking.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Russell Breen". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Russell Breen,
Vice-Rector, Academic.

A NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE DEPARTMENT.

This year's Political Science Student Journal, the fifth annual publication to appear since the journal's inception in 1976/77, continues to maintain the high standards of scholarly excellence established by its predecessors.

It is the Department's fervent hope that our undergraduates will perceive the challenge that the journal represents, and be stimulated to have their research and analytical skills with the goal of having their academic efforts recognized through publication in subsequent journals.

Except for the editorial assistance contributed by faculty, for which special thanks should go in particular to Dr. Arthur Ross, the journal continues to be the responsibility of the Political Science students themselves.

Thus, in addition to congratulating the authors, specific mention should be accorded to the student editorial and publication board (Mr. Tim Morson and Mr. Doug West) for a superlative effort.

I should like once again, on behalf of the students to thank the Vice-Rector, the Deans of Students on both campuses and the Dean of Division II for their continued encouragement and financial support.

Special thanks should be extended to Ms. Jeannie Krumel for her long hours of patient work in typing the manuscripts.

On behalf of the Department, I extend my hearty congratulations to all the students for a job well done.



Everett M. Price
Chairman
Department of Political Science.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1. Eric Voegelin and the Nature of Political Reality.	1
JAMES CRAIG	
2. Domestic Influences on American Policy Towards the Middle East	15
FRANK BUELL	
3. An Analysis of John Lock's Theory of Property And Its Implications: Does it Provide a Possible Basis for a Possessive Market Society?	52
DAVID BIGIO	
4. La Minorité Anglophone et ses Droits: Etude des Lois 63, 22 et 101.	66
JEAN-PIERRE BRAULT	
5. Meeting the Economic Challenges of Quebec: The Parti Quebecois' Dilemma in Business and Labour Relations	92
LYNDA GELSTON	

ERIC VOEGELIN AND THE NATURE OF POLITICAL REALITY

JAMES CRAIG

The quarrel between Voegelin and the behaviouralists is rather more basic than a simple debate over whether or not physical and political reality are essentially the same. Voegelin and the behaviouralists do not, in fact, speak in the same terms when examining science and reality. Behavioralists have a unidimensional view of reality as being composed strictly of matter and the relations, regular or otherwise, between and among entities composed of matter. Thus, for the behaviouralist, relations between human groups and individuals are not basically different from the relations between any other types of physical entities. But for Voegelin reality is something much more complex. It was both an immanent (worldly) and a transcendent (divine) aspect. These form what he terms "the poles of being". In his essay "What is Political Reality?" Voegelin points out that:

Reality (a) is not a thing that man confronts but the encompassing reality in which he himself is real as he participates; real (b) are the "things" that can be distinguished in the encompassing reality - the gods, men and so on; real (c) is also participation of things in each other within the encompassing reality.

Voegelin's concept of reality is thus necessarily ambiguous. It is so because the words or symbols "reality" and "truth" must represent something which envelops and transcends human consciousness. "The symbol must be ambiguous", Voegelin writes,

because even attempts to limit it to one or the other unambiguous meaning would destroy the insight in the

structure of reality that the philosopher, within reality, has gained through participation in its process.²

Voegelin's acolyte, Ellis Sandoz, puts the process this way:

What is sought and appropriated as "known" is only a fragment of the truth that is; the insights gained are partial and provisional, but they are within these limits nonetheless validated to the exhaustion of rationality and evidence.... This is carried out from the inevitable starting point of a man's passionate involvement in existence as a self-reflective participant in the reality to be explored; thence the enquiry rises the arduous way (methodos) toward the dispassionate contemplation (theoria) of truth in the scientific attitude.³

As the foregoing would indicate, Voegelin does indeed believe in the possibility, in fact the existence, of a science of politics. But Voegelin's political science is science in the sense understood in classical philosophy (epistémé), not in the factual, mathematical sense in which the natural sciences are understood by modern political scientists whose systems are based on a positivist outlook. Voegelin calls the mode of reasoning initiated by the philosophers of ancient Greece "noesis", from the word "nous" which is roughly equivalent to "reason". Noetic knowledge differs from knowledge obtained in positivist social science in that it is derived through experience of relations from within rather than through observation from without. Experience thus forms the empirical basis of Voegelin's political science and, as Sandoz points out:

... is dramatically expanded beyond the present 'permissible' limits of sensory perception and reflections of phenomenal regularities. . . . Truth lies at the level of experience, not at the level of propositions and symbolisms which articulate its content. The experiential foundation of the science of politics and the very source of scientific 'objectivity', is man's pre-scientific participation in all of the realms of being from the somatic and simply sentient to moral, aesthetic and mystical levels of experience.⁴

Through experience man becomes conscious of order in the world. In Voegelin's language, this is the consciousness of existing from a "ground". This transcendent ground of being is the one fixed point in Voegelin's ontology and the attraction it exerts upon human consciousness is man's centre of order. The "tension toward the ground" is what gives rise to man's attempts to interpret the reality in which he participates, whether it be through mythology, religion or science. The particular contribution of noesis to this phenomenon is that it illuminates this participation. In other words, consciousness becomes differentiated or explicit to itself. Thus noetic interpretations are those which entail a "knowing questioning" about the ground of being. At the same time, the luminosity of the noetic exegesis differentiates itself from periods of less luminosity as in the past. The field of past history is then seen as "the field of the less transparent phases of the same endeavour to know truth of the ground."⁵

This is an important point because, as Voegelin had asserted at the very beginning of his first major work on the subject, "the existence of man in political society is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the same time be a theory of history."⁶ Needless to say, this, in Voegelin's opinion, is exactly what modern positivism does not do. He sees the "destruction worked by positivism" as the consequence of two fundamental assumptions. The first of these is that the mathematical sciences of the external world are possessed of some inherent virtue and that the social sciences would achieve comparable success by following their example. Secondly, it is assumed that the methods of the natural sciences (as these are perceived by the adherents of positivism) are a criterion for theoretical relevance in general. Voegelin considers the second assumption the real source of danger because it:

. . . subordinates theoretical relevance to method and thereby perverts the meaning of science. Science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the various realms of being. Relevant in science is whatever contributes to the success of this search. Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge contributes to the study of essence, while methods are adequate in so far as they can be effectively used as a means for this end. Different

objects require different methods. . . . If the adequacy of a method is not measured by its usefulness to the purpose of science, if on the contrary the use of a method is made the criterion of science, then the meaning of science as a truthful account of the structure of reality, as the theoretical orientation of man in his world, and as the great instrument for man's understanding of his own position is lost. Science starts from the prescientific existence of man, from his participation in the world with his body, soul, intellect and spirit, from his primary grip on all the realms of being that is assured to him because his own nature is their epitome. And from this primary cognitive participation, turgid with passion, rises the arduous way, the methodos, toward the dispassionate gaze on the order of being in the theoretical attitude. The question whether in the concrete case the way was the right one, however, can be decided only by looking back from the end of the beginning. If the method has brought to essential clarity the dimly seen, then it was adequate; if it has failed to do so, or even if it has brought to essential clarity something in which concretely we are not interested, then it has proved inadequate.

Those social scientists, therefore, who hold that method is the criterion of all science, have lost touch with the history of the knowledge of man's participation in the ground of being and of the phenomena of order that have been derived from this participation. The consequent corruption of scientific truth, according to Voegelin, arises from a misunderstanding of classic and Christian ethics and politics. These, he believes, contain no value-judgments (as positivists maintain) but "elaborate empirically and critically the problems of order which derive from philosophical anthropology as part of a general ontology."⁸

What destroyed this tradition of classic and Christian ethics and politics was the introduction of gnostic ideas into Christian scholasticism during the Middle Ages. This came about as a result of Christianity's separation of the sacred and the profane into two separate domains, thus negating the social embodiment of truth or "order of the soul" that had been the psychic binding force of the Roman and preceeding great empires. Gnosticism helped to fill the psychic vacuum created by the loss of a civil theology by providing a popular, but fallacious, immanentization of the Christian ethic.

In *The New Science of Politics* Voegelin traces what he sees as the course of the gnostic tradition in Western thought. In his later work Voegelin deemphasized the seminal role he had earlier ascribed to gnosticism. Nevertheless, the core of his thinking remained unchanged and it may be useful to briefly summarize Voegelin's original concept of the gnostic tradition insofar as it relates to our topic, the nature of political reality.

The tradition shows itself variously in dogmatic metaphysics, certain aspects of protestantism and in utopianism, socialism, fascism, communism and scientism. The several manifestations are frequently in bitter conflict with one another but all display the common theme of man as flawed by social conditions but capable of achieving world-immanent perfection through social change. All of this is not the result of mere historical accident for, as we have seen, the transcendent ground of being exerts, at all times, a compelling attraction upon man and yet its perception is never more than partial, and any attempts to interpret it are necessarily ambiguous. Gnostic interpretations thus help man overcome his sense of alienation with the promise of salvation through attainable, immanent, rather than remote, transcendent, grounds, Voegelin calls gnosticism "a counterexistential dream world." He elaborates:

In every society thus is present an inclination to extend the meaning of order to the fact of existence, but in predominantly gnostic societies this extension is erected into the principle of self interpretation. . . . In gnosticism the nonrecognition of reality is a matter of principle. . . . The identification of dream and reality as a matter of principle has practical results which may appear strange but can hardly be considered surprising. The critical exploration of cause and effect in history is prohibited; and consequently the rational coordination of means and ends in politics is impossible.⁹

Gnostic movements can be divided into two general types: right wing (progressive or utopian) and left wing (socially activist). The conflict between these two tendencies keeps Western gnostic societies in a constant state of turmoil and paralysis because "no fundamental critique of left-wing gnosticism is possible without blowing up right-wing gnosticism in its course."¹⁰ As for the bewildering variety and mutual antagon-

isms of these movements which are all an outgrowth of the same historical phenomenon, Voegelin offers this explanation:

The corrosion of Western civilization through gnosticism is a slow process extending over a thousand years. The several Western political societies, now, have a different relation to this slow process according to the time at which their national revolutions occurred. When the revolution occurred early, a less radical wave of gnosticism was its carrier, and the resistance of the forces of tradition was, at the same time, more effective. When the revolution occurred at a later date, a more radical wave was its carrier, and the environment of tradition was already corroded more deeply by the general advance of modernity.

Thus it was that the more modern the manifestation of gnosticism, the more it seeks to organize and control all aspects of society into some preconceived order that is held to represent worldly perfection. This would explain why British and north American political societies, which trace their beginnings at least to the 17th century origins of parliamentary democracy, have shown themselves least vulnerable to gnostic totalitarianism.

Oblivious of this historical background, positivist political science, and ideologists of all stripes, harbour an antiphilosophical resentment that, Voegelin observes, ". . . is not directed against the classical noesis, of which they know nothing, but against Thomas' design of propositional 'metaphysics' treating of universals, principles and substances."¹² In its conflict with theological and metaphysical dogmatism, the gnostic rebellion has therefore lost contact with the very thing it is opposing, or believes it is opposing. Consequently, its symbolism (ie. vocabulary) also loses contact with the reality of knowledge. As with Orwell's "newspeak", language becomes increasingly incapable of expressing the subtleties of reality as experienced through consciousness. In particular, the discreet reality of consciousness, the fact that the "concrete consciousness of concrete man is the only consciousness given in our experience"¹³ is lost sight of. This leads to such constructions as a "collective consciousness" or the "consciousness of man in history", which Voegelin believes have no basis in theory but result simply from the cleavage of language and reality. The

"ersatz" images of reality thus formed are the basic tools which the ideologists of power use in their attempts to promote fallacious schemes of world-immanent salvation. As Voegelin warns, "Should we attempt to transcend our own transcending toward the ground and to outstrip our perspectival knowledge of reality in the endeavour to possess reality in a kind of absolute knowledge, we derail into gnosticism."¹⁴

Since we cannot "possess reality in a kind of absolute knowledge" when considering the realm of man, we cannot make empirically certain propositions about human reality. Human (ie. social) reality, unlike physical reality, therefore, cannot be objectively investigated as though it were a limited, closed system. Social reality can only be experienced individually and represented, partially at best, through such indirect means as analogy, paradox, allegory or myth. Voegelin elaborates on this:

. . .there are no principles of political science because there are no propositions. Rather, the 'propositions' of political science are common-sense insights into correct modes of action concerning man's existence in society, from insights concerning the organization of government to insights into the requirements of domestic and foreign policy, finance and military policy, down to concrete decisions Every attempt to construe the commonsense insights, which refer to the order of the entire existence, as scientific 'propositions' according to the model of the natural sciences and to find beyond them 'principles' that could take the place of the real source of order is a violation against the structure of the realm of man. Furthermore, every attempt of this kind is not only a symptom of existential disturbance but also a source of social disorder insofar as it can induce disturbances of the rational consciousness in other people.¹⁵

The paradox in all of this is that, if one accepts Voegelin's thesis, the ultimate support of no political ideology can be seen to reside in "scientific" logic, as ideologists pretend. We have observed that the thesis specifically excludes the use of inductive logic in the social sciences. Rather, ideologists must ultimately rely upon that very quality they most abhor and seek most assiduously to banish from their "systems". That quality is faith. Unrecognized or unadmitted dogmatic faith is what makes ideology so potentially powerful and dangerous. As Gerhart Neimeyer observes: "Where faith is mistaken for critical knowledge, the critical knowledge allowed

to play the part of faith, a fall into an abyss of inhumanity may result."¹⁶

We have now reached the point where we can turn from Voegelin's critique of modern positivist political science to examine his concept of what a true science of politics should be. As we have seen, Voegelin believes that "common sense" arising from human experience is the essential starting point of such a science. Scientific activity then consists of refining common sense insights through noetic reflection in order to formulate theories. Voegelin believes there can be no political science without a body of theories to inform it with organization and direction. Without a theoretical base, political science would amount to nothing more than a compilation of vast quantities of irrelevant facts. That modern political science has been able to produce anything of value at all, is, in Voegelin's opinion, due to the persistence of "theoretical traditions" in society, theories unrecognized as such by the political analyst but which nonetheless form part of his cultural background and guide his thinking.

It should be noted at this point that Voegelin, while urging a return to the noetic mode of thought, does not envisage a restoration of classical philosophy in its original form. Such a restoration would be inappropriate (not to say impossible) inasmuch as the historical context has greatly altered since Aristotle's time. He explains that:

By restoration of political science is meant a return to the consciousness of principles, not perhaps a return to the specific content of an earlier attempt. One cannot restore political science today through Platonism. Augustinianism or Hegelianism. Much can be learned, to be sure, from the earlier philosophers concerning the range of problems, as well as concerning their theoretical treatment; but the very historicity of human existence, that is, the unfolding of the typical in meaningful concreteness, precludes a valid reformulation of principles through a former concreteness. Hence, political science cannot be restored to the dignity of a theoretical science in the strict sense by means of a literary renaissance of philosophical achievements of the past; the principles must be regained by a work of theoretization which starts from the concrete, historical situation of the age, taking into account the full amplitude of our empirical knowledge.¹⁷

What makes history a structurally intelligible field of reality is not, as we have indicated, the existence of some form of collective consciousness persisting through time, but rather the presence of one ground in which all men participate, no matter how different their experience of participation, no matter how different their experience of participation. From this thoroughly Platonic perspective, Voegelin explains the collective consciousness fallacy as arising from the fact that concrete persons can produce a social field of symbols intelligible to others who adopt these symbols as the basis for their actions. These social fields of concrete consciousness are not independent entities functioning in the manner of some disembodied collective mind, nor are they identical with organized societies since there may be many social fields in a given society. This often misunderstood phenomenon of the social field, therefore, is fundamental to understanding the meaning of human social activity. Voegelin writes:

Human society is not merely a fact or an event in the external world to be studied by an observer like a natural phenomenon. Though it has externality as one of its important components, it is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated by meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization. It is illuminated through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation - from rite, through myth, to theory - and this symbolism illuminates it with meaning in so far as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion... transparent for the mystery of human existence. . . through such symbolization the members of a society experience it as more than an accident or a convenience; they experience it as of their human essence As a consequence, every human society has an understanding of itself through a variety of symbols, sometimes highly differentiated language symbols, independent of political science Hence when political science begins, it does not begin with a 'tabula rasa' on which it can inscribe its concepts; it will inevitably start from the rich body of self-interpretation of a society and proceed by critical clarification of pre-existent symbols.¹⁸

It might be noted here that these "socially pre-existent symbols" will refer to both noetic and non-noetic interpretations of order in society and history. Non-noetic interpretations historically precede those of the noetic mode,

indeed are their necessary precondition, are in opposition to them and remain the form of society's self-interpretation even after the rise of noesis. As Voegelin explains, the language of political science must therefore be kept nonobjective (perhaps 'neutral' would be a better word) as is the experience of order itself.

Far as we might push the game of objectivizing language, we must keep dissolving it negatively in order to keep free our awareness of the experience of order as a non-objective reality. The nonobjective character of the experience of order admits of no so-called knowledge of order; rather, the intangibility of the reality, which is no ineffability, allows room for a variety of experiences that motivate a corresponding number of expressions of the experience. In the dynamism of the effort to find the right expression of order we find the origins of the tensions in political reality.¹⁹

Attempts to objectivize the experience of order are expressly what lead to gnostic (ie. ideological) interpretations of order. The result is a kind of "secondary order", that is, not a direct expression of concrete experience, but rather a mental construct imposed upon reality. Political science as an academic discipline focuses on the study of national and international institutions (such as the state, political parties and so on) that are based on dogmatic notions of this secondary order that characterize Western society. For this reason Voegelin believes that:

Today the most important contributions to a political science - not in the academic but in the noetic sense - come from archaeology, the research on myths and ethnic cultures, the history of the ancient orient, of classical antiquity and the Far East, from classical philology, the history of Judaeism and Christianity, of patristic and scholasticism, from the science of comparative religion and comparative literature. For when the symbols of order of a society express a predogmatic reality of knowledge, they impose on the researcher at the very least a notion toward noesis, even though he may not reach the goal. Reversely, the historical materials attract those people in whom the desire for knowledge is alive, since it is in those materials that we find the reality of knowledge.²⁰

This brings us to Voegelin's point that it is the history of the knowledge of participation in the ground of being along with the respective historical level of the noetic exegesis that empirically determines the realm of man. This observation forms the foundation of Voegelin's model of the noetic exegesis.²¹ It is a two-part model. The first part explains that the exegesis starts with the existential tension toward the ground as man's centre of order and expands toward the symbolism of humankind through three objective orders. These are: the order of concrete human consciousness, the order of human existence in organized society, and the order of human and social existence in history. These three orders are mutually dependent and not interchangeable or reversible. The second part of the model deals with man's "synthetic nature", his realms of psychic, animalic, vegetative and inanimate being. These "tiers" of being are related in that the higher are materially dependent on the lower and the lower are organized by the higher. These relations also are not reversible. The two parts of the model are related by their basis in man's corporeal foundation and the fact that they overlap and fit together into the comprehensive "realm of man". When the entire structure is ordered from the centre of the existential tension, the "good life" results. Such a model isn't much use for the mechanical operations of examining voting patterns, comparing constitutions or in most of the other pursuits of traditional political science. But Voegelin demonstrates that it does help to point out the fallacies inherent in many dogmatic systems of political thought, for example, it shows how "attempts to interpret order that postulate either a free-flowing consciousness without corporeal foundation or a corporeal foundation without ordering consciousness (lead to) the loss of reality or the obscuring of sectors of reality."²² Clearly, either condition would violate the necessary relations among the "tiers" of being as set forth in the second part of the model.

Another example of a violation of the model can be found in the concept of order advanced by ideological mass movements under the guise of a "philosophy of history". These concepts make history itself the dominant factor in interpreting social order and thereby reverse the man-society-history series as described in the first part of the model. As we have noted, the series

cannot be changed or reverse and each of the three orders is dependent on the others. Therefore, the formulation of any valid concept of social order must begin with a study of concrete human consciousness. No such formulation can begin with a study of society or history treated as isolated entities.

Beyond this function as a tool for demonstrating fallacies in dogmatic interpretations of social order and setting the ground rules for a philosophical science of politics, Voegelin's model has little to offer those who seek a measure of certainty and predictability in politics. Indeed, it asserts that political knowledge can ever only be fragmentary and tentative. On the other hand, it does affirm man's capacity for approaching truth through experience. Perhaps the greatest virtue of Voegelin's model is that it is able to accept and encompass any form of rational interpretation of reality, that is, any form which is grounded in experience and does not claim to be exclusive or exhaustive. Furthermore, it is probably the only model which links mythological, religious and scientific interpretations of order into a comprehensive whole rather than setting each in opposition to the others.

Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether Voegelin's political science, with all of its inherent ambiguities and limitations, is ever likely to produce significant results. Perhaps that question cannot be answered from our perspective of the present era of technology. We seem to lack the ability to evaluate scientifically what cannot be measured quantitatively. If Voegelin's theories are leading us anywhere it may be toward some post-technological age which will at last integrate and harmonize all avenues of mankind's search for ultimate truth, whether through the physical and social sciences, the fine arts, history or literature. In the meantime, Voegelin has at least given us a new appreciation of the rational capabilities of the common individual and a new perspective from which to criticize, and work more effectively against, the evils of totalitarianism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Eric Voegelin, "What is Political Reality?," in Anamnesis, ed. and trans. Gerhart Niemeyer (London: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1978, p.163.
2. Ibid., p.164.
3. Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Behavioralism," in The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science, ed. George J. Graham Jr. and George W. Carey (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), p.297
4. Ibid., p.298.
5. Voegelin, Anamnesis, p.156.
6. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: The University of Press, 1952), p.1.
7. Ibid., pp.4-5
8. Ibid., p.11.
9. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, pp.168-170.
10. Ibid., p.178.
11. Ibid., p.188.
12. Voegelin, Anamnesis, p.194.
13. Ibid., p.200
14. Ibid., p.180
15. Ibid., pp.210-211.
16. Gerhart Neimeyer, "Reason and Faith: the Fallacious Antithesis," Modern Age, Vol.25, no.1, (Winter, 1981), p.13.
17. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p.2.
18. Ibid., pp.27-28.
19. Voegelin, Anamnesis, p.147.
20. Ibid., pp.191-192.

21. Ibid., pp.208-209.
22. Ibid., pp.200-201.

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DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE
MIDDLE EAST.

FRANK BUELL

INTRODUCTION

The sources of American involvement in the Middle East are complex and differentiated, stemming both from foreign and domestic influences. As a superpower at odds with the Soviet Union, U.S. policy has often reflected this dichotomy. However, there are a number of important domestic factors which influence U.S. policy towards the Middle East. Public opinion, economic forces, interest groups, and the mass media have played important roles in the decision-making process.

This paper will explore how these factors, singly and together, effect American foreign policy. It will try to demonstrate that there is a dynamic interaction of forces in the domestic environment which results in American policy decisions. This approach will attempt to remove any myths of pro-Arab or pro-Israel domination of this process. Claims of "Zionist control" or "Arab interference" have been thrown about relentlessly during crucial moments of past decisions made on the subject, yet they do not take into account the full interaction of certain domestic forces and are thus too simplistic.

The approach of this paper will be to analyze these various factors in the domestic environment. Public opinion will be studied and its impact on both the government and the media will be explored. The political ramifications of the powerful economic corporations based in the U.S., both international

and national, require analysis, for their interests have an immense bearing on foreign policy decisions. This interaction between the economic sector and the U.S. government will be examined in the second chapter.

The third chapter will discuss the roles of the respective interest groups vying for supportive Middle East policy. The pro-Israel and pro-Arab groups are extremely active in the political process. But both groups have strikingly dissimilar approaches to gaining this support. This interest group activity can be viewed as another battlefield of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where the casualties are more subtle, but no less devastating.

Finally, the mass media will be examined, and its role in the political process will be assessed. Much criticism of the media has been made by the pro-Arab and pro-Israel interest groups over its coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The role it has in interpreting and of informing the public about the conflict, gives the media perhaps the single most important role in the decision-making process.

THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Public opinion in the U.S. sets the parameters within which government decision-makers operate. Their policy decisions must fall within these parameters or they will risk alienating the public which they represent. This risk is not as dangerous as it seems for in the event of passing some controversial policy, the government is in a position to persuade the public of the policy's merits. This is generally the case for non-controversial issues also, where the government has a free-hand, in policy formation. In more controversial issues, like the Arab-Israel dispute, public opinion has to be considered as an important input to the decision making process. The presence of a relatively high support for the pro-Israel side and a low support for the pro-Arab side, narrows down the options available to the policy makers.

Generalizations on public opinion, like the one made above, need to be clarified because the public does not behave as one unified mass. It is a

pulsating arena of many different opinions, some which are more noticeable than others, but all of which must be measured and considered. The pro-Israel/anti-Arab feeling in the public is generally accepted as a fact. But the extent of this opinion, as some studies have shown, tends to fluctuate at different levels of the public spectrum. The division of the public into categories of mass public, attentive public, and opinion leaders helps in clarifying the diversity of opinion as a whole.¹

Mass Public: To the mass public the Arab-Israeli conflict is seen from extreme and quite stereotypic perspectives. The issues are black and white in texture and they translate into strong support for Israel and negative support for the Arabs. Stereotypes are very active with the mass public: Israel and the Jews are understood as Western, part of American tradition and culture, and seen as good; the Arabs are understood as the bad group, they are foreign in culture, and untrustworthy as a whole. Events in the Middle East, such as the June 1967 war, the October 1973 war, and the 1973 oil embargo, have reinforced some of these stereotypes. The Arab terrorist and the oil-rich Sheik are very active images in the American public. Encouragement of these stereotypes by the pro-Israel groups and the mass media has also assisted in fixating them on the public psyche.² The pro-Arab groups, like the Action Committee on Arab American Relations, have not helped in reducing this image with their radical behaviour and rhetorical pronouncements, i.e., "American Imperialism" and "Zionist expansionism".

The pro-Israel/anti-Arab sentiment is not constant and will peak with the impact of events - the oil boycott and the price rise and shortages it caused in the U.S., resulted in a tremendous anti-Arab feeling. Overall, a lack of interest and expertise in the situation makes the mass public generally acceptive of the government's policy in the Middle East. Yet, because of the traditions and stereotypes which exist in the mass public, policy which is counter to these images would be confusing, and would have to be clearly explained by the government.

Attentive Public: The attentive public is more refined in its approach to the conflict. The negative support of the Arabs is still present, but the problem is stratified into specific issues, it is seen in shades of grey rather than black and white. Polls have indicated strong support for Israel, but they have also been critical of Israel on certain issues, like military raids into Lebanon, and supportive of the Arabs on other issues, like the Palestinian demand for the right of self-determination at a future date.³

It is difficult to determine whether a shift in support for the Arab position is taking place. Studies up to 1974 and 1977, by Robert Trice indicate that support for Israel has dropped, but rather than an increase in Arab support, the attentive public has shifted its opinion in favor of neither side, and taken a more neutral position.* (see Tables 1 and 2). It would be premature to predicate a significant rise in Arab support. But studies such as the one by Janice Belkaoui on the prestige press, and the increase of more favorable articles towards the Arabs, and more critical articles towards Israel on issues like Jerusalem and Palestine in the mass media indicate a more balanced position taken by the attentive public.**

Opinion Leaders: Opinion leaders tend to define and interpret the conflict from an "America first" point of view. They are supportive of Israel generally, but at times very critical of Israeli policy on certain issues, i.e., Palestinian rights, Jerusalem, and raids into Lebanon. The Arab side is generally negative but it is not as discriminating as that of the mass public. The opinion leaders are for the most part willing to listen to the Arab point of view as long as it is well-informed, authoritative, and non-rhetorical. Statements denouncing American "imperialism" are frowned upon.

* Trice, "Foreign Policy, Interest Groups, Mass Public Opinion, and the Arab-Israeli Dispute," Western Political Quarterly, v. 31: 238-52, (1978).

** Janice Belkaoui, "Images of Arabs and Israelis in the Prestige Press," Journalism Quarterly, v.55: 732-38, 799, (1978).

TABLE 1
American Public Opinion on Alternative U.S. Policies Toward the Arab-
Israeli Conflict (Based on Informed Group)

Question:	What Should U.S. do about Situation?	What Should U.S. do in Event of War?	What Should U.S. do about Situation?	What Should U.S. do about Situation?	What do you Think the U.S. Should do in This Situation?
Date:	<u>June 1967</u>	<u>July 1968</u>	<u>February 1969</u>	<u>February 1970</u>	<u>April 1975</u>
Solution:					
1. Stay out of Conflict	41%	61%	52%	58%	41%
2. Support Israel (Non-Military aid)	16	10	13	13	5
3. Negotiate for Peace/ Act as Mediator	14	8	11	10	24
4. Work Through U.N./ Reconvene Geneva Convention	11	3	2	2	1
5. Support Israel (send Troops)	5	*	1	1	*
6. Support Arab States	*	*	1	1	*
7. No Opinion, Other	13	20	20	15	31
Totals	100%	102%**	100%	100%	102%**

* Less than 1/2%

** Adds to more than 100% because of multiple responses.

Source: Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 60.

TABLE 2

American Public Opinion Toward the Parties to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Question: In This Trouble, are Your Sympathies More With
Israel or More With the Arab States?*

Date:	June 1967	Feb. 1969	Feb. 1970	July 1970	Aug. 1970 (Harris)	Oct. 1970 (Harris)	Oct. 1973	Dec. 1973	Jan. 1975	May 1975	Sept. 1979 (Gallop/ Newsweek)
<u>Preference:</u>											
Israel	56%	50%	44%	60%	47%	47%	48%	54%	44%	37%	26%
Arab States	4	5	3	8	6	6	6	8	8	8	15
Neither	25	28	32	8	25	26	21	24	22	24	22
NO Opinion	15	17	21	24	22	21	25	14	26	31	37
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* All data are from the Gallop Opinion Index except for August 1970, October 1970, and September 1979. The 1970 data is from a Harris poll with the same question. The 1979 data is from a Gallop/Newsweek poll with the same question.

Source: Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East, (Beverly Hill: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 62.
Newsweek, September 3, 1979, p. 28.

The "American" point of view is reflected in the essay by George Ball, "The Coming Crisis in Israel-American Relations."⁴ The following quotation is typical of the pro-American stance:

A reformulation of our relations with Israel does not mean in any sense an abandonment of our commitments or of our close cooperation. But no relations between nations can be mutually healthy and satisfactory unless they are based on a mutual fulfillment of national interests. Over the years we have become so sympathetic to Israel's aspirations, so admiring of its achievements, and so aware of its sensitivities, that we have smudged and lost sight of our own interests - and, paradoxically have in the process done Israel a disservice. (5)

Public Opinion and its Impact on Policy-Making: It can be concluded that public opinion affects the behavior of the decision-makers by providing clear indications of public support or the lack of it for specific policy proposals. Surveys consistently indicate a pro-Israel as well as a pro-American stance in the conflict. It is argued, regardless of the attempts by the pro-Arab and pro-Israel groups to rally public opinion to their preferences, that the public's attitudes once they are fixed are slow to changing. And, of the changes in opinion that have occurred, the only significant one is the cautious "hands off" or neutral point of view. (See Table 2).

This cautious or traditional characteristic does have some bearing on the success or failure of the respective groups trying to sway public opinion. It can be assumed because of the wide support for Israel in general, that there is an automatic or "knee-jerk" support for Israel in most instances, while the pro-Arab groups are faced with more resistance for their cause in the public domain. Moreover, policy that is in-line with the traditional view will be more readily accepted by the public than a "new" policy. Given this analysis it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in American policy for one side or an other, but rather one with the American point of view.

are a certainty.* The tough policy will justify the defense spending.

What has actually taken place is an economic realignment between the political parties. The Democrats with Carter were greatly influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Trilateralist approach. The "evenhanded" policy of Carter, or his attempts at being evenhanded, can be seen as a result of this Trilateralist influence. Reagan's approach is influenced by the national economic sector, which in his bid for the Presidency, along with a conservative platform, he acquired this sector's support. Outwardly, the foreign policy may seem to have priority, but inwardly it is the economic benefits to the military-industrial sector which determine the foreign policy.

The situation in the Middle East today is such that both economic groups, the Trilateralist and the national, have interests which coincide. American interests in the Middle East - continued support for Israel, Egypt, and the Gulf States; the protection of these states from hostile forces, be they internal or external, and particularly from the USSR; the protection of Western oil interests; and the establishment of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict - bring the two economic sectors closer together.

This tougher foreign policy of the Reagan Administration will undoubtedly make it difficult for the domestic interest groups in the U.S. On some issues, such as U.S. -OPEC relations, and peace policy, the interest groups in the U.S. may find their interests thwarted in favor of a pro-American policy. Overall, as the next section will examine, such a policy may bring relative gains to the pro-Arab interest groups in the U.S., since a pro-American stance is an improvement over a one-sided pro-Israel stance.

* The Reagan Administration's policy to end the threat of Communism in El Salvador, and the 4.3. billion dollar increase over Carter's defense budget, gives evidence to this thesis.

THE ROLE OF THE PRO-ARAB AND PRO-ISRAEL INTEREST GROUPS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE DECISION-MAKERS IN THE U.S.

There is agreement among both the layman and the expert that the pro-Israel interest groups are more influential in the decision making process.¹⁰ This has led more radical pro-Arab groups to state that the whole American government system is unsympathetic to their cause, and that the bureaucracy, Congress, and the White House are captives of the pro-Israel lobbies. The pro-Israel groups on the other hand claim that the White House is dominated by a group of Arabists. The extent of the influence each group does possess is difficult to measure, but in general the pro-Israel groups are perceived as holding more clout.

This influence is not a constant force and will tend to vary according to the issues involved. For example, the pro-Israel groups will have greater influence in an issue like "Arms Sale Policy" than they would with "American Peace-Making Policy." Arms sale policy is formulated by the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Presidency, and finally must be approved by Congress. This gives the lobbies a broad target with which to make contact as there are more government actors involved in the outcome of this specific policy. The broader the amount of access is to the decision-makers, the greater is the receptivity to the interest group's position. In the area of "Arms Sale Policy" the pro-Israel groups have been more effective in influencing decisions. During the 1966-1980 period significant cash sales, credit sales and grants of military aid were given to Israel and the Arab governments. Some of the largest arms transfers during this period were the sale of F-4 (Phantom) fighter-bombers to Israel for the resupply of arms after the 1973 war, the three-way Israel-Egypt-Saudi Arabia \$4.8 billion sale of planes in 1978, and the \$3.4 billion aid to Egypt and Israel in 1980. Arms sales to the Arab governments have taken place, but it is nothing as compared to the aid given to Israel.

Peace-Making policy is formulated by the President, the State Department, and the National Security Council. These decision-makers are more restricted than the Congress and the DOD, thus limiting the interest groups to only marginal access. Over the period mentioned above, neither interest groups was supportive of the U.S. Peace initiatives: President Johnson's "Five

¹⁰Trice, p. 56, 75, n. 9.

Great Principles Speech," of June 1967; the "Rogers Plan" of December 1970; the American cease-fire initiative of July 1970; the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli troop disengagement agreements of 1974; the Sinai Agreement of 1975; and the Camp David Accords of 1978. U.S. peace policy has been overwhelmingly characterized by American interests in achieving peace in the area. This has led the more radical pro-Israel groups, on occasion, to claim that the State Department and the NSC are Arabist, Anti-semitic, and bought-off with oil money.

These different target areas may have a tendency to polarize. If a certain section of the decision-making system is viewed as being friendly, then the lobbying groups may apply their efforts more vigorously in that section than in those sections perceived as hostile. Little effort, it is postulated, would be expended where it was thought it would be unsuccessful. This rule seems to be true in the case of the pro-Arab groups. The pro-Israel groups maintained their efforts in all target areas regardless of their relative success or failure.

Certainly in terms of lobbying activity, the pro-Israel groups have been the most aggressive. In a study by Robert Trice, it is shown that 70% of the lobbying in Congress on the Arab-Israeli dispute was done by the pro-Israel groups; 72% of the contacts made with the Presidency were pro-Israel, as was 60.1% of the contacts in the U.S. government.¹¹ The pro-Arab groups accounted for no more than 13% in either of the three target areas.

The behavior of the Congress seems to indicate some positive results to this aggressive pro-Israel activity. In a study analyzing the U.S. Senate's behavior towards Israel during the period of 1970-1973, the Senate overwhelmingly supported Israel in 84% of the roll calls.¹² There was no distinction between party affiliation on support for Israel. 84.3% of the Democrats and 83.6% of the Republicans were supportive of Israel during this period.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 48. Since 1972, however, the National Association of Arab-Americans has become a major lobbying group.

12. Robert Trice, "Congress and the Arab Israeli Conflict: Support for Israel in the U.S. Senate. 1970-1973," Political Science Quarterly, v. 92, Fall 1977, p. 447.

These statistics should not be strictly adhered to as there have been significant changes in the Arab-Israeli dispute since 1973 (the October War, the oil embargo, and Camp David.) Strong support is still evident in the Congress. For example, in 1976, President Ford ordered a "reassessment of America's foreign policy toward the Middle East. Arms shipments to Israel were slowed down or deferred because of Israel's intransigence to withdraw from the occupied territories. The Congressional reaction was immediate with 76 senators endorsing a letter condemning the President's action. The letter asked the President to "be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs" and "to make clear, as we do, that the U.S., acting in its own national interests, stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations."¹³

Individual Congressmen have been critical of Israel and her policies. Senator Adlai Stevenson, on June 17, 1980, proposed an amendment to the U.S. Senate International Security and Development Cooperation Bill. Stevenson proposed that \$150 million intended for Israel be withheld "until the President finds that Israel has ceased the expansion of its settlements in the West Bank and other occupied areas, and has ceased planning for additional settlements in the West Bank and such territories."¹⁴ Senator Stevenson's amendment was rejected in a vote by the Senate.

The sheer weight of activity by the pro-Israel groups whether successful or not, has instilled the attitude by the pro-Arab groups that the decision-making system in the U.S. is dominated by the pro-Israel groups and completely hostile to the Arab cause. This feeling from the outset removes any hope of any successful policy changes. The discouragement the pro-Arab groups feel is in itself one of the factors which limits their success in achieving pro-Arab policies in the U.S.

Yet the high success, or apparent success, of the pro-Israel groups in influencing the government system cannot be attributed entirely to their

¹³G. Ball, p. 240.

14. The text of Senator Stevenson's speech found in The Journal of Palestine Studies, v. X, n. 1, Autumn 1980, pp. 179-83.

lobbying activities. There are deep social and cultural traditions in American Society which give the pro-Israel groups a headstart in pleading their case. It is necessary to explore these traditions in order to understand the full scope of the pro-Israel group in the American political system.

Jews in American Society: The history of the Jews in America is one of struggle, diligence, and hard work. As immigrants from Eastern Europe, where anti-semitism bore its full weight of oppression, the Jews had and still have a very strong sense of freedom and liberty. Their involvement in American politics begins very early with the formation of labour unions in the 1930's and the civil rights movements in the 40's and 50's. It was through the unions and their outspokenness that the Jews secured for themselves freedom from injustice and prejudice. The Jews had close association with other minority groups fighting for their civil rights. The Black community and their struggle for justice was actively supported by the Jews.¹⁵

But from the lower class in the first half of the twentieth century, the Jews became predominantly part of the middle class in the second half-leaving the blue collar and taking increasingly white collar jobs. Today they make-up one of the most affluent minority groups in North America. They provide nearly 20% of the U.S.'s lawyers, and nearly 80% of all Jewish youths attend college and become professionals. But as they rose from the lower class and into the middle class establishment, so too did their political views change. No longer were they as supportive of the civil rights movements, which has alienated them somewhat with those groups still striving for social equality.

Nationally, the Jews are one of the most urbanized ethnic groups. They have the highest rate of membership in voluntary organizations of any religious group in the U.S. And politically, they are the most active group in American politics. While constituting only 3% of the total population, they cast more than 4% of the vote nationally. In New York State, for example, Jews represent about 14% of the population and cast between 16 and 20% of the total vote. In terms of party activity, Jewish participation has been measured as nearly 20% in both major political parties.

¹⁵ Stephen D. Issacs, Jews and American Politics, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975), p. 9.

The Jews have participated actively in every facet of American life. Through ingenuity and hardwork they have established for themselves influential positions in various institutions across the U.S. The clothing industry, publishing, broadcasting, law, and other businesses and professions are prominently occupied by Jews.

Overall, the Jews have played a major role in the process of solving problems, both domestic and foreign. They have helped define problems and recommended solutions. In fact, their contribution as a group is far superior to that of any other minority. In a society where political and social activism is very limited and where millions of people simply limit their contribution to the act of voting or not participate at all, American Jews have set an extraordinary example in furthering the vitality of the American system.

Thus it is much too simplistic to state that the success of the Jews in influencing American foreign policy is due to a conspiracy, and the coordinated pressure by influential Jews. It should be repeated that a significant majority of Americans, not only Jews, are in agreement with the favorable policy towards Israel. Had this consensus not existed, and U.S. policy gone against Israel, the power or influence of this constituency would have diminished measurably.

The Impact of Anti-semitism: Underlying this participation in American politics rests the very active forces of anti-semitism and Zionism. The two forces are very much interconnected with the politics in the U.S., being consciously and unconsciously exploited by many actors to further their political aims, whether it is a politician seeking votes, or a Zionist striving to aid Israel. Fear of anti-semitism is undoubtedly the greatest single factor for Jewish involvement in the political system. For the Jews, as Stephen Issacs points out, anti-semitism "has proved to be one of the most intractable melanomas in the history of the world. Some Jews are more apprehensive of it than others, and, when they perceive the slightest trace of it here or there, they fear its metastasis across America."¹⁶

The reasoning as to the extent of anti-semitism in America is not essential to this paper. However, what is important is that politicians and Zionists, in seeking their particular goals, will make appeals to the Jews and the American

¹⁶Ibid., p. 14.

public on the threat and fear of growing anti-semitism. For the Jew, such an appeal plays with very real fears and apprehensions. These insecurities are translated into a very strong sentiment that Israel is the ultimate refuge, and is synonymous with survival. This feeling is active among the American public as well, and results in strong support for the State of Israel. There is an undercurrent of guilt, a strong sense of blame, for the way a Christian European nation treated the Jews during the 1930's and 40's.

Yet some writers feel that these highly emotional sentiments are being exploited for political aims, and are thus being artificially encouraged.¹⁷ The Zionists encourage the fear of anti-semitism in order to attract more Jews to the State of Isreal, while aspiring politicians will avow to stamp it out and give staunch support to Israel in order not to appear anti-semitic, a label which is politically damaging.

The pro-Arab groups seeking to plead their cause to the American government and people, have an extremely difficult task of removing the label of anti-semitism.¹⁸ Their insistence that they are not against the Jews but rather Zionism tends to fall on deaf ears, as the two, Judaism and Zionism, are perceived as synonymous. Furthermore, other groups and institutions, like the business and media industries in particular, must weigh the ramifications of alienating the Jewish segment of society. Strong anti-semitic, or what is construed to be anti-semitic, could result in quite considerable criticism from the Jews and public.

The Structural Aspects of the Pro-Israel Groups: From the analysis already given, it is evident that those organizations which are involved in pro-Israel activities are highly structured and efficient. The pro-Israel groups have extremely large memberships, are professionally staffed, and are well financed. For example the Women's Zionist Organization of America (Hadassah) has 325,000 members with 400 chapters; the Zionist Organization of American has 45,000

¹⁷ The works of Elmer Berger, Alfred Lilienthal, and Moshe Menuhin are examples on this point. These anti-Zionist Jews are very emphatic about the exploitation of anti-semitism for Zionist purposes.

¹⁸ The irony is that Arabs, who are racially classified as semites are now being labelled as anti-semites, i.e., Jew-haters.

members and 500 locals; the American Jewish Congress has 40,000 members; and the National Council of Jewish Women has 100,000 members. These organizations are large multitiered and structured from the local to the national level.¹⁹

Large bureaucratic machines connect politically active Jews throughout the country. Centralized leadership, in groups such as the ZOA and AJC, have extensive communication flows which link the international and national elites with the regional, state, and local leaders. This allows for a rapid mobilization and coordination of responses to issues as they arise.

LIST I
PRO-ISRAEL ORGANIZATIONS²⁰

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
Zionist Organization of America
Jewish Defense League
B'nai B'rith
Rabbi Board (of New York)
American Israel Public Affairs
Committee
Synagogue Council of America
United Jewish Appeal
Rabbinical Council of America
American Jewish League for Israel
B'nai Zion
Women's Zionist Organization of America
(Hadassah)
Religious Zionist of America
Labour Zionist Movement
Progressive Zionist League
(Hashomer Hatsair)
United Labor Zionist Party

¹⁹ Nancy J. Nelson, "The Zionist Organizational Structure," The Journal of Palestine Studies, (Beirut), v. X, n. 1, pp. 80-93. And Robert Trice, "Interest Groups..." op. cit., pp. 52-72. The information for this section is taken primarily from these two sources.

²⁰ Ibid.

Representation of all the various religious, labour, and social groups which are pro-Israel is done through large umbrella organizations; the National Jewish Community Relations Council; the National Council for Labour Israel; the American Zionist Council; and so on. Most of these national umbrella groups belong to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and are affiliated with the American Israel public affairs Committee which are the only two domestic pro-Israel groups that are tax-paying registered lobbies.

These large umbrella organizations are capable of specializing in different areas by forming subcommittees with highly trained professionals. One example of these specialized activities is that of the Committee on Information and Public Relations for the American Zionist Council. In an introductory paragraph of a CIPR memorandum the purpose of the Committee is described as "to help interpret Israel to the general American Public."²¹ In order to do this, a number of specific activities were outlined:

1. Magazines

Cultivation of editors.

Stimulation and placement of suitable articles in the major consumer magazines.

Reprinting and distribution of favorable materials which appear in the above publications...

2. TV, Radio, Films

The Department arranges for talks and interviews on radio and TV, and servicing of film requests. It also cultivates leading personalities in these media. It encourages networks and stations to create programs revolving around Israel....

5. The Daily Press

Cultivation of Editors.

Stimulation of positive material via syndicated writers, columnists, etc. Counteraction of hostile material

Reprinting and distribution of favorable materials.

6. Books

Assistance to publishers in the promotion of worthwhile books.

Promotion of reviews of favorable books.

Distribution of books to public and college libraries...²²

²¹ Nelson, p. 82. A similar memorandum can be found in A. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, op. cit., pp. 210-11.

²² Ibid., pp. 82-84.

This example is one of many activities which the pro-Israel groups perform. They do not confine themselves to political lobbying, but to the involvement of the whole domestic environment. The support of the public is just as important as the government because, ultimately, the government must answer to the public. Not only do the pro-Israel groups encourage positive exposure in the media, they openly approach other ethnic and religious groups, such as the Black and Christian communities. Seminars in Universities are sponsored and visits to Israel are subsidized... The scope and breadth of these organizations gives them a very strong voice on issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The Pro-Arab Groups: The pro-Arab groups are dwarfed in comparison to the pro-Israel groups. But this is due to the fact that the pro-Arab groups' effort has not been as concerted and motivated as the pro-Israel groups. Their approach has been characterized by the feeling that because their cause is just, it is not up to them to demonstrate anything to the U.S.--- it is up to the U.S. to understand them. As it has been already shown, the pro-Israel groups have not been reluctant to take their position to the public and to decision-makers. Their efforts have gone largely unchallenged by the pro-Arab groups.

As the pro-Israel groups are highly organized and efficient, the pro-Arab groups tend to be small with low memberships, bad financing, and poor leadership. They generally tend to be one man shows, with different ideological stances, that have deterred any unification of these groups under one banner. Also, there seems to be a resistance to forming any large organization because they don't want to use the same techniques as their opponents.

Basically there are two types of pro-Arab groups: the anti-Zionist and the pro-Arab. However there are other groups such as the Black and Christian-Church organizations which swing in their support for the Arab cause from issue to issue.

LIST 2
PRO-ARAB ORGANIZATIONS²³

Pro-Arab:

Action Committee on American Arab
Relations
Americans for Justice in the Middle
East
Arab American University Graduates
Association
National Association of Arab Americans

Anti-Zionist:

American Council for Judaism
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism

Black and Christian-Church:

National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People
National Black Political Convention
National Council of Churches
Southern Christian Leadership Con-
ference (Black)

Publically, the pro-Arab groups have not gathered much support because of a tendency of being too radical - their extremist outbursts have not done much to convince the public of their cause. More to the point, they have not implemented any real policy of their own other than criticising the pro-Israel groups, Israel, and the American government. There seems to be no consensus on the political and tactical approach to handling issues.

The slight shift of public opinion during the later half of the 1970's on some of the issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict has helped the pro-Arab groups gain some legitimacy. Increased participation on the diplomatic front by the Arab States, and the formation of the National Association of Arab-Americans, an umbrella organization, has helped to elevate their position in terms of lobbying the U.S. government and in gaining a more moderate image in the American public.

One significant change that has taken place during the 1970's has been the rise of the Black organizations in the foreign policy process. The once close civil rights alliance between the Black and the Jews has widened noticeably over a variety of issues - ranging from Israel's ties with South Africa to affirmative action quotas in jobs and schools. The resignation of Andrew Young as the U.S. representative at the United Nations in 1979, had the result of solidifying the major Black organizations, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, into a much stronger and unified voice. Because of the circumstances surrounding Young's resignation, the Black groups have increasingly demonstrated their desire to become more involved in foreign policy, particularly on the question of Palestine. The impact of this new "pro-Arab" group is likely to be felt throughout the U.S. But the Black and Jewish communities hesitate to meet head-on, a domestic confrontation of such racial characteristics would be detrimental to both groups.

Overall, the diverse make-up of the pro-Arab groups limits them in their range of activities. The lack of centralized leadership and no specific policy position tends to leave the pro-Arab groups impotent to respond forcefully when the need arises. The comparison of the two groups leaves little doubt that the pro-Israel groups are in a much better position for influencing foreign policy. The traditionally active role of the Jews in American politics, their experience and organizational skills, prove to be decisive factors in the power position of the pro-Israel groups.

The use of political "dirty tricks" needs to be discussed briefly. The pro-Arab and anti-Zionist groups have stridently claimed that they have been victimized, slandered, and harassed by the pro-Israel organizations. The writings of Elmer Berger, Alfred Lilienthal, and Moshe Menuhin describe this in depth. Although the fairness of such practices is to be questioned, the use of "dirty tricks" has long been one of the more colourful traditions in American politics. Certainly, if the pro-Israel groups have pursued such practices, they run the risk of alienating the public, a body who's support is extremely important.

DIAGRAM 1
Structural Interrelationship of Zionist Organization
in America *
1956-1966, 1971

The Government of Israel

Domestic Environment of the United States





Diagram 1a
Fund Raising Activities in U.S.



* This structural interrelationship is an approximation.

** Little information was available on Mossad activities, but inclusion in this diagram seemed appropriate.

Sources: Nancy Jo Nelson, "The Zionist Organizational Structure," The Journal of Palestine Studies, (Beirut), v. X, n. 1, Autumn 1980, pp. 80-93.
Newsweek, September 3, 1979, p. 23.

International connections of both groups, particularly financial, are difficult to establish, but they are generally assumed to exist. Either way, both the pro-Arab and the pro-Israel groups accuse each other of being financed by foreign sources, funds from Israel and Arab petrol-dollars. The remarkable support the Jews have shown for Israel and their generosity is without precedent. Yet, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations disclosed in 1963 during its hearing on Non-Government Representatives that monies collected by the United Jewish Appeal were being channelled to the American Zionist Council and again along to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.²⁴ such channelling of UJA funds was illegal because they were tax-free on the pre-mise they were intended for Israel. Structural changes in the pro-Israel organizations since 1963 make it impossible to know if such wrong doing still occurs.

Any Arab filtering. of funds into the U.S. is equally difficult to uncover. The four small offices of the Arab Information Centres in the U.S. are openly financed with foreign capital. However the AIC's impact and contribution to the information war is marginal at best. Yet the assumption that Arab money is being illegally channelled is commonly believed. So common, in fact, the FBI set-up ABSCAM to investigate corruption in the Congress.

It is important to recognize that interest group activity is a major battlefield of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the pro-Arab groups are dwarfed in terms of organizational ability and domestic financing, they have been able to capitalize on this limitation by coming across publically as the underdog, unable to challenge the Zionist Machine. Yet the pro-Arab groups have become more influential in recent years due to maintaining this status domestically in the U.S., and by concentrating their efforts on international developments. By way of strategy, if it is, the pro-Arab groups have been very successful in isolating particular issues of the conflict. With the increase of international criticism, public awareness in the U.S., and media coverage of controversial issues, the pro-Arab groups have benefited where the pro-Israel groups have not benefited and found themselves in the position of defending Israel, for her perceived rash actions. The pro-Arab groups have focused their energies in a much more subtle fashion. This approach is discussed in the next section on the mass media and the pro-Arab ability

of capitalizing on issue oriented coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE MASS MEDIA AND ITS COVERAGE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

The efforts of the pro-Israel interest groups in gaining and maintaining the support of the mass media have been equally as aggressive as their activities with the U.S. government. The importance of the mass media in molding public opinion is quite substantial, and the pro-Israel groups have not neglected it. In comparison, they out organized and out spent the pro-Arab groups in this area, providing tours for influential reporters and distributing press kits that were favorable towards Israel.

For example, in 1970 alone, the Mass Media Committee of the Presidents Conference prepared and distributed press relations kits containing feature stories on Israel, captioned photographs in mat form, and a supplementary service of additional features with photographs to 1,700 daily newspapers around the country. In addition, 1,000 newspapers with circulations under 5,000 were sent mat features (photos plus text) on Israel. These local-targeted activities supplemented the more routine efforts to have feature articles prepared by the Conference staff members accepted by the national and international news services. The scorecard for 1970 included: 17 captioned photographs on life in Israel accepted by the Associated Press; 14 different photos selected United Press International for distribution to clients; two feature stories and photographs included in Parade Magazine (a Sunday supplement with total circulation of more than 14 million); and assorted Israeli anniversary materials accepted by Family Week, Central Press and the North American Newspaper Alliance (Conference of Presidents, 1971: 37-38). (25)

A number of studies have been conducted on the media's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they have indicated strong support for Israel. A study by R. Trice, indicated a very imbalanced support for Israel in editorials in the prestige press.²⁶ Janice Belkaoui also made a study of the prestige press by doing a content analysis of the Arab and Israeli images.²⁷ Their study showed that the Arab image conveyed in the press was generally negative and classified

the Arab as a "villian," while the image of the Israeli was positive and thought of as "good."

This imbalance in coverage by the mass media has led the pro-Arab groups to state that the media is discriminatory and assists in the perpetuation of negative stereotypes within the public. These negative images are reflected in stories and features in magazines, newspapers, and on television, as well as in photographs and cartoon features.²⁸ This bias has led the ardent pro-Arab groups to feel that the mass media is controlled by the pro-Israel groups.

Although the active canvassing of the media by the pro-Israel groups may give the appearance that the above statement is true, there are a number of factors which have made this imbalance so prevalent in the media. Firstly, the close sociological and cultural ties of the Jews in the U.S., and the strong public support for the Jews and Israel because of these ties, are reflected in the media's coverage. In a word, the media "mirrors" the public consensus.

Secondly, the media is not infallible. It is, in fact, subject to several structural and operational limitations. The need to increase and maintain audience and sponsors are an economic and business motive which limits the content of information in the media. The television and newspaper industries do not want to alienate significant segments of their audience such as the Black, Irish, or Jewish communities. Another factor which circumscribes the mass media is the process of structuring information. The editing, dubbing, and reconstruction of raw information into "news" has a tendency to fictionalize the event, i.e., the facts reinforce fiction. The question a viewer should ask is what am I not being told? and what did they throw into the editing room waste-paper basket?

There are physical and economic constraints to the media's access to news in the Middle East. The problem of insufficient manpower in the area, and limited access to the Arab States was a major problem before 1973. The distrust of these states towards the Western media resulted in the harassment of reporters and censorship, which automatically makes the reporter biased in his coverage as he would have to depend on Israeli sources.²⁹ Furthermore, the expense of satellite news transmissions is prohibitive, an event has to be extremely newsworthy, like a war, if this system is used. More conventional modes

of transporting the news are used for the regular "timeless" features like "life in Israel" or "the plight of the Palestinians".

This factor leaves the North American public uninformed over the smaller events in the area. In these circumstances, the pro-Arab and pro-Israel groups try to fill in this information vacuum by providing tours and press kits such as the one previously mentioned. It is also important to recognize the American media's dependency on the syndicated news services such as the United Press International, Associated Press and Reuters. An actual example of this dependency, and how tenuous it is can be found in the Montreal Gazette during the period of November 19, 1980 and November 26, 1980. It pertains to the coverage of some Palestinian student demonstrations in which Israeli soldiers fired upon and wounded some demonstrators. On Wednesday, November 19, 1980 the Gazette ran on the front page of the "World" section (p.17) the following headline: "10 SHOT IN WEST BANK PROTESTS". The story accompanying the headline was by the Gazette News Service and it seemed to cover the event objectively:

...The violence---the worst in five months---was touched off by an earlier shooting and the closure of an Arab university. ...The troops opened fire in response to stone throwing by demonstrators... The Army accused the students of stockpiling stones to ambush the troops...The students were also protesting over the closure of the all-Arab Bir Zeit University north of Ramallah as punishment for staging an unauthorized Palestine Week. (Emphasis added) (30).

It is important to notice that this story states that the Israeli authorities closed the University down. However, on Tuesday, November 25, 1980 the Gazette carried a United Press release headlined: "TROOPS BREAK-UP STUDENT PROTEST". After describing the event, the UPI release states near the end of the story that the Bir Zeit University had been opened "after a weeklong shutdown for a Palestinian cultural festival."³¹ This story as compared to the first one, gives a different emphasis as to the cause to the incident. It encourages the idea that the students became agitated during the "Palestinian cultural festival" and then began to protest. The UPI release is reticent about the fact that the demonstrations began only after the Israeli authorities stopped the Palestine Week by closing the University. This example demonstrates

the problems the American media has in getting reliable information from the syndicated news services. The credibility of information from the Middle East has at times left little distinction between the "news" and "propaganda."

Thirdly, the "media" is not a solid entity, independent of the domestic environment. The people who work in these organizations are themselves part of the public, and are influenced by the same traditional responses and opinion of the society they live in. There is a natural tendency to be more favorable to those things which are familiar. In this case, Israel is more readily identified as Western and therefore "good" than are the Arabs who are viewed as foreign and "bad". The encouragement of these stereotypes by the media can be seen more as a condition or trait of news presentation than of purposeful misrepresentation.

To explain more fully, television or film are characterized by inherent stereotyping. The rationale to this statement is that television is a visual medium (as well as acoustic) and works through the presentation of a series of images or "symbols" --- a policeman, an Arab, an Israeli. These images, as they are used more often, acquire a certain amount of authority, i.e., they become symbolic.

A quotation by Edward Epstein in his book, *News from Nowhere*, describes the phenomenon in the following manner:³²

If over long periods of time the same type of symbols are consistently used to depict the behavior and aspirations of groups, certain stable images or what Walter Lippmann called a "repertory of stereotypes," can be expected in television news. Moreover, to the extent that cameramen, film editors, correspondents, and producers take their cues for selecting symbols for future stories from past stories, the stereotypes tend to be self perpetuating.(32)

The easiest gimmick for drawing out these stereotypes is through conflict or potential conflict. The media has a reputation for bringing only bad news, this is because of its overwhelming coverage of conflict situations. Situations are sought out by the media in which there is a high potential for violence, but low potential for audience confusion. News events showing a violent confrontation between two easily recognizable sides in the conflict--- for

example, Arabs vs. Israelis, military vs. civilian---are preferable to one in which the issues are less easily defined. Where the conflict is not clear cut, the news can be reconstructed to appear more split.

In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the aims of the pro-Israel groups --- positive exposure within the media---have largely been successful because of these inherent limitations and weaknesses of the media. The pro-Israel aims and the media coverage have coincided and resulted in the reinforcement of existing stereotypes in the public consciousness. There is no doubt that the pro-Israel groups have been able to take advantage of this inherent media bias. Their "cultivation" and stimulation" activities have exploited the weaknesses within the media. The pro-Arab groups, on the other hand, view the media with distrust because of the pro-Israel bias, and have not duplicated the activities of the pro-Israel groups. This is probably due to organizational and financial limitations of the pro-Arab groups, as well as a lack of motivation because of this perceived discrimination.

However, as was mentioned in the first section, there has been a growing pro-America point of view in the public, along with an increased understanding of specific issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This division of the conflict into issues makes it difficult for the media to cover. No longer is the conflict seen in black and white, where the "good guys" and the underdog are easily recognized over the "bad guys." Issues have made the conflict grey with complexity, and have added much confusion. Some issues have cast Israel as the villain, no longer as the underdog facing overwhelming odds, but as the aggressor. Jerusalem, the Palestinians, and raids into Lebanon are substantial issues where the media has been critical of Israel.

The breakdown of the conflict into issues, and the increase of media events on these issues, whether staged or spontaneous, like a riot on the West Bank, a raid into Lebanon, or a UN resolution condemning Israel, have been beneficial to the pro-Arab groups. It is on these specific issues where the pro-Arab groups have concentrated their energies. Perhaps the issue which has gained the most support in the American public since 1973 has been that of the Palestinians. The media has increasingly explored the Palestinian

issue in magazines like Time and Newsweek, and on television news programs such as 60 Minutes.

The pro-Arab groups have been aggressive in exploiting the Palestinian problem as a media issue. Since 1973, the PLO has ceased to make acts of international terrorism --- the negative response from the media and the public proved beneficial to the pro-Israel groups --- and concentrated on guerrilla attacks into Israel. After this change took place, the stereotypic image of the Palestinian terrorist was soon overshadowed and replaced by the image of the rich oil sheik. This shift in Arab strategy has effectively reversed the negative image of the Palestinian from that of a terrorist to that of a dispossessed refugee. Today the excessive counter measures of the Israelis in combating the PLO are criticized by the media and public.

Thus, while the pro-Israel groups have been successful in "cultivating" the American media domestically, the pro-Arab groups have been successful in creating "media events" which appear to be spontaneous but are staged, and in exploiting other events which are spontaneous, in terms of issues. The pro-Arab success on the international front has allowed them to ignore the organizational and financial necessities of canvassing the media. The media, in effect, does the work for them. The relatively open access of the media to the Arab States since 1973 has done much to enhance their position as the ones who are right in this dispute, and since they are "right" they have nothing to hide. Justice is on their side.

CONCLUSION

It can be evenly stated that the dynamic interaction of forces in the domestic environment had had a major impact on American policy towards the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict has involved each of the factors discussed in this paper, some have played more substantial roles, and some have been forced to participate because of international and political circumstances. The strategic move of the oil producing Arab states, for example, of cutting off the U.S.'s oil supply in 1973 and the introduction of the "Oil Weapon" has

forced the economic sector in the U.S. to reassess their priorities and aims, and in turn influence the U.S. government to formulate new "pro-American" policy. A policy which has been interpreted as pro-Arab because of the past imbalance of previous American decisions.

The changing opinion of the public over certain issues has influenced, albeit until now, modest policy changes towards Israel. The Carter Administration's flirting with the Palestinian issue (Andrew Young and the UN settlements resolution) has affected public opinion, either towards Carter or the Middle East. Although it is difficult to measure the current attitude of the public over the Middle East Conflict, the increase of more balanced coverage by the media on certain issues indicates a shift in emphasis and approach by the media. This new point of view can tentatively be translated into a more balanced policy by the U.S. government.

Interest group activity in the U.S. remains perhaps the most dynamic of inputs to the decision-making process. The immense organizational machinery that the pro-Israel groups have at their disposal for pressuring almost every sector of American society, gives this interest group a distinct advantage in influencing Middle East policy. The pro-Arab groups are the reverse, because of an extremely limited organizational machinery, their behavior has been that of an opposition party, ceaselessly criticizing American policy, Israel, and the pro-Israel groups. The pro-Arab groups have been remarkably successful in isolating issues, with the help of manipulation of the media. And the tide of public opinion, although still supportive of Israel on basic points like her right to exist, has become more critical of her on these media exposed and isolated issues.

In terms of direct influence on the decision-makers, the pro-Israel groups still have greater access and, therefore, a better opportunity to stimulating favorable policy. The pro-Arab groups, although they have grown in terms of organization, are functioning from a grass roots level, with less access to the decision-makers. Their strategy is to influence the decision-makers through the public. As long as there is conflict in the area, and the media continues to give exposure to the more contentious issues, which it will do out of its nature, the pro-Arab groups stand to benefit with the

increase of public displeasure towards Israel.

The possible direction which American policy may move is difficult to forecast even with the above analysis. However, certain trends can be perceived and these trends, should they continue, may have an impact on American Middle East policy. One such trend is the "America first" attitude which has solidified with the election of Ronald Reagan. This election can be interpreted to mean a tough anti-Soviet foreign policy, from which all other policies will swing. Thus temporarily, the interest groups' influence on the decision-makers, may not be as substantial as the Pentagon and economic establishment. The battle of winning the support of the public will likely intensify because of the lack of response in the government.

The media will continue to have an important role in covering and interpreting events in the Middle East. Issues are likely to characterize the media's coverage, which in light of the discussion above, is likely to benefit the Arabs more than Israel. There is a grave possibility of a rising anti-Israel feeling in America, because of the media coverage, which may rightly or wrongly, be interpreted as anti-semitism. If a campaign on anti-semitism is brought-out in the American public, the pro-Arab groups stand to lose substantially, considering their lack of resources on the domestic front to counter such an attack.

How likely such a campaign is to effect American policy with the Reagan Administration is hard to assess. But if public opinion does ultimately influence American policy, Reagan may be forced to take a position. On the other hand, since Reagan had said that he does not intend to run for office again, he may not respond to this pressure if it is counter to America's future goals and prosperity.

FOOTNOTES

1. Generally the "mass public" represents about 30% of the total population, the "attentive public" 45%, and "opinion leaders" 25%. See Barry Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978), pp. 202-205.
2. Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1978), p. 274.
3. Robert Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) pp.59-62.
4. George Ball, "The Coming Crisis in Israel-American Relations", Foreign Affairs, v.58, n.2. (Winter 1979).
5. Ibid., p.254.
6. Jeff Frieden, "The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970's", Monthly Review, v.29, n.7 (December 1977).
7. The Reform of International Institutions, a Report of the Trilateral Task Force on International Institutions to the Trilateral Commission, (New York, 1976), p.2. Cited from Mughrabi, op.cit., p.169.
8. Toward Peace in the Middel East, (Brookings Institutions: Washington, 1975). Cited from Mughrabi, op.cit., p.169.
9. Adam Yarmolinski, The Military Establishment, (New York; Harper and Row, 1971), p.254.
10. Trice, p.56, 75, n.9.
11. Ibid., p.48. Since 1972, however, the National Association of Arab-Americans has become a major lobbying group.
12. Robert Trice, "Congress and the Arab Israeli Conflict: Support for Israel in the U.S. Senate, 1970-1973", Political Science Quarterly, v.92, Fall 1977, p.447.
13. G. Ball, p.240.
14. The text of Senator Stevenson's speech found in The Journal of Palestine Studies, v.X, n.1, Autumn 1980, pp.179-83.
15. Stephen D. Issacs, Jews and American Politics, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975), p.9.

16. Ibid., p.14.
17. The works of Elmer Berger, Alfred Lilienthal, and Moshe Menuhin for examples on this point. These anti-Zionist Jews are very emphatic about the exploitation of anti-semitism for Zionist purposes.
18. The irony is that Arabs, who are racially classified as semites are now being labelled as anti-semites, i.e., Jew-haters.
19. Nancy J. Nelson, "The Zionist Organizational Structure", The Journal of Palestine Studies, (Beirut), v. X, n.1, pp.80-93. And Robert Trice, "Interest Groups...", op.cit., pp.52-72. The information for this section is taken primarily from these two sources.
20. Ibid.
21. Nelson, p.82. A similar memorandum can be found in A. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, op.cit., pp.210-11.
22. Ibid., pp.82-84.
23. Robert Trice, "Interest Groups...", op.cit., p.38.
24. US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principles in the United States, 88th Congress, 1st session, cited in Nelson, op.cit.
25. R. Trice, "Interest Groups...", op.cit., p.65.
26. R. Trice, "American Elite Press and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Middle East Journal, v.33, pp.304-25. (Summer 1979)
27. J. Belkaoui, op.cit.
28. A. Lilienthal, op.cit., pp.271-313. And Jack Shaheen, "ABSCAM: Arabianphobia in America," American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1980).
29. Abdel-Kader Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause, (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1974), pp.275-84.
30. The Montreal Gazette, November 19, 1980, p.17.
31. Ibid., November 25, 1980, p.36.
32. Edward Epstein, News from Nowhere, (New York: Vintage Press, 1973).

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AN ANALYSIS OF JOHN LOCKE'S THEORY OF PROPERTY
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: DOES IT PROVIDE A POSSIBLE
BASIS FOR A POSSESSIVE MARKET SOCIETY?

DAVID BIGIO

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to discuss John Locke's theory of property as articulated in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, and the nature of the social, economic, and political order that emerges from it. The research of Peter Laslett has led that scholar to advance a thesis concerning the dating of Locke's work. It is now generally accepted that the work was written between the years 1679 and 1683 in the midst of the crisis over the possible succession of James, the Catholic brother of Charles II. More specifically, the treatises were intended as a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer, who was a proponent of the divine right of kings. In attempting to understand Locke's social context as best as I could, I consulted various historical sources. However, it should be noted that the works of Christopher Hill form the basis of the picture of the economic and social history that I describe in the next section of this paper. The discussion of historical context is necessary in order to understand the social environment in which Locke found himself, and to discuss how his theory of property was a reflection of the society he saw around him, or how it was a projection of one he envisaged.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The sixteenth century was a time of complex social and economic relations during which seeds of conflict were sown. Members of the old aristocracy, stripped of their military power, still dominated the country politically. The rising group of capitalist conscious entrepreneurs were finding economic success, but were also running into conflict with a government seeking to control economic activity at their expense. London, undergoing rapid growth, was seen as the

center of materialistic market values. The formation of the all-important joint-stock companies, another advance in capitalist organization, date from the reign of Edward VI. The joint-stock company is an image often used to describe the form of government envisaged by Locke.

Whatever their differences, all elements of the landowning classes shared a disdain for the landless poor. The gradual emergence of Puritanism and its strict work ethic would do much to foster the image of the poor as criminals. The lower orders of English society remained without political rights, and could only hope to escape the brutal treatment of the poorhouses through acts of private generosity. Vagabondage was a continual problem, and it is estimated that there were 30,000 idle persons and "masterless men" in London by 1602.¹

In the sixteenth century, perhaps for the first time in all civilized history, an absolute majority of the population ceased to find their lives circumscribed by an immemorial round of traditional agricultural tasks. Instead, they faced the troubling ups and downs of an unpredictable market economy in which some few grew rich, some prospered, while many became paupers; and all, rich and poor, suffered inescapable uncertainty as to the future.²

The mounting of tension between the Crown and the House of Commons (now representing the prospering gentry) reached a peak which led to the Civil War, the beheading of the King and the Protectorate under the direction of Oliver Cromwell. The economic developments in the country were dissolving old bonds of service and obligation and creating new relationships founded on the operations of the market, and the domestic and foreign policies of the Stuarts were failing to respond to these changing circumstances.³ What is germane to this study is the effect of the rule of Parliament on the changing circumstances of English society.

In the political sphere, the abolition of the King's prerogative courts was instrumental in establishing Parliament and the Common Law as the fundamental institutions of legislative and judicial power respectively. The unity of the men who controlled the Commons eventually broke down, but it is significant that none championed the political rights of all men. The disappearance of the Levellers, a party that supported the rights of small proprietors, after the revolution, demonstrates that the lasting ideology of Parliament was that of the large property owners who feared a possible revolt of the "many headed monster." By the time of the Restoration, Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, was considered the representative body of the interests of the property owning

class. Capitalist production had been bred from the restrictive policies of the Crown. All lands formally held from the King by feudal tenure were converted into freehold, giving landlords absolute rights over their estates. Unconditional ownership and transmission of landed property was one essential for planned longterm capital investment in agricultural improvements. The other was that copyholders-mostly smaller tenants with no security of tenure- should not win absolute rights in their holdings, particularly not an absolute right of inheritance but could be evicted by landlords who wished to enclose or consolidate.³ Enclosure, once a controversial measure, was now opposed only by the Levellers.

With the abolition of industrial monopolies, and the establishment of free trade within national boundaries the isolated units of English society broke down. The improvement in communications contributed to this development of the national market with London as its center. High levels of taxation could now be tolerated because those who legislated them were assumed to be doing so in their own interest. These economic changes were complemented by ideas circulating in England at the time. Puritanism, with its emphasis on thrift, sobriety, and hard work in whatever station one might find himself, was conducive to capital accumulation.⁵ This period also saw the victory of Baconian science, and its application to politics by theorists such as Harrington.

To continue the survey of English social and economic development after the Restoration would be redundant. The propertied classes dominated Parliament within a framework of greater social stability. The interests of the rising economic class were now the interests of the government. The capitalist farmer was no longer in the minority, and those with sufficient capital to improve their agricultural techniques did so at the expense of small yeoman farmers. Large numbers of households still preserved a precarious existence by agriculture or domestic handicrafts, but workers in domestic industry were steadily coming under the control of the merchants who employed them.⁶ In general the economy continued to develop in the direction stabilized during the Interregnum.

LOCKE'S THEORY OF PROPERTY

i. Immediate Circumstances

Locke's political allegiance was to his friend and patron the Earl of Shaftsbury, who had formed a political party known as the Whigs. Shaftsbury and his followers feared that since Charles II had no legitimate heir to the throne

his Catholic brother James would become King. The Whigs were attempting to capitalize on the "Popish Plot", a rumour that the Pope was planning to take over England, by passing a bill through Parliament excluding James from the succession. The bill was passed by the House of Commons, but rejected by the House of Lords. Before the bill could be redrafted Charles II dissolved Parliament. Although Locke was a proponent of religious toleration the Catholics were excluded from his benevolence. Ever since Mary Tudor had burned the Protestant martyrs suspicion about Catholics, and especially the political motivations of the Popes and the Catholic continental monarchs was an active concern of Protestant politicians, and the laity as well. One of Locke's major concerns was to protect Parliament from being dissolved at the whim of the monarch, as Charles II had done during this crisis.

What made the task more difficult for the Whigs was the popularity of the work of Sir Robert Filmer. Filmer's assertion of the divine right of Kings and their prerogative power was the backbone of the Tory defence of the monarchy against the Whig exclusionists, and supported the former's doctrine of passive obedience to hereditary succession. Therefore, Locke had to somehow justify a "revolution" of sorts to counter the Tory principles.

In his works, Filmer had ridiculed the notion of representative government by demonstrating that the House of Commons was elected by less than one-tenth of the people of England.⁷ Locke also had to contend with natural law theorists such as Grotius and Pufendorf who had used that framework to present rationalist theories of absolutism.⁸ Locke's mission was to establish a societal framework for constitutional change through a representative body within the natural law tradition. In the process of destroying the argument of divine right and arbitrary power of kings a social order based on the consent of the individual for the protection of his property was to be substituted.

ii. The state of nature and natural law.

Locke's state of nature and civil society are not the equivalent of the pre and post fall of man societies of the Old Testament.⁹ The law of nature itself is not implanted in our minds; it becomes evident to those who choose to consult it. We are all the possessions of God, who has ordered the universe according to his will. Since we owe our lives directly to God one of the basic laws of nature is the preservation of ourselves. When our preservation is not threatened

we then have a duty to help preserve others, and therefore have an obligation to respect the life, liberty, and possessions of our neighbours.

The condition of man in the state of nature is clearly one of natural equality, and each person is naturally independent of all the others. However, in order to preserve this equality we are obliged to conduct ourselves according to the law of nature. Those who transgress the law are subject to appropriate punishment from all men because all men are natural law judges. This seems to contradict the notion that not all men necessarily understand the law of nature. Though all men are potentially rational only some possess a knowledge of the law of nature, which is reason. There is clearly a potential here for an abuse of juridical power. Men cannot be assumed to be impartial judges in their own cases. The state of nature can dissolve into a continual state of war if individuals insist on transgressing the law of nature. The state of nature is not a satisfactory state of relations for the preservation of liberty and property. Locke is careful to point out that no man may assume arbitrary power in the state of nature for it would make him a judge in his own case. Locke can then claim later on that arbitrary power is unjustified in civil society because no man can transfer more power than he originally had in the state of nature.¹⁰

iii. Civil society and the theory of property right.

Man enters into civil society to secure the rights that are naturally his. The concern of this study is to focus on the preservation of a particular right, the ambiguous notion of property, and the consequences of the establishment of civil government on the property relations that exist in the state of nature.

Locke introduces the word property into the natural law vocabulary by declaring that "every Man has a Property in his own Person."¹¹ Since in order to fulfill the law of nature one must preserve himself any actions that are directed towards that end do not require the consent of others. It is the mixing of one's labour with the fruits of the earth that establishes private property.¹² At this point in the state of nature there exist limitations to the amount of property that can be privatized because of man's duty to respect the right of all others to self-preservation. Natural law dictates to man that he has a right to use only as much as he can before spoilage, to leave enough for others, and to restrict himself to the goods on which he has laboured. As long as man remains within these restrictions he is fulfilling God's requirement that he labour in order to preserve himself, and does not violate the natural rights of

other men. These limitations are extended to include the question of appropriation of land.

The convention that alters the economic relations of the state of nature is the invention of money. Men consent to assess a value to money which can be accumulated because it is a non-perishable commodity. Money enables men to enlarge their possessions and accumulate wealth without violating the limitations described above.¹³

iv. Implications and possible interpretations

Locke claims that God gave the world "to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title to it) not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious."¹⁴ Clearly there is a certain work ethic that Locke approves of and considers rational and in accordance with the law of nature. When constrained by the premonetary economy man is obliged to keep "within the bounds, set by reason of what might serve for his use."¹⁵ Appropriation of land by improvement is legitimate as long as enough is left for others. Man is morally obliged to appropriate and to labour. This condition "necessarily introduces private Possessions."¹⁶ The restrictions of the law of nature ensure that no man's possessions exceed "moderate proportions."¹⁷

The introduction of money changes property relations significantly. "The tacit agreement of Men to put value on it (money) introduces (by Consent) larger Possessions and a Right to them."¹⁸ Locke assumes that the agreement to put a value on money implies that men consented to unequal possessions. He goes on to hint that men did not always desire larger possessions, but does not venture an explanation of this change in attitudes. Money is the cause of a new set of socio-economic relations, but we are unsure as to why men should want to change those relations in the first place. Locke does not speculate that certain men may have desired to accumulate wealth, while others who consented to the use of money may have done so out of necessity or convenience. The point is that Locke provides insufficient explanation for the monetarization of economic relations, thereby demonstrating that he assumed those relations to be natural.

Although Locke seems to refer perjoratively to the state of society that follows the introduction of money, his subsequent elaborations on property relations cast some doubt on what he considers as the preferable system. He claims that enclosure "increases the common stock of mankind," and improves the

ratio of produce per unit of land one hundred-fold.¹⁹ The produce of this improved land certainly cannot all be consumed by the labourer himself before spoilage occurs. Therefore, the introduction of money allows for the sale of surplus produce not consumed or bartered away. Locke approves of farming techniques that, by virtue of their efficiency, make necessary the creation of a nonperishable unit of value.

Rational activity is equated with accumulation of property and increased productivity. The application of capitalist techniques to land was what had helped elements of the gentry increase their wealth. As described in the preceeding sections, the increase of personal wealth was shown to be in the interests of the nation as a whole. This attitude was pervasive in English society in Locke's day, hence his assertion that kings of nations rich in unimproved land were fed, lodged, and clad "worse than a day labourer in England."²⁰ Therefore, how could he possibly consider a premonetary society to be superior to a post-monetary one if the standard of living is lower in the former?

The first two limitations on the acquisition of wealth are transcended by the monetarisation of the economy. Macpherson shows that the "supposed labour limitation" is easily discarded because Locke's original statement that "the Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say are properly his,"²¹ implies that each man is free to alienate his labour.²² As proof of an individual's right to appropriate the labour of another, Macpherson cites this passage: "Thus, the Grass my Hourse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut;... become my Property, without the assignation or consent of anybody."²³

The consequences of the alienation of labour in civil society is that the alienator does not possess full political rights, or as Macpherson puts it he is in but not of civil society.²⁴ Macpherson supports this assertion with evidence from Locke's other writings that demonstrate his attitude towards wage-labourers. Laslett describes Locke as being born and reared "into the classical atmosphere of early capitalism, and into what might well be called a Puritan rising family."²⁵ Locke was also a "determined enemy of beggars and the idle poor."²⁶ However, to claim that Locke was a supporter of the political rights of small proprietors, as Laslett, Hundert, and Ryan all do, is to paint him as a radical thinker. The Levellers, who were the champions of the rights of a small proprietors during the revolution, disappear from view after the Restoration. As a loyal devotee of Shaftsbury and the Whigs it would be unlikely that Locke would write a

treatise to support their constitutional position that would go so far in according political rights.

The Restoration included a restoration of order and stability, as well as the King. The landowning classes feared a revolt of the real majority of the people. Legislative power was intended for those rational and industrious capitalists who, by virtue of their economic status, are assumed to be fully rational. It is important to consider that this rationality is not defined simply by the amount of wealth that one has accumulated. Locke does not separate in his mind the accumulation of wealth from the increase in the common stock of mankind that it inevitably brings. Those who increase the wealth of the nation are fully rational because their activities satisfy both laws of nature, which are understood through the exercise of reason. The poor labourers are dangerous not only because their emergence may threaten the wealth of the landowners, but also because they do not possess the intellectual resources to administer the business of the nation correctly.

Macpherson's view of Locke's intentions are summarized in this paragraph: "In short, Locke has done what he set out to do. Starting from the traditional assumption that the earth and its fruits had originally been given to mankind for their common use, he has turned the tables on all who derived from this assumption theories which were restrictive of capitalist appropriation. He has erased the moral disability with which unlimited capitalist appropriation had been handicapped... He also justified as natural, a class differential in rights and in rationality, and by doing so provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society."²⁷

Locke's theory should not be seen as an ideological ploy or a conflict of old and new values (as Macpherson does), but simply as a product of complex interaction between changing economic relations, and the religious and intellectual consciousness of his age. Given the political crisis in which Locke found himself it appears that Macpherson's assertion is invalid. Locke does not provide a moral justification for capitalism; he articulates an assumption shared by the members of his social class. Capitalism was a generally established mode of production in his day. He is concerned with developing a theory of property and wealth accumulation within a natural rights framework for a different purpose than the one described above. By introducing into the state of nature a developed commercial economy alongside a description of individual rights which does not allow arbitrary rule by one man, he provides a basis for a civil society which will protect the interests of the property owners against potential despotism. The theory of property

is not the end of the treatise; it is a crucial element in determining the relationship between legislative and executive branches of government. By postulating a state of nature where no man has arbitrary power, and where legislative power is derived from the consent of the property owners, he is directly challenging the notion of a predetermined hierarchy of men, therefore dismissing the possibility that the King may claim his throne by divine right.

v. Locke's theory and the possessive market model

Macpherson's postulates for a possessive market model of society are to be found on pages 53 and 54 of his book. The best criticism of Macpherson's statement that Locke's theory conforms "with the needs and possibilities of a possessive market society,"²⁸ comes from E.J. Hundert. Granting the proposition that Locke's theory involves the alienation of one's labour, Hundert claims that this does not imply the existence of a wage-relationship. Hundert admits that the traditional master/servant relationship was eroding, but says that it still consisted of a wage and responsibility relationship.²⁹ Laslett supports Hundert's statement in his review of Macpherson's book.³⁰ Locke's own description of the master/servant relationship lends itself to either interpretation. "Master and Servant are Names and old as History, but given to those of far different condition; for a Freeman makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive: And though this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the ordinary Discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the Contract between 'em."³¹ The implication of the stress placed on the conditions of the contract, and not the social obligation tends to favour Macpherson's reading of Locke. The remnants of feudal relations may have been present in the 1670's, but it appears that Locke's vision was one of emerging contractual obligations.

Hundert's claim that Locke could not have been describing a possessive market society because a completely free labour market was not discussed until the third-quarter of the eighteenth century poses greater analytical problems.³² The Act of Settlement of 1662 did indeed restrict the movement of labourers, but it is significant that after the revolution of 1688, which the publication of the Second Treatise intended to justify, this act came under sharp criticism for impeding the development of industry.³³ Therefore, though Locke did not live in a completely possessive market society, the set of socio-economic

relations he describes does provide a basis for it.

This is not to say that Locke was an advocate of absolute laissez-faire economics. Macpherson clearly states that the possessive market model is compatible with mercantilist policy.³⁴ This does not negate the fact that the market society mentality was deeply embedded in English society at that time. Locke's theory was not fully utilitarian, however, which is reflected by the fact that he held on to the natural law tradition.³⁵ What makes Locke's theory seem incredible at times is the fact that men would consent to change from a state of equality to a state of inequality, and that civil society exists to consolidate this inequality. Locke considers this social order to be to the benefit of all. The end of civil society is the preservation of the individual's property. In the case of the poor wage-labourer, society helps him preserve the property of his physical person so that he may be exploited by the members of the property owning class who seek to enlarge and protect their private possessions. To see Locke's projected society in a more democratic light would be to attribute to him characteristics inconsistent with his writings and political activities.

The major issue of concern was the relationship between the legislative and executive powers of a society. In the process of articulating a theory of society he read back into a state of nature market relations characteristic of his country's economy. The economic evidence furnished in the first section of this paper indicates that Locke wrote at a time when the possessive market society was coming to fruition. Regardless of the conditions of the English economy that do not correspond exactly to the model, Locke's theory of property lends itself to a description as a possessive market society.

FOOTNOTES

1. Christopher Hill, Reformation to Revolution (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), p. 31.
2. W.H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago: University Press, 1963) quoted in Christopher Hill, Reformation to Revolution (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), p. 87.
3. Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 72.
4. Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1961), p. 148.
5. Idem., ed. The English Revolution, 1640: Three Essays in Interpretation (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1940), pp. 44-55.
6. Idem., Century of Revolution, p. 208.
7. Ibid., p. 176.
8. James Tully, "The Framework of Natural Rights in Locke's Analysis of Property: A Contextual Reconstruction," in Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present, eds. Anthony Parel and Thomas Flanagan (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1979), p. 119.
9. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University Press, 1953), pp. 215-216.
10. Rather than footnote the page numbers from the specific edition of the Second Treatise that I used, I will instead indicate the appropriate section number for the respective citations. For paragraphs of the essay that group together information culled from several sections of the treatise I will employ one footnote for the entire paragraph, and list the relevant sections in sequential order in the footnote.
11. John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, secs. 4, 6-8, 12-13.
12. Ibid., sec. 27.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., secs. 31-32, 35-36.
15. Ibid., sec. 34.
16. Ibid., sec. 31.
17. Ibid., sec. 35.
18. Ibid., sec. 36.
19. Ibid.,
20. Ibid., sec. 37

21. Ibid., sec. 41.
22. Ibid., sec. 27.
23. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962; Oxford Paperbacks, 1964), p.214.
24. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 28.
25. Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 227.
26. Peter Laslett, Introduction to Two Treatises of Government, by John Locke (Cambridge: University Press, 1963; Mentor Books, 1965). p. 55.
27. Ibid., p. 56.
28. Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 221.
29. Ibid., p. 270.
30. E.J. Hundert, "Market Society and Meaning in Locke's Political Philosophy," Journal of the History of Philosophy XV (1977): 41.
31. Peter Laslett, "Market Society in Political Theory," Historical Journal VI-VIII (1963-64: 153.
32. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 85.
33. Hundert, "Market Society and Meaning," p. 40.
34. Hill, Century of Revolution, p. 268.
35. Macpherson, Possessive Individualism, p. 58.
36. Ibid., p. 270.

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LA MINORITE ANGLOPHONE ET SES DROITS:

ETUDE DES LOIS 63, 22 ET 101.

JEAN-PIERRE BRAULT

INTRODUCTION

Explosif serait le mot juste pour qualifier le problème linguistique au Québec. Cette question, à laquelle peu de gens attachaient vraiment une attention fébrile, est devenue depuis 20 ans un des aspects majeure de la vie collective du Québec. En effet, depuis 1960, le mot "langue" en est venu graduellement à remplacer le mot "religion" dans les discussions portant sur la préservation de l'entité francophone du Québec.

Aujourd'hui, la langue se range aux côtés des préoccupations majeures des Québécois, en plus de l'inflation, la situation politique et constitutionnelle ainsi que le chômage. La conscientisation de la population du Québec, particulièrement celle de souche française, qui s'est opérée durant les années 60, se traduit aujourd'hui par cet intérêt vif que les Québécois en général manifestent pour la question linguistique.

Explosive encore dans son actualité, la question linguistique promet encore quelques sursauts, surtout si on l'inscrit dans la perspective d'une victoire libérale le 13 avril. La question linguistique en est une de taille si l'on se fie à l'attitude mi-figure mi-raisin qu'entend adopter Claude Ryan, à tout le moins durant la campagne électorale. De toutes les lois qu'a fait voter la députation péquiste, la loi 101 est certes la plus prisée. La loi 101 représente l'accomplissement de cette vaste entreprise de conscientisation et c'est pourquoi elle est populaire. Elle procure une relative paix sociale mais elle apaise surtout les craintes de la petite minorité française d'Amérique du Nord.

Au-delà de son application quotidienne, la loi 101 a été, bien malgré elle, l'objet d'une publicité tapageuse de la part de ses opposants. La minorité anglophone du Québec se sent encarcené par la charte de la langue française et demande qu'on lui redonne pleine jouissance de ses droits, chèrement acquis au cours des années précédentes. La minorité anglophone, ou du moins ses porte-paroles, ont toujours considérés la loi 101 comme étant intolérante, restrictive, voire raciste. Cette loi, selon eux, ne se fonde pas sur le principe de la bonne volonté et de l'encouragement à la coopération par une série de mesures incitatives. Les accusations portées contre la loi 101 en ce qui concerne les droits de la minorité anglophone du Québec sont des plus sérieuses; c'est pourquoi elles ne peuvent être écartées du revers de la main sans avoir été auparavant examinées.

L'objet de cette étude est avant toute chose personnelle. Elle se veut une évaluation et une synthèse des arguments apportés au débat linguistique depuis la loi 63. Ce faisant, nous pourrons non seulement suivre le cheminement de la volonté linguistique de la majorité francophone mais aussi comprendre la position de la minorité anglophone face à ce débat. Cette étude est personnelle dans la mesure où elle se veut une réponse à une question troublante: Est-ce que la loi 101 dépouille la minorité anglophone des instruments nécessaires à sa survie collective? Si l'analyse se veut être la solution à une problème de conscience de l'auteur, ce dernier ne peut qu'espérer que le lecteur se satisfera de l'objectivité démontrée dans le façon de solutionner la question. Toute objectivité étant bien sûr relative aux limites intellectuelles de l'auteur ainsi qu'aux circonstances qui ont engendrées le processus analytique, il convient de remettre certaines interprétations et certaines affirmations dans la perspective même de leur relativité.

UNE MINORITE ET SES DROITS

Il conviendrait, en tout premier lieu, de s'entendre sur une définition appropriée concernant le concept de minorité. De plus, nous devons préciser quels sont les droits essentiels que la minorité se doit d'exercer afin de préserver ses caractéristiques propres. La définition d'une minorité que nous fournit l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ouvrage annuel sur les droits humains, édition 1950, suffira largement à combler les besoins de cette analyse. Tel que proposé par l'O.N.U., une minorité

se définit comme suit: "Only those non-dependent groups in a population which possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from those of the rest of the population".¹

La pertinence de cette façon de définir les caractères essentiels d'une minorité pourrait être sérieusement mise en doute. Par exemple, que veut-on dire par "non-dépendant"? Est-ce qu'une dépendance économique quelconque est suffisante pour soustraire à un groupe social distinct son statut de minorité? Le cas des Amérindiens du Canada est spécialement important dans ce contexte car ceux-ci sont extrêmement dépendant par rapport au gouvernement fédéral. Cependant, il n'est pas question de discuter la validité de la définition de l'O.N.U. car elle suffit largement aux besoins de notre étude.

La minorité anglophone du Québec constitue, selon les cadres de la définition des Nations-unies, une minorité dans le plein sens du mot. Toutefois, il est mal aisé d'appliquer la définition à un groupe minoritaire dont nous ne connaissons pas exactement le nombre ainsi que les caractéristiques propres. Dans son livre La loi 22, le Parti Québécois aurait-il fait mieux? Bernard Smith nous propose trois expressions différentes pour désigner la communauté anglophone du Québec. Tout d'abord, il y a la minorité anglaise qui représente environ 6% de la population totale du Québec. Cette section de la population québécoise constitue selon Smith le groupe des "vrais anglais".² De ce groupe sont exclus les Irlandais, les Ecossais, les Gallois ainsi que tous ceux qui ne sont pas d'origine anglaise. Nous pouvons donc affirmer que la minorité anglaise est celle qui correspond le mieux à la définition de l'O.N.U. car il s'agit sans l'ombre d'un doute d'un groupe non-dépendant affichant des caractéristiques communes qui sont à la fois ethnique, religieuse et linguistique.

Cependant, la communauté anglophone du Québec ne se compose pas uniquement de québécois de souche anglaise. Pour les besoins de notre analyse, je considérerai comme membres de la minorité anglophone tous ceux dont la langue maternelle est l'anglais. Le critère de la langue maternelle me semble à tout le moins extrêmement important car c'est la langue maternelle qui détermine le sentiment d'appartenance d'un individu.

C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'un citoyen canadien dont les parents ou grand-parents sont d'origine italienne, se définit dans bien des cas comme italien d'abord et canadien ensuite. La langue véhicule donc l'identité. C'est donc dire que le critère de la langue d'usage n'est pas valide car il n'exprime pas l'identité de l'individu.

La minorité anglophone du Québec, telle que définie par la langue maternelle, représentait, en 1976, 12.9% de la population totale. La langue maternelle étant une caractéristique commune, la minorité anglophone du Québec se définit donc comme telle selon la définition fournie par l'O.N.U.

De façon à pouvoir s'assurer une relative survivance ainsi qu'une vie communautaire normale, une minorité a droit à un système de protection de ses droits essentiels. Selon Albert Verdoodt, spécialiste belge en ce qui concerne la question des droits de minorités, il existe six points essentiels dans lesquels nous pouvons inclure la totalité des besoins d'une minorité. Le premier de ces six points proclame qu'il doit y avoir complète absence de discrimination pour motif linguistique.³ Ce premier point constitue certes la base des droits minoritaires car il sert le principe d'intégration et d'acceptation de la minorité par la majorité. De plus l'absence de discrimination sert un double objectif car non seulement elle permet la participation de la minorité à la vie de la collectivité mais elle éduque la majorité, en restreignant et en corrigeant les élans xénophobes de cette dernière. En fait, la simple reconnaissance du fait qu'une minorité ait droit à une certaine protection devrait produire un effet pacificateur sur les relations entre la majorité et la minorité.

Le droit d'utiliser sa langue dans la vie quotidienne, devant les tribunaux, en public et dans certaines assemblées constitue le deuxième point, selon Verdoodt.⁴ Cette facette des droits minoritaires permet à un groupe en situation minoritaire de maintenir et préserver sa "personnalité sociale". Aucune restriction devrait donc entraver l'usage de la langue de la minorité entre ses membres et ce, en public ou en privé.

Le droit d'un individu appartenant à une minorité reconnue à être jugée dans sa langue maternelle constitue un droit fondamental qui devrait être garanti sans condition.

Le troisième point, que je considère personnellement comme absolument vital, c'est le droit d'une minorité de créer ou d'obtenir des établissements d'enseignements propres.⁵ Si l'on admet que la langue et la culture sont des valeurs collectives, il n'est point alors besoin d'insister sur le fait qu'une minorité doit avoir accès à certaines facilités de façon à lui permettre de préserver son caractère national. L'éducation extra-familiale assume de plus en plus un rôle déterminant en relation avec la formation socio-intellectuelle de l'enfant. Conséquemment le rôle que les parents sont appelés à jouer dans l'éducation de leur enfant se voit constamment diminué; la situation créée par notre société moderne, pour qui l'efficacité rationnelle a tous les droits, ne fait qu'accélérer cet état de chose. De plus, aujourd'hui, c'est l'éducation public qui tient le haut du pavé. Cela nous force donc de constater que le droit d'une minorité à ses propres institutions d'enseignement devrait être fermement garanti; non seulement par tradition mais également par écrit.

Le quatrième point que M. Verdoodt soumet à notre attention sert des objectifs utilitaires. Ce quatrième point concerne l'égalité de traitement qui doit être préservée entre les groupes linguistiques d'un même pays aux plans économique et politique.⁶ Cet énoncé implique donc que les membres d'une minorité devraient posséder les mêmes droits et opportunités en ces domaines que la majorité. Le droit de vote en est un exemple; le droit d'une minorité à bénéficier des incitatifs économiques gouvernementaux pourrait en constituer un autre. Les subsides gouvernementaux à l'éducation pourraient également être inclus dans ce quatrième point.

Servant des objectifs externes non-politiques, le cinquième item à la liste des droits de la minorité pourvoit au besoin de cette minorité de s'associer avec les membres d'un même groupe linguistique vivant en dehors des frontières du pays dont les membres de la minorité sont citoyens. Cette forme d'association extra-territoriale prend une dimension tout à fait unique dans notre contexte américain. En effet, la communauté anglophone du Québec nourrit, depuis de nombreuses années, des liens très

solides avec le reste du Canada, et ce, sans compter les autres liens d'amitié qui lient le Québec anglophone aux Etats-Unis.

De tous les droits dont la minorité anglophone devrait jouir, ce dernier est certes le moins discutable de la part de la majorité car celle-ci a eu depuis quelques années le privilège de jouir, en toute relativité, de l'entretien de liens plus ou moins sérieux avec la communauté francophone mondiale. De plus, ce droit d'association est relativement facile à défendre pour la minorité anglophone car une attaque virulente contre ce droit de la part de la majorité francophone pourrait amener des pressions de la part des autres associés, le Canada et les Etats-Unis. La minorité anglophone du Québec a donc de puissants alliés dans la défense de ses droits, ou, à tout le moins, dans la défense de son droit d'association.

Le sixième et dernier point que M. Verdoodt considère comme absolument essentiel, c'est tout simplement le droit à l'auto-détermination.⁷ Ce droit est sans aucun doute celui autour duquel le débat se fait le plus violent; cela est compréhensible comme nous aurons l'occasion de le voir plus loin. Néanmoins, il constitue le fondement même de la démocratie appliquée au niveau des collectivités.

Le droit à l'auto-détermination est reconnu par la majorité des experts en droit collectif comme un mécanisme extrêmement valable, agissant de façon régulariser et équilibrer les relations entre la minorité et la majorité. A cette affirmation, nous pourrions ajouter que le statut ou la perception, accordé dans une société au droit à l'auto-détermination, est extrêmement révélateur des relations qui existent entre la majorité et la minorité. Quand le droit à l'auto-détermination est systématiquement refusé à la minorité, on peut généralement en conclure que le traitement offert à cette dernière laisse à désirer.

En fait, lorsqu'une minorité se voit refuser le droit à l'auto-détermination, cela signifie qu'elle n'est pas totalement impliquée dans les décisions politiques concernant l'avenir de son pays. Dans cette ligne de pensée, la majorité se perçoit comme la seule entité en droit de propriété

sur le territoire qu'elle occupe et avec lequel elle s'identifie. En poursuivant de raisonnement, il devient clair que la majorité dénie le droit à la minorité de s'identifier en refusant de lui accorder le droit à l'auto-détermination sur le territoire qu'elle occupe.

La vision majoritaire dans une telle situation fait en sorte que la minorité n'est perçue que comme un groupe à qui l'on a donné le privilège d'exister à l'intérieur des frontières du pays du groupe dominant. La minorité ne doit donc pas abuser de ce privilège qui lui fût gracieusement accordé. Cette façon de voir les choses ne peut qu'engendrer d'amers conflits. Paradoxalement, nous pourrions supposer que le respect du droit à l'auto-détermination entraînerait en toute probabilité sa non-application puisque la reconnaissance de ce droit s'inscrit dans une approche de traitement équitable de la minorité. La reconnaissance du droit à l'auto-détermination implique la notion de co-propriété du territoire sur lequel habite la majorité et la minorité. Il s'en suit que la minorité acquiert un statut respectable, la majorité acceptant pleinement cet état de fait. Dans une telle situation, nous pouvons presque conclure que la majorité devient la gardienne des droits de la minorité.

En ce qui concerne la majorité francophone du Québec, il semble impossible qu'elle puisse accorder le droit à l'auto-détermination à la minorité anglophone résidant sur le territoire québécois. Le Québec n'étant pas un Etat souverain, il est impossible pour lui de légiférer sur ces questions. De toute manière, en se basant sur les précédents historiques dans le monde et au Canada en matière de droits collectifs, il semble peu probable qu'un Québec souverain soit prêt à accorder le droit à l'auto-détermination à la minorité anglophone résidant sur son territoire.

LES DROITS DE LA MINORITE ANGLOPHONE DU QUEBEC

Grand état est fait depuis quelques années des droits des anglophones du Québec; on parle non seulement de ces droits mais aussi de leur maintien ou encore de leur répudiation. Or qu'en est-il? En fait, quelques uns de ces droits existent; dans le cas de la minorité anglophone du Québec, il semble juste aussi de parler de privilège. Un droit, pour les besoins de cet analyse est un privilège

reconnu dans un texte de loi; un privilège, par contre, est un état de fait qui perdure et est soutenu par la tradition. Nous voyons donc ici la subtile différence qui s'établit entre les deux termes.

En nous basant sur la liste de droits minoritaires que M. Verdoodt a établi en six points, il devient facile de tracer un profil révélateur de la situation de la minorité anglophone au Québec. Le droit à l'absence de discrimination pour motif linguistique est reconnu et protégé par l'article 10 de la loi 50, votée en 1975. Cette loi, qui se veut une charte québécoise des droits humains, établit ce droit au niveau de l'individu. Cette protection de niveau individuel semble adéquate même si elle n'était pas, au départ, orientée vers la protection d'une collectivité minoritaire. Bien que le droit d'utiliser sa langue dans la vie quotidienne ne soit ni reconnu ni protégé, celui de l'utiliser devant les tribunaux l'est cependant dans les deux instances. Ce droit est confirmé et protégé par l'article 133 de l'Acte britannique de l'Amérique du Nord. Rappelons également que la protection du droit d'utiliser sa langue dans la vie quotidienne ne souffrirait aucun obstacle puisqu'il existe déjà en tant que privilège majoritairement et traditionnellement accepté.

Le droit de créer ou d'obtenir des établissements d'enseignement propres existe effectivement en tant que droit reconnu mais il n'est cependant pas protégé. L'article 73 de la loi 101 stipule qu'un enfant ayant des parents définis comme anglophones peut recevoir son instruction en anglais. Comme la définition d'un anglophone à l'article 73 est suffisamment large pour englober tous ceux dont la langue maternelle est l'anglais, il semble donc conséquent de prétendre que l'article 73 confirme ce droit minoritaire indispensable. Sa protection n'est pas assurée du fait que l'article 73 peut être abrogée du jour au lendemain.

Les trois derniers points, qui relèvent typiquement du droit collectif, ne sont ni reconnus ni protégés. Le droit à une égalité de traitement entre les groupes linguistiques d'un même pays aux plans économique et politique n'existent que comme privilège. Cependant ce droit collectif est reconnu lorsqu'il recoupe les droits individuels; un bon exemple pourrait être le

droit de vote accordé, sans discrimination linguistique, à chaque citoyen. Les droits d'association outre-frontière et de sécession sont complètement ignorés; pour l'un, c'est une ignorance bien fondée, pour l'autre une ignorance fondée plutôt sur le manque de courage politique. En effet, ceux qui prônent la souveraineté du Québec ne sont habituellement pas les premiers à accorder hypothétiquement ce droit à la minorité anglophone du Québec.

Le fait que les droits collectifs soient si placidement ignorés au Québec, sauf lorsqu'ils rejoignent les droits individuels, soulève un point intéressant concernant la perception des droits collectifs non seulement au Québec, mais aussi à l'ensemble du Canada.

Comme nous le souligne Dominique Clift et Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos dans leur ouvrage intitulé Le fait anglais au Québec, il semble évident que le Canada, pour une raison ou une autre, ait échappé à un processus mental d'évolution en ce qui concerne les notions de droit collectif. Cette situation est d'autant plus étrange si on la compare à celle qui règne aux Etats-Unis. Les Etats-Unis, chasse-gardé par excellence des droits individuels, admettent dans une certaine mesure l'existence de droits collectifs. Le class action, qui est fort bien emplanté aux Etats-Unis, en est un exemple.

"Pour les Anglais, le Canada est un pays à majorité anglaise où les droits ne s'exercent que sur une base individuelle et ne se rattachent qu'à la personne, comme le droit de vote. Même si le Québec est majoritairement français, la communauté anglaise considère que la province fait partie d'un ensemble anglo-canadien et que, par conséquent, ses membres possèdent les mêmes droits individuels que des Anglo-Ontariens ou des Anglo-Albertains."⁸ Cette perception tronquée de l'exercice des droits par un individu explique sans aucune ambiguïté l'attachement que beaucoup d'anglophones du Québec ont pour un principe aussi aberrant que le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement. Ce principe est aberrant car il confirme une vision de l'individu qui est illogique: l'individu n'exerce ses droits qu'en rapport avec lui-même. Or nous savons bien que l'homme n'existe et ne peut se définir que par rapport à d'autres hommes. C'est donc dire que l'homme ne peut définir ses droits individuels qu'en rapport à ceux de ses semblables et que l'exercice l'un droit

individuel, qui constitue l'essence même de la liberté, ne peut se faire aux dépens de la liberté d'autres individus.

C'est donc sans risque d'erreur que l'on peut affirmer que les droits individuels sont, dans une certaine mesure, subordonnés aux droits collectifs puisque l'exercice d'un droit individuel est limité par le bien-être de la collectivité. Comme nous le souligne Hannah Arendt, "From the beginning the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an "abstract" human being who seemed to exist nowhere, for even savages lived in some kind of a social order."⁹

LA LOI 63: LOI POUR PROMOUVOIR LA LANGUE FRANCAISE AU QUEBEC.

La loi 63 fut adoptée le 28 novembre 1969. Ce projet de loi avait utopiquement pour but d'apaiser les craintes linguistiques de la majorité et de la minorité du Québec. Bien qu'il fut certes animé des meilleures intentions, le bill 63 ne pouvait arriver à atteindre ce but ci-haut mentionné car, dans le contexte du Québec d'alors, donner à l'un c'était prendre à l'autre.

Calqué sur le bill 85 qui, en 1968, avait été décrié par nombre de groupes de pression et finalement retiré du menu législatif, le projet de loi 63 était appelé irréversiblement à être perçu avec la même hostilité. Révélateur à cet égard, le Conseil supérieur de l'Éducation avait recommandé le pur et simple retrait du bill 85 car celui-ci, disait-on, ne représentait qu'une approche timide face à un problème qui demandait mûlt réflexion. Conséquemment, le Conseil suggérait que toute la question entourant la langue soit soumise à la commission Gendron, ce qui fut fait.

La commission Gendron avait pour tâche d'évaluer et de proposer une approche systématique aux problèmes des langues et des minorités du Québec. La commission qui ne présenterait son rapport qu'en 1971 servait également d'achappatoire au Premier ministre Jean-Jacques Bertrand, qui n'était que trop heureux de désamorcer momentanément une situation politique des plus délicates. La situation sur le terrain était cependant bien différente et la crise de Saint-Léonard, qui grondait depuis 1968, éclata durant le mois de septembre 1969 quand les groupes francophones et italophones s'entrechoquèrent. Bertrand se vit donc forcé d'agir et le résultat de cette action

précipitée fut le bill 63.

La grande hâte du gouvernement unioniste s'illustre d'elle-même si l'on retrace chronologiquement le déroulement des événements. Le bill 85 fut retiré en mars 1969; à cet époque, le Premier ministre ne montrait visiblement aucun signe d'impatience à réintroduire un nouveau projet de loi. De plus, cette constatation n'a que plus de crédibilité si on considère l'existence de la commission Gendron, dont Bertrand lui-même annonça la création. De plus, comme le prétend Robert J. MacDonald, "by late September and early October, there were unmistakable signs that the Bertrand government was prepared to take action."¹⁰

Nous pouvons donc affirmer, sans courir le risque d'une fausse interprétation, que le projet de loi 63 servait avant tout des objectifs à court terme: pallier les désordres récents causés par la question de la langue. Dans la même veine, il semble également raisonnable d'affirmer que le bill 63 n'était pas, de par sa nature même, susceptible de résoudre les problèmes linguistiques du Québec car il contredisait les aspirations naissantes de la majorité francophone. S'inspirant substantiellement de la philosophie qui avait guidée la création du bill 85, le bill 63 ne pouvait que reprendre à son enseigne les mêmes défauts qui en avait fait l'opprobre de la majorité francophone.

Le projet de loi 63 se composait de quatre articles et s'intitulait "Loi pour promouvoir la langue française au Québec". Le premier article avait pour but de promouvoir une connaissance d'usage de la langue française à tous les étudiants inscrits au secteur anglophone. Le second article établissait la responsabilité du ministre de l'Éducation dans l'application de cette loi; ce dernier devait veiller à ce que chaque étudiant québécois puisse bénéficier des avantages du système public, s'il le désirait. Adjoint à l'article 2 et en faisant même partie intégrante, le second paragraphe indiquait sans équivoque que l'enseignement ne pouvait se donner qu'en français; cependant ce diktat d'apparence était assorti d'une phrase qui consacrait le choix, par les parents, de la langue d'enseignement à leurs enfants. L'article 3 concernait les immigrants

arrivant au Québec. Le ministère de l'Immigration du Québec était, selon cet article, habilité à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour s'assurer que les immigrants s'installant au Québec acquerraient une certaine connaissance de la langue française et ce, à l'arrivée ou même avant que ces derniers n'aient foulé le sol de leur nouvelle patrie. L'article 4 listait les devoirs et pouvoirs de l'Office de la langue française alors que l'article 5 prévoyait les modalités d'entrée en vigueur des différents articles de la loi 63.

En ce qui concerne l'article 3 du bill 63, il semble difficile d'interpréter la véritable volonté du législateur. En effet, la version anglaise est différente de la version française. En anglais, la dernière phrase de l'article stipule que les immigrants peuvent faire instruire leurs enfants en français alors que la version française dit que ces derniers doivent faire instruire leurs enfants en français.¹¹ La même erreur est reprise dans les notes explicatives. Serait-ce là une preuve de la hâte dont le gouvernement Bertrand usa pour pondre le bill 63? Cela, en effet, ne fait qu'ajouter aux soupçons qui pesaient contre la qualité de la réflexion qui avait amené la création du bill 63.

Une analyse plus minutieuse du bill 63 viendra encore soutenir la thèse qui veut que le bill 63 n'ait été proposé que pour remédier à une situation bien particulière qui n'était pas en relation intime avec la solution majeure qui s'imposait au Québec. Le premier détail qui saute aux yeux, c'est le fait que 3 des 5 articles du projet de loi 63 se retrouvent, dans la même phraséologie, parmi les 11 articles du bill 85.¹² Conséquemment, si nous retirons ces trois articles, du bill 63, il ne nous reste que les changements qui illustraient la pensée du gouvernement à cette époque. Quels sont-ils ces changements? Premièrement, le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement est accordé et deuxièmement, l'article 4 définit les pouvoirs de l'Office de la langue française, les dit pouvoirs demeurant largement consultatifs.

Toutes les nouveautés mentionnées ci-haut me semblent purement circonstanciellles. Il est bien sûr évident que les gouvernements se doivent de légiférer selon la situation qu'il convient de corriger mais ceci doit se faire à partir d'une situation générale et non pas restreinte, à partir d'une situation permanente et non pas à partir d'un événement. En ce sens,

il m'apparaît que la loi 63 n'avait pas plus d'envergure que, par exemple, un arrêté-en-conseil visant à rétablir les services essentiels dans les services hospitaliers. Le rapport qui existe entre une situation dramatique et une loi spéciale est le même que celui qui existait entre les émeutes de Saint-Leonard et la loi 63.

La loi 63 tenta d'apaiser les esprits en accordant, d'une part, le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement; d'autre part, on donnait un titre pompeux à la loi et quelques nouveaux pouvoirs à l'Office de la langue française de manière à ce que celle-ci puisse assurer au français le rang de la langue suprême au Québec.

Si en vérité il nous est permis de conclure que la loi 63 ne répondait pas aux aspirations de la majorité francophone, il n'est pas faux d'affirmer également que les droits de la minorité anglophone étaient laissés pour compte. En 1969, les seules garanties formelles sur lesquelles les anglophones pouvaient compter pour voir leurs droits respectés concernaient le droit de vote, le droit d'être jugés dans leur langue maternelle et le droit d'avoir des écoles confessionnelles. La loi 63 n'offrait absolument aucune protection supplémentaire à la minorité anglophone du Québec. Cette situation s'illustre amplement si l'on considère que la simple abrogation de la phrase concernant le libre choix des parents à la langue d'enseignement aurait été suffisant pour condamner à une disparition rapide et complète toutes les écoles appartenant au secteur anglophone, exception faite, peut-être, des universités. C'est donc dire, qu'en 1969, les droits de la minorité anglophone du Québec, bien que peu sérieusement menacés, avaient tout de même besoin d'être formellement reconnus.

Toutefois, la grande majorité des anglophones du Québec acceptèrent d'emblée le principe directeur du bill qui, selon eux, garantissait l'existence de leur communauté ainsi qu'une liberté fondamentale: le libre choix de chaque individu de choisir la langue d'enseignement pour ses enfants. Nous pouvons aujourd'hui constater que les effets protecteurs que l'on attribuait à la loi 63 étaient largement exagérés puisqu'aujourd'hui le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement n'existe plus pour la majorité de la population.

Le sentiment de sécurité des anglophones reposait sur une interprétation traditionnellement élargie des articles 93 et 133 de l'Acte britannique de l'Amérique du Nord. De plus, certaines personnes furent amenées à croire que le "Canadian Bill of Rights" de John Diefenbaker garantissait le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement puisque ce libre choix était considéré par les mêmes personnes comme un droit fondamental. Sur la même envolée d'extrapolations et d'hypothèses juridico-légales, on pouvait penser que le bill 63 venait confirmer les prétentions du "Canadian Bill of Rights" et établir une tradition solide de libre choix dans un Québec où la majorité semblait vouloir jusqu'à maintenant pencher vers un uniformisme inquiétant. Toutefois, la situation était appelée à changer moins de quatre ans plus tard lorsque le gouvernement libéral de Robert Bourassa présenta une nouvelle politique linguistique: la loi sur les langues officielles.

LA LOI 22: LOI SUR LA LANGUE OFFICIELLE

La loi 22 fut sanctionnée le 31 juillet 1974; elle comprenait 123 articles qui touchaient à plusieurs aspects de la vie québécoise. Cette législation représentait l'accomplissement d'un rêve que les libéraux entretenaient déjà depuis quelques années: produire une pièce législative globale qui coordonnerait les efforts du gouvernement en vue d'établir la prééminence du français au Québec. En effet, l'argument favori que Jean Lesage utilisait contre le bill 63 était que cette loi ne légifèrait pas dans certains secteurs-clés tel le domaine du travail.

Le premier article de la loi 22 déclarait sans ambage que le français était dorénavant la langue officielle du Québec. Cette règle s'appliquait à tout document émanant de l'administration publique. Ces documents, qui pouvaient être accompagnés d'une version anglaise, n'étaient réputés officiels que dans leur version française. Le français était également appelé à devenir la langue de communication interne au sein de l'administration publique. Conséquemment, une connaissance suffisante de la langue officielle était exigée de tous les titulaires à un poste payé par le gouvernement.

Le bill 22 légiférait également dans le domaine des entreprises d'utilité publique ainsi que dans celui des professions. Ceux-ci se devaient d'avoir la capacité d'offrir leurs services dans la langue officielle. De cette mesure découlait naturellement le fait qu'il ne fut pas permis à une corporation de professionnels de délivrer un permis d'exercice de profession à tout individu dont la connaissance du français ne correspondait pas aux critères gouvernementaux.

Le français devenait, par le biais de la loi 22, la langue du travail. De ce fait, des programmes de francisation devaient être établis pour chaque type d'entreprise. Un certificat de francisation était ensuite délivré à toute entreprise dont les efforts de francisation étaient couronnés de succès. La conséquence de l'adoption d'un tel programme pour les entreprises était considérable: celles-ci avaient la possibilité de se voir octroyer des contrats ou des subsides gouvernementaux, contrairement à celles qui refusaient de se plier à un programme de francisation. Le français, langue des affaires, exigeait maintenant que les raisons sociales des entreprises installées au Québec soient en français. De plus, le bill 22 prévoyait que l'étiquetage des produits de consommation vendus au Québec devait se faire en français; des poursuites sommaires pouvaient être intentées par le gouvernement contre ceux qui ne se pliaient pas à cette nouvelle loi concernant l'étiquetage. L'affichage public n'était permise que dans la langue officielle ou, dans cette dernière plus une autre langue.

La section la plus controversée de la loi 22 fut certes celle qui réglementait la langue d'enseignement. De même que le bill 63 l'avait fait quelques années auparavant, le bill 22 prévoyait que le français serait la seule langue d'éducation dans toutes les écoles québécoises, sauf celles qui donnaient déjà une éducation dans les langues anglaise, indienne et inuit. Toutefois, contrairement au bill 63, la question du libre choix n'apparaissait plus dans la loi.

Le libre choix fut remplacé par un système de tests qui fut jugé à l'époque, par les minorités ethniques et le cercle intellectuel, comme simplement "inhumain". Les parents qui désiraient envoyer leur enfant à l'école anglaise devaient accepter au départ que leur enfant soit soumis à un test d'admissibilité;

ce test avait pour but de déterminer le niveau de connaissance de la langue anglaise pour chaque candidat au secteur anglophone, dont on doutait de la connaissance suffisante de la langue. Dans les cas de non-admissibilité, les enfants devaient se contenter d'une éducation en français.

Ce système de tests fut réputé discriminatoire, et pour cause. Avec ce système, les libéraux s'engageaient à mi-chemin entre le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement et le système de langue prioritaire que l'on a avec la loi 101. Considérons le cas des immigrants arrivant au Québec: il est évident que pour un immigrant anglophone, la question de discrimination ne se pose pas. Cependant, pour un immigrant autre qu'anglophone, son choix était conditionné par l'imposition de tests à faire subir à ses enfants. Selon l'expression consacrée, on obtenait donc "deux classes d'immigrants". Toute la controverse entourant l'imposition ou la non-imposition des tests mettait cependant en relief le véritable enjeu du débat: Est-ce que les citoyens du Québec avaient, oui ou non, le droit de choisir la langue d'enseignement pour leurs enfants? A cette question, les libéraux n'offrirent qu'une réponse timide, un "peut-être" qui en disait long sur le dilemme politique dans lequel ce parti politique était plongé face au Québec d'une part, et à sa clientèle électorale d'autre part.

L'Office de la langue française, qui avait été créé par le bill 63, devait maintenant céder sa place à la Régie de la langue française. Celle-ci avait des pouvoirs accrus: elle avait un pouvoir d'enquête face au processus de francisation dans les entreprises ou encore face à n'importe quel sujet concernant chacun des articles de la loi 22. De plus, la Régie se voyait offrir la possibilité de suggérer au gouvernement des moyens pour corriger certaines situations anormales dans le domaine linguistique.

De tout ce que nous avons mentionné ci-haut, il m'apparaît que les droits de la minorité anglophone n'étaient pas battus en brèche par la loi 22. Signalons avant tout que depuis 1969 la situation de la minorité anglophone n'avait pas changé au plan de la reconnaissance officielle de ses droits. Les seuls droits encore garantis étaient le droit de vote, le droit être jugé dans sa

langue ainsi que le droit à un système d'éducation confessionnel. De ses trois droits reconnus, le bill 22 prit bien soin de les respecter. Par exemple, l'article 16 reconnaît implicitement, mais on ne plus clairement, que les jugements rendus par les cours québécoises peuvent l'être en anglais.¹³

Soulignons de plus que dans plusieurs cas, l'anglais se voyait accordé un statut privilégié par rapport à la loi et à la langue officielle. Par exemple, les textes officiels émanant de l'administration publique pouvaient être accompagnés d'une version anglaise; de plus, tout citoyen pouvait s'adresser à l'administration publique soit en anglais, soit en français. Outre ces dispositions, l'anglais obtenait une certaine reconnaissance dans le milieu de travail: il était, par exemple, permis de l'utiliser dans les communications écrites entre employeurs et employés.

Comme nous pouvons le constater grâce à ces exemples variés, la loi 22 n'avait pas pour but de réduire les droits de la minorité mais plutôt de raffermir le caractère français du Québec. L'anglais, sous le bill 22, cessait d'être une des deux langues officielles du Québec.

Plusieurs ont clamés dans leur opposition au bill 22 que ce dernier limitait la possibilité d'accéder à l'école anglaise; cela est vrai sans l'ombre d'un doute. On utilisait cet argument pour montrer un caractère coercitif, restrictif et arbitraire de la loi; cette loi n'était donc pas judicieuse puisqu'elle utilisait la coercion plutôt que la persuasion. Cependant, la limite posée à l'accès au secteur anglophone d'éducation ne visait aucunement à détruire celui-ci mais plutôt à revigorer le secteur francophone. Les limites posées par la loi 22 visaient avant tout les populations francophones et ethniques; donc, la loi sur les langues officielles n'érodait en aucune manière les droits de la minorité anglophone puisque celle-ci, par exemple, conservait le droit d'obtenir ou de créer ses propres institutions scolaires, même si ce droit n'est pas encore expressément protégé.

En parcourant les comptes rendus de la Commission permanente de l'éducation, des affaires culturelles et des communications, commission qui avait pour but

d'entendre le plaidoyer des différents groupes de pression appelés à critiquer le bill 22, il semble virtuellement impossible de trouver un argument solide qui appuierait cette fantastique théorie voulant que le bill 22 attaquait les droits fondamentaux dont les anglophones jouissent ou on le droit inaliénable de jouir en tant que minorité linguistique. Ces arguments seront d'ailleurs exposés et débattus dans une des sections suivantes de cette analyse.

LA LOI 101: CHARTE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE

Trois ans après l'adoption de la loi sur la langue officielle, une nouvelle politique linguistique venait changer le contexte linguistique au Québec. Le projet de loi 1 devint la loi 101 en août 1977. Cette loi se composant d'au-delà de 200 articles prend un pas additionnel et décisif dans la voix de la pré-éminence du français au Québec. Cette pièce législative est aussi complète que la loi 22 car, comme cette dernière, la loi 101 fait sentir sa présence dans toutes les sphères d'activité au Québec.

Il serait fastidieux d'élaborer sur chacun des articles de la loi 101; bien que celle-ci représente une position assez différente de celle illustrée par la loi 22, les deux textes législatifs demeurent assez près l'un de l'autre. En général, nous pouvons dire que la loi 101 est un peu plus minutieuse que la loi 22. Attachons nous donc à établir les quelques différences entre les deux lois. Si on excepte le chapitre 3 de la loi 101 qui concernant la langue de la législation et de la justice et qui fut déclaré inconstitutionnel, la majeure partie des changements et nouveautés se retrouvent dans les chapitres 6, 7 et 8 soient ceux de la langue du travail, la langue du commerce et des affaires ainsi que la langue de l'enseignement.

Les changements demeurent mineurs ou encore sont de nature à préciser le mouvement qui s'était déjà amorcé avec la loi 22. Par exemple, les communications entre employeur et employés se font en français, l'employeur n'étant plus tenu, comme le stipulait la loi 22, de produire une version anglaise du document. Les articles 45 et 46 prévoient qu'il est impossible pour un employeur de "congédier, mettre à pied, de rétrograder ou de déplacer"¹⁴ un

employé sous prétexte qu'il soit unilingue francophone, exception faite, bien sûr, des emplois où la connaissance d'une autre langue est nécessaire. On prévoit aussi l'application de la loi aux syndicats et aussi à la convention collective. L'article 57 ne prévoit pas de version anglaise accompagnant "les demandes d'emploi, les bons de commandes, les factures, les reçus et quittances"¹⁵ comme l'exigeait la loi 22 à l'article 33. La seule véritable nouveauté au chapitre de la langue du commerce et des affaires s'inscrit au niveau de l'affichage public. Selon la loi 101, cette dernière ne peut se faire généralement qu'en français (sauf exception prévue par la loi) alors que la loi 22 stipulait qu'en général l'affichage public pouvait se faire dans la langue officielle, plus une autre, à la discrétion de l'afficheur. De plus, la loi 101 stipule que seule la raison sociale française peut être utilisée au Québec; la loi 22 prévoyait de son côté la possibilité d'y adjoindre une version anglaise. Finalement, les articles 73 et 75 de la loi 101 viennent préciser la question de l'admissibilité à l'école anglaise, question qui fut plus ou moins en suspens dans la loi 22 par les "bons offices" de l'article 43. L'article 73 forme ce que l'on appelle communément "la clause Québec". Enfin, l'article 84 assure que chaque étudiant québécois désireux d'obtenir un certificat de fin d'étude secondaire doit réussir le programme de français tel que proposé par le ministère de l'Éducation.

La loi 101 se caractérise aussi par le fait qu'elle abolit la Régie de la langue française. Cette dernière est accompagnée d'une Commission de surveillance, d'une Commission de toponymie et d'un Conseil de la langue française. Cette ensemble de commissions, d'offices de conseils jouent sensiblement le même rôle que la Régie de la langue française fut appelée à jouer sous la loi 22.

En ce qui concerne les droits de la minorité, il convient de souligner que, depuis 1975, il existe au Québec une Charte des droits et libertés de la personne. L'article 10 de cette Charte offre une protection supplémentaire à la minorité puisque celle-ci affirme que chaque individu a droit à la pleine reconnaissance de ses droits et qu'aucune discrimination linguistique ne peut être tolérée. Bien que cet article fut cité ad nauseam par la plupart des groupes de pressions anglophones lors des auditions devant la Commission permanente de

l'éducation des affaires culturelles et des communications portant sur la charte de la langue française, il est extrêmement difficile, voire impossible et illusoire, de trouver un seul article de la loi 101 qui contrevienne à l'article 10 de la charte des droits et libertés de la personne. Encore une fois, la rigueur intellectuelle ne peut nous imposer qu'une seule conclusion: la loi 101, dans sa forme actuelle ne porte pas atteinte aux droits fondamentaux de la minorité anglophone du Québec.

Toutefois, dans sa forme originale, la loi 101 portait atteinte à un droit fondamental de la minorité, soit, celui de pouvoir être jugé dans sa langue maternelle. Ce droit ayant été formellement reconnu plusieurs années auparavant par l'article 133 de l'Acte britannique de l'Amérique du Nord, il fut donc aisé pour la minorité d'obtenir gain de cause contre le gouvernement du Québec. Le chapitre 3 fut déclaré ultra vires dans son entier par le Cour suprême du Canada. Cet exemple illustre avec vigueur l'extrême importance qu'il convient d'accorder à la reconnaissance formelle des droits fondamentaux de la minorité.

UNE ARGUMENTATION A VARIER ET A REVISER: UNE ATTITUDE A CHANGER

Si l'argumentation des groupes de pression anglophones contre le bill 22 pouvait provoquer le mépris et la colère chez quelques-uns, celle utilisée contre la loi 101 ne pouvait qu'inspirer chez plusieurs, un sentiment de pitié. Pourtant, l'argumentation utilisée contre le bill 22 et la loi 101 était et demeure, semble-t-il, toujours la même. C'est justement cette constance étroite et inébranlable qui alimente ce sentiment de pitié, face au peu de ressources ou de volonté de changement dont font part encore nombre de porte-paroles de la communauté anglophone. Revoyons donc un à un les principaux arguments qui sont mis de l'avant par les porte-paroles anglophones dans la défense de "leurs" droits fondamentaux.

Prenons d'abord de front la question du libre choix. C'est cette question qui est centrale à toute l'argumentation présentée par la plupart des groupes de pression anglophones devant les commissions parlementaires chargées d'entendre les mémoires concernant les bill 22 et 101. La première remarque que l'on peut faire au sujet de la question du libre choix, c'est qu'elle soit défendue par un groupe minoritaire alors qu'elle ne s'y applique strictement pas. Du reste, l'argumentation autour de cette question laisse largement paraître cet incongruité

qui caractérise le fait qu'un groupe minoritaire défende les droits d'une majorité. En effet, les loi 22 et 101 ont toujours maintenu la liberté de choix pour la minorité anglophone qui peut, si elle le désire, faire instruire ses enfants en français ou en anglais. Donc, sa liberté de choix, qui du reste n'est pas un droit fondamental comme nous le constaterons plus loin, est maintenue. Il est donc évident que les représentants de groupes de pression anglophones défendaient non pas leurs droits en tant que minorité, mais plutôt ceux des autres. On ne saurait pousser plus loin la mansuétude.

Pour défendre cette question du libre choix, on a eu recours au Bill of Rights de John Diefenbaker.¹⁶ En arguant que la liberté de parole est un droit fondamental, on essaya d'associer liberté de parole et liberté de choix de la langue d'enseignement. Argument insensé s'il en est un qui de plus devient futile si on prend pour acquis que le Bill of Rights ne s'applique qu'au niveau des lois votées par le Parlement fédéral.¹⁷ On a également invoqué le contenu de certaines encycliques papales de Pie XI et aussi le document sur l'éducation produit par Vatican II; bien peu de législatures s'appuient sur ces documents pour dessiner une politique quelle qu'elle soit car il y a déjà bien des années que la séparation de l'Eglise et l'Etat s'est effectuée dans la plupart des pays catholiques.

On a également prétendu, dans le cas de la loi 22, que celle-ci violait la base même de la philosophie qui anime l'Acte britannique de l'Amérique du Nord.¹⁸ Cela peut-être débattu car le partage des compétences législatives prévu dans cette loi britannique démontre plutôt que le principe de territorialité était fortement suggéré en 1867 puisqu'on laissait le pouvoir en matière d'éducation aux parlements régionaux. Aujourd'hui, nous constatons que le bilinguisme canadien tend, dans sa réalité physique, à se rapprocher du concept de bilinguisme territorial. De toute manière, il est évident que "la base même de la philosophie qui anime l'Acte britannique de l'Amérique du Nord" ne constitue pas un droit fondamental de la minorité anglophone, la violation de cette base, du reste, ne constituant en fait qu'une simple question d'opinion.

Le Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards invoqua encore contre le bill 22 que la loi sur les langues officielles, votée en 1969 par le Parlement fédéral, avait officialisé deux langues au Canada. Le bill 22 était donc, pour

reprendre les termes exacts employés par l'Association "in direct violation of this federal law".¹⁹ Rappelons encore que cette loi fédérale ne s'applique qu'au niveau fédéral.

Lors des auditions concernant le projet de loi 1, l'article 10 de la charte des droits et libertés de la personne fut présenté comme l'anti-thèse de la loi 101, spécifiquement en ce qui a trait à l'obtention d'un emploi dans la fonction publique. C'était encore un argument spécieux car l'article 20 de la même charte dit qu'"une distinction, exclusion ou préférence, fondée sur les aptitudes ou qualités exigées de bonne foi pour un emploi est réputée non-discriminatoire". A part cette nouveauté, on peut dire qu'en général, les groupes de pression anglophones revinrent aux audiences de 1977 avec ce qu'il est convenu d'appeller "l'argumentation classique" utilisée en 1974.

On fit également appel à la charte des Droits de l'homme, votée par les Nations-unies en 1948. Cette Charte stipule que les parents ont le droit de choisir le type d'éducation pour leurs enfants. Est-ce que cependant, le "type" d'éducation inclut la "langue" d'éducation? Peu de gens de loi s'engageraient à soutenir une telle cause car les Nations-unies ont précisé au fil des années ce qu'elles entendent par "type d'enseignement".²⁰

L'attitude négative démontrée par la plupart des groupes de pression anglophones ne doit pas être généralisée. Dès que l'on s'éloigne des cercles vaguement intellectuels, ou des personnes qui laissent entrevoir un conflit d'intérêt entre leur profession et leurs opinions supposément objectives (les commissaires d'école, par exemple), le débat réassume des proportions normales. Les mémoires présentés en 1977 par les universités Concordia et McGill en font foi.

CONCLUSION

Il est difficile d'évaluer à quel point la perspective des anglophones du Québec a évolué depuis 1977. Il semble malheureusement que dans beaucoup de cas, on en soit resté figé aux "belles années" de la loi 63. Le fait, par exemple, que l'on ait élu récemment Joan Dougherty fut des croisades contre les lois 22 et 101; avec la perspective d'une victoire libérale, le temps

était venu pour elle de faire valoir son point de vue sur la scène politique, celui d'une représentante d'une commission scolaire anglophone. Notons de plus le fort contingent d'anglophones, associés aux commissions scolaires, qui garnissaient les rangs du Parti Libéral lors de la dernière campagne électorale au Québec. Ces gens et ceux qu'ils représentent sont en conflit d'intérêt car le métier qu'ils pratiquent et qu'ils aiment dépend directement du volume d'élèves dans les écoles du secteur anglophone. Moins d'élèves: moins de commissaires, de principaux et de professeurs.

La minorité anglophone s'isole irrémédiablement si elle compte sur ces gens pour la défendre. De ce fait, elle est déjà isolée; les mémoires présentées par les groupes ethniques devant les commissions parlementaires ne recourent pas les idées avancées par les groupes de pression anglophones. On est moins émotif, mais plus pragmatique. De plus, à aucun endroit dans le monde, où le bilinguisme est institutionnalisé, a-t-on accordé le libre choix de la langue d'enseignement aux parents. Citons, pour étayer cette affirmation, l'exemple que nous fournit le jugement de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme touchant la Belgique, en 1968.²¹ Il est clair que les anglophones qui se sentent lésés dans leurs droits fondamentaux ne le sont que dans leur tête. L'affirmation de l'un n'entraîne pas automatiquement la négation de l'autre.

Il convient cependant d'établir des nuances face à la dernière proposition. Si le processus d'affirmation de la majorité n'implique pas nécessairement des suites fâcheuses pour la minorité, il n'en subsiste pas moins quelques dangers. A cet égard, il convient de noter que les lois 63, 22 et 101, produites par trois gouvernements différents les uns des autres, ne se sont pas préoccupés des droits minoritaires fondamentaux. Bien que personnellement je n'estime pas que ce soit le rôle de telles législations de protéger les droits minoritaires, il n'en demeurent pas moins que pratiquement rien n'a été fait pour les protéger. Rendons hommage à M. Godin, de qui semble s'amorcer une prise de conscience de l'importance des droits des minorités du Québec. L'avenir cependant demeure encore imprévisible pour la minorité anglophone du Québec, et ce sens, les craintes exprimées par Dominique Clift et Sheila Arnopoulos, ne sont pas tout-à-fait dénuées de

fondement.²² Espérons que ces propos ne soient pas le présage d'une situation où le Québec aurait fort à perdre.

NOTES HORS-TEXTE

1. R.Sampat-Mehta, Minority Rights & Obligations (Ottawa: Harpell's Press, 1973) p.3.
2. Bernard Smith, La loi 22: le Parti Québécois aurait-il fait mieux? (Montréal: Editions du Jour, 1975), p.24.
3. Albert Verdoodt, La protection des droits de l'homme dans les Etats plurilingues (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1972), p.175.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Dominique Clift & Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos, Le fait anglais au Québec (Montréal: Libre expression, 1979), p.56.
9. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 5th ed. (New-York: HJB/Harvest Books, 1973), p.291.
10. John R. Mallea ed., Quebec's Languages Policies: Background & Responses (Québec: Les presses de l'université Laval, 1977), p.228.
11. Voir annexe A.
12. Voir annexe A.
13. Mallea, appendice bill 22.
14. Camille Laurin, Le français, langue du Québec (Montréal: Editions du Jour, 1977), appendice projet de loi 1.
15. Ibid.
16. Québec, Assemblée Nationale, Journal des débats, 2^e session, 30^e législature. Commission permanente de l'éducation, des affaires culturelles et des communications: Etude du projet de loi 22, p. B-3340:

16. "The freedom of speech is a fundamental right. We contend that the freedom to choose the language of instruction is also a fundamental right. We contend that the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights guarantees every Canadian an education in institutions using as a medium of instruction the official language of its choice."
17. Paul W. Fox, Politics Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), p.557-8.
18. Québec, Assemblée Nationale, Journal des débats, 2^e session, 30^e législature. Commission permanente de l'éducation, des affaires culturelles et des communications: Etude du projet de loi 22, p.B-3357: "Bill 22 conceives of Quebec eventually being a French-speaking province and the rest of Canada, eventually being English-speaking provinces. And we submit that this is contrary to the basic concept to the philosophy of the Constitution of Canada..."
19. Ibid., p.B-3577.
20. Maurice Torelli & Renée Beaudouin, Les droits de l'homme et les libertés publiques (Montréal: Les Presses de l'université du Québec, 1972), p.293:
"2. Aux fins de la présente convention, le mot "enseignement" vise les divers types et les différents degrés de l'enseignement et recouvre l'accès à l'enseignement, son niveau et sa qualité, de même que les conditions dans lesquelles il est dispensé.
Art. 2.- Lorsqu'elles sont admises par l'Etat, les situations suivantes ne sont pas considérées comme constituant des discriminations au sens de l'article premier de la convention:
b) La création ou le maintien, pour des motifs d'ordre religieux ou linguistique, de systèmes ou d'établissement séparés dispensant un enseignement qui correspond au choix des parents ou tuteur légaux des élèves, si l'adhésion à ces systèmes ou la fréquentation de ces établissements demeure facultative et si l'enseignement dispensé est conforme aux normes qui peuvent avoir été prescrites ou approuvées par les autorités compétentes, en particulier pour l'enseignement du même degré.
Art.5.- 1. Les Etats parties à la présente convention conviennent: b) Qu'il importe de respecter la liberté des parents et, le cas échéant, des tuteurs légaux: 1^e de choisir pour leurs enfants des établissements autres que ceux des pouvoirs publics, mais conformes aux normes minimums qui peuvent être prescrites ou approuvées par les autorités compétentes; et 2^e de faire assurer, selon les modalités d'application propres à la législation de chaque Etat, l'éducation religieuse et morale des enfants conformément à leurs propres convictions; qu'en outre, aucune personne ni aucun groupe ne devraient être contraints de recevoir éducation religieuse incompatible avec leurs convictions;"

21. Québec, Assemblée Nationale, Journal des débats, 2^e session, 30^e législature. Commission permanente de l'éducation, des affaires culturelles et des communications: Etude du projet de loi 22, p. B-3255: "En juillet 1968, la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a rejeté les prétentions de parents francophones qui réprobaient pour la Flandres un système d'enseignement unilingue en néerlandais. Le droit du chef de famille à choisir la langue d'enseignement de ses enfants n'a pas été reconnu...dans ce jugement.

Me Verhoeven, juriste belge: "Quoique la Cour ne se soit pas prononcée sur la philosophie conventionnelle, elle n'en paraît pas moins partager une opinion diametralement opposée à la doctrine classique des libertés, refusant particulièrement de distraire les droits dits de l'homme de leur enracinement économique et social. Le droit de l'homme y perd l'absolu et l'intangibilité dont on le pare quelque peu hâtivement. Plutôt qu'un droit individuel, il devient en quelque sorte un droit social, en tant qu'il se pose en une relation de l'individu à la société, dans l'équilibre de leur exigence respective, problématique à tout prendre, plus conforme à la notion de personne humaine que l'individualisme classique."

22. Clift & Arnopoulos, p.72: "Tout indique que la défense des droits du français au Québec n'est que le prélude à l'imposition de la langue et la culture françaises à tous les citoyens du Québec. La stratégie choisie pour la loi 101 l'indique très clairement. Cette loi, à la manière de l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord, ne se préoccupe que des droits majoritaires, et elle n'offrent aucune protection juridique à l'expression de cultures minoritaires. Cette omission est particulièrement remarquable dans le cas de la minorité anglophone qui représente environ vingt pour cent de la population du Québec. Elle n'offrent aucune protection non plus aux droits collectifs des Amérindiens et des Inuits."

MEETING THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES OF QUEBEC:
THE PARTI QUEBECOIS' DILEMMA IN
BUSINESS AND LABOUR RELATIONS

LYNDA GELSTON

INTRODUCTION

The recent re-election of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) to office has confirmed that the nationalist content of economic development is to remain a decisive force in the political economy of the province. Once again enjoying the fruits of electoral success, the PQ remains committed to a directed, and possibly even independent, economy in which provincial state planning is a means of mobilising the entire society behind politically determined goals. Yet its commitment to direct the economic future of Quebec is often over-stated, contributing much to the misconception that the PQ is at the helm of the ship of state; single-handedly determining the circuitous route and speed of development. Such over-statements frequently occur in discussions and analyses of Quebec's economic development, and as a consequence conceal the role played by the private sector and the labour movement in shifting the final outcome of government policy.

Celebrants of the nationalist content of economic development unwittingly fail to reach under the veil of superficialities. These with less nationalistic ardour, who appreciate the complexities involved in any political economic analysis, will recognize the rallying strokes of

tactics employed by both business and labour to extend their sway in the political realm. It is the latter approach that is to prevail in the course of this analysis.

The intention of this paper is to critically survey the PQ's performance in dealing with business and labour relations in Quebec. In what follows, it will become evident that the PQ is not, and cannot, single-handedly manoeuvre the ship of state without the trust and cooperation of business and labour. It is my hope that an examination of this nature will bring to light the dynamics of the relationship; and how the Government can effectively alter its present measures to avert further antagonisms emerging out of this tri-partite relationship.

To this end I have provided, in the first section, a brief description of the context in which state planning has emerged in the economy of Quebec. Following this I have included an extensive examination of the dilemma facing the PQ, a self-avowed separatist party attempting to strengthen the economic infrastructure of the province under strong resistance from both business and labour elements. Bringing this up to date, a very interesting analysis will follow questioning some of the PQ's recent electoral proposals which, if implemented, will have dire consequences for labour relations. Finally, the concluding remarks consist of a synthesis of all that has been covered.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: BRIEFLY RE-CONSIDERED

Virtually every Western capitalist society has, at one point or another, passed through a stage of economic liberalism to a stage where increased state planning and activity in the economy becomes a welcome necessity. Quebec, as is often noted, proceeded through this developmental process in a peculiar and rather dilatory manner. In the post-war era, while other economies were infectiously involved in the process of post-industrial adjustments, Quebec kept up its resistance. Under the Union Nationale, economic liberalism was virtually benign, and the Government was ideologically poised to resist the threat posed by industrialization.

It was not until after the death of the Union Nationale's Leader, Maurice Duplessis, in 1959, that the process of transformation was to take root.

The sixties was an age not so much signifying that Quebec was at the crossroads of the great transformation, as it was an age marked by a change of hands from a conservative-minded political elite to a progressive, modern-minded elite. To qualify this we have only to contrast the great conservative-minded Duplessis with the likes of a Levesque or a Pelletier. Emerging out of the traditionalist fifties, these latter politicians decidedly confronted the challenge of industrialization rather than back down indefinitely, as their precursors would have preferred.

Commitment to economic development via the state apparatus was, for the most part inspired by the new modern-minded and politically confident nucleus of the sixties.¹ Initially this nucleus was small, and consisted mainly of well-educated, francophone professionals. The term "smallness" is used simply to indicate that this groups was numerically small at the time, later to grow in proportion significant enough to effect many changes, and even ascend to political power. Despite numerical deficiencies and frequent shifts of political allegiances, these individuals were vivacious enough to succeed in having their voices heard for the establishment of a broadened role for the Quebec state. It was these individuals, moreover, who were willing to assume political responsibility for appeasing rapid economic transformation and the negative social and cultural effects following in its wake.

The particular vision of development articulated by this elite differed significantly from that of others. Proof of this exists in the fact that support for reform-inclined programmes under the Lesage Liberals, like Levesque's Hydro project, were apparently met with heavy resistance.² Such resistance proved, in many respects, the so-called progressive decade of the sixties was not as reform-inclined as supposed. We are faced with the issue, then, that the project begun in the sixties, and spearheaded by a state-expanding elite, was not to get seriously underway until well into the mid-seventies with the election of the Parti Quebecois to office.

It seems to have taken a long time for some of those elites to finally coalesce around a party, the PQ, and develop a comprehensive programme, one appealing enough for them to eventually rise to legitimate political power.

In many ways the PQ has inherited the legacies left outstanding from the Quiet Revolution of the sixties. Nonetheless, the effort was made and it is now being followed through by the present PQ government to give expression to the nationalist content of economic development in a Quebec context, and in line with the vision appropriated by this particular political elite.

BUSINESS AND LABOUR: THE PARTI QUEBECOIS' DILEMMA

The Referendum results proved the francophone population was not as cohesive in its support of the PQ option as supposed. At a more fundamental level, the results indicated that the PQ's vision of political independence coupled with a viable Quebec economy was only one of many visions, incapable of arousing sufficient support. This in some ways suggests that the PQ was an adjunct of a political elite simply acting out its ideological callings regardless of public support. Yet, if this were the case and if the issue could be stated that simply, then they would not have been re-elected to office on April 13. The very fact that they were re-elected indicates the presence of some underlying factors which must be accounted for.

Scattered attempts have been made to pinpoint the precise line of cleavage within the Quebec fabric. In the sixties, francophone analysis³ tended to focus on the high correspondence between French-Canadian ethnic origin and lower socio-economic standing. From these findings it was assumed that the main source of cleavage was that emerging along "ethnic class" lines. What the analysts failed to take account of was that while "les moyennes bourgeoisie" having never enjoyed a particularly strong influence in the commercial sector did enjoy a strong and favoured presence in the state sector.⁴

The political arena in Quebec has been a place overrun by struggles for power and prestige somewhat analogous to what one generally finds in the commercial sector. Rather than consider competition for power, prestige and jobs as solely peculiar to the private sector, we must alter our views in the case of Quebec, and recognize the crucial role of public competition in the political sphere. The expansion of the public services and the state bureaucracy has had the effect of cushioning francophone unemployment and underemployment found in the private sector. Where once it was difficult for an upwardly mobile francophone to succeed in the private sector, the possibility of doing so opened up with the expansion of public service employment. As indicated in Table I, the PQ has continued to expand the public sector, absorbing greater numbers of employees into its public ranks. Although the motive for expansion may not have been to compensate for the imbalance of francophone presence in the private sector, it has still had the effect of doing so.

As other analysts point out⁵, it is the new "state middle class" which is at the center of political competition for power and influence in Quebec. Instead of building economic empires, these members of the francophone middle class busy themselves with the construction of political empires. PQ members are not exempt from membership in this class, since the vast majority of them form the elite portion of it. The Referendum results can now be seen in a new light; as a failure of the governing elites to co-opt other sections of the francophone middle class into supporting its proposed plans of Independence.

Let us examine precisely what these "state middle class" analysts have suggested. Supposedly, by the mid-twentieth century most francophones were frustrated in their attempts to gain ascension in the private sector, and turned to the Quebec state as the vehicle for upward mobility. Political development and nationalism since the Quiet Revolution have been viewed by these analysts as products, produced to meet the aspirations of the francophone middle class. Thus, the emergence of the bureaucratic revolution, and the consequent rise to power of the PQ technocrats, can be viewed as attempts to accomodate this elite's strategy of development via state

administrative planning. It naturally follows that those who tend to support the continued development of state economic planning are the "new state middle class" working directly in the public and para-public sector.

The link between the provincial government and the new middle class can be easily established. Its existence can be shown in terms of "(a) the "nucleus" of its political support, (b) the choice of "competent" administrative personnel in the civil service, and (c) the nature of its legislative reforms."⁶

With respect to the first of these criterias, Henry Milner found support for political independence to be strongly allied to a "new state middle class" consisting of highly educated and trained professionals, most of whom were francophone and employed in the upper reaches of the state administration.⁷ A utilitarian motive for supporting such an option was observed; had they not supported an increased role for the provincial administration and state apparatus their jobs would have been in jeopardy. On the other hand, when asked, the respondents hesitated to endorse economic and political Independence together.⁸ Obviously most supporters drawn from the new state middle class did not view economic independence as a necessary step to the future success of a truly strong and technocratic Quebec.

In a different article written prior to the Referendum, Henry Milner noted that regardless of what the Referendum results are, there is no way Quebec nationalism or the "Quebec problem" will go away. Commitment for economic and social development through the Quebec state is so well entrenched within the state bureaucracy, and so well legitimated by the new technocratic leaders that the option of free enterprise and anything approaching such a notion will inevitably be fated.

Milner explains how the root of the nationalist problem rests with this new state middle class. He states that:

"The only possibility of such a change (independence) lies in the wholesale cooptation of the social stratum that articulates the specific content, and mobilizes support for the present thrust of Quebec nationalism - the educated new middle class Francophones working directly or indirectly for the state, or, simply put, the state middle class."¹⁰

To support this assumption Milner points out how the federalist forces perceiving the need to coopt this strata had introduced "French power in Ottawa" and "bilingualism and biculturalism". Two particularly poignant examples of the failure of this effort were the PQ victories in the 1976 election in the two ridings close to Ottawa which were comprised of many middle-level civil servants working for the Federal Government. Another example of its failure emerged in revelations made by RCMP witnesses before the MacDonald Commission in 1977 that some federal civil servants leaked information to the PQ.¹¹

As for the second and third criterias for determining the extensive control exerted by the state middle class on the shape of Quebec politics, more will be said about them in passing. It is significant as this point simply to bear in mind the existence of such a group. As regards the PQ, we shall see that the "technocratic elite" composing this government is the culmination of this stratas rise to political power.

Analysts of the state middle class thesis overlook some very important factors, more complex than is suggested here. In some respects this class is not as homogeneous in its support of a clearly "independantiste" nationalism. Although all seem to agree on the fundamentals, like the continued role of the Quebec government in following through the project begun in the sixties, they disagree on the extent to which the nationalist project should be fulfilled by the "technocratic elite" of cabinet and party officials. In another respect, the studies fail to account for the other, equally important, Francophone middle class of business elites. In effect, the nature of the state middle class is altered greatly once we introduce these two distinct elements. The first of these suggests a split in the francophone elite, between that of the high-ranking political officials and the economic managers and businessmen. The second of these

suggests a split between the private/public elites and the lower-ranking managers, political officials, clerical staff, blue collars, and others that are unionized. Hence, the unionized in the private and public sectors are pitted against both the employer elites of the state and commercial sectors. Given these circumstances, any party in power has a difficult task to fulfill. It requires a Government willing and able to overcome its own immediate interests to arbitrate the competing interests of business and labour. The only successful way of dealing with these different groups is for the Government to maintain a balanced and flexible policy towards them. However, now that the government-as-employer has taken central stage in labour disputes the government/labour/business relationship becomes all the more complex.


It is crucial that the party in power does not alienate either business or labour, or, alienate one at the expense of the other, or, alienate both in its endeavor to shape Quebec development according to its own visions. The PQ has endured these difficult circumstances rather well. However, a serious analysis of how these relationships have worked themselves out over time is absolutely necessary before drawing any general and lucid conclusions. To elucidate the dynamics of the relationship I shall begin with the labour side.

The labour scene in Quebec is one dominated by conflict and confusion. Quebec unions and the various affiliates are either in the process of splitting off from the Canadian body (the CLC), joining together in Common Fronts, or competing for membership. One thing is certain, the Labour movement in the whole of Canada is in a confused state of affairs and has contributed much to the inability of Canadian Labour to devise clear and coherent policy positions in its dealings with public and private employers.¹²

Of all Quebec labour sections, public sector employees have been the most volatile and articulate. Much of the reason stems from the rapid pace of unionization in this sector. The chart below indicates the significant growth of union membership in the Service and Public Administration sectors as compared to the other sectors listed.

CHART I

UNION MEMBERSHIP, by Industry - Quebec



***Source: Labour Canada Statistics, 1975, cited in J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada, Table XIA, p. 113**

The expansion of this sector was quick, and perhaps so quick that it produced severe dislocations. Vast numbers of recently educated franco-phones identified with the state as their main means of mobility. According to studies performed in the educational field¹³ it has been indicated that far too many French-Canadians acquired administrative and technical skills without realizing that there was an insufficient number of upper-level positions to be shared by all. Thus, some were permitted to rise to upper-level jobs while the remainder had to settle for what they may have deemed humble jobs in the bureaucracy and related state institutions.

Many who were capable of manipulating the processes involved in the development of the province and unable to attain positions of political influence felt somewhat frustrated and disillusioned. In turn, most of these individuals were unionized and they used the union as a vehicle for expressing their doubts about the Quebec state apparatus, and about the political elites who were enjoying the fruits of planning and decision-making.¹⁴

It is not surprising that these unionized elements have shown themselves willing enemies of the state in the numerous Common Front Strikes waged in the 1970s. Trade unions with a particularly large public service following, have from that time on been assuming political dimensions without precedence in Quebec. In 1972, one of the most serious Common Front strikes took place.¹⁵ By mobilizing most of the state service sector, the strike showed how the emergent cleavage between the Quebec Government and public service employees was assuming such a proportion that the very survival of the province was threatened.

Manifestoes were drawn up by the CSN, CEQ, and FTQ expressing the skeptical views the labour movement held regarding the so-called economic progress of Quebec. These documents were widely read by the members at large and endorsed by the vast majority of them.¹⁷ The substance of the documents covered such things as allegations against government officials, and in-depth analyses of every sector of the Quebec economy under various parties. Quebec nationalism was criticized as a sugar-coated instrument of the political elite, a middle class responsible for the modicum of technocratic mishaps. The Quiet Revolution was labelled a haunting issue requiring re-evaluation in light of the economic circumstances. They questioned the very substance of the sixties as a time which only took the French-Canadian population from one economic hazard to another. Mention was also made of the political elite's motivation as self-serving and limited in intent. Surprisingly, little attention was focused upon questions of the commercial elites.

The main thrust of the Common Front position can be seen in the following references to the Quiet Revolution taken from the main union manifesto. The CNTU gives us its impressions of the origins and results of the sixties:

"This was the era of "Maitre Chez Nous"; we thought big, the state and the French Canadian Bourgeoisie were going to acquire the means to take control of electricity, forests, mines, oil and the manufacturing sector. It was in this period that the "great government enterprises" Hydro Quebec, the General Investment Corporation. Sidbec . . . were conceived.

Of course the French Canadian bourgeoisie fears intervention by the state; having no other choice though, 'enlightened' Quebec capitalists accept this intervention all the more readily assuming they have sufficient control over the politician and the state.

These latter have easily found allies among the emergent group of technocrats, these technocrats are first of all products of a rationalist ideology which posits a more direct role for the state in the economy; but they are also the left-overs from a local bourgeoisie who couldn't fit into an industrial structure dominated by the Americans and the Anglo-Saxons. These technocrats hope that the state will allow them this minimum of power which had been refused them by the external monopolies. The technocrats and indigenous capitalists could thus lean on the old nationalist ideologies. For these 'nationalists' the power to be gained by the Quebec government appeared as the means to realize the old dream of being set free from Ottawa's tutelage . . . On the basis of interests and ideologies which often diverged, it was agreed that the state was to become the major means of development, the 'protector' of the 'Quebecois'. Henceforth political power was to be based on the idea that the state must be the engine of development."17

Doubtless, such union skepticism indicates that union members in 1972 had few illusions about the so-called amenities of state-run development. The Manifestos raised serious doubts as to the ability of the Quebec Government to transform the economy in any serious manner. With the PQ in power, a party is finally dedicated to the radical transformation of the provincial structures. Now, however, labour union support, or the lack thereof, is all the more difficult to assess.

The PQ maintains the image of a party committed to servicing the interests of labour, especially in the public sector. Supposedly everyone employed by the Quebec state is working for the national interest. Its social democratic tinge and comparatively lenient attitude towards labour affirms this image. Take for instance several acts of legislation reinforcing this labour-lenieny image: anti-scab laws, higher minimum wages, the rescinding of Law 64, the withdrawal of the lawsuit undertaken by the Liberals as a result of the last Common Front strikes in 1975. Due to these and other such positive reinforcements no other Common Front incident has occurred, and on several occasions a union would explicitly support the PQ effort.¹⁸

Apart from the positive attitude towards labour, the PQ has on many occasions shown itself a willing enemy of the very labourers it employs. In fact the labour movement in Quebec has been slowly alienated from political influence. The growing number of public sector employees contributes to the already growing sense of unease that labour feels towards its employers. As a result no Quebec union has endorsed the PQ of late, contrary to what had been done earlier.

In some respects, the PQ does not differ in any significant way from previous Quebec governments. Active government intervention has been invoked on numerous occasions and under several guises. From 1976 to the present, various union affiliates have been placed under trusteeship;¹⁹ back-to-work legislation issued; and in late 1980, Levesque pondered the prospect of limiting the right to strike in the public and para-public sector.²⁰ This last act had the effect of ruffling the feathers of the CEQ in particular, and further alienating other public sector elements. Under such circumstances state employees and others are hard-pressed to find reasons for supporting the nationalist effort as outlined by the so-called party of elites.

Tensions have been particularly acute in the Public Service Sector. Its rapid and continued expansion, as Table I indicates, has served to increase the numbers of highly trained and specialized public servants

TABLE I

Croissance des dépenses pour la fonction publique de gouvernement
et pour les programmes sociaux,
Québec et Ontario, 1975-1978
(\$ millions)

Catégorie	QUEBEC					ONTARIO				
	1975	1976	1977	1978	variation (%) 1975-1978	1975	1976	1977	1978	variation (%) 1975-1978
Fonction gouvernementale	372	457	573	614	65.1	419	556	593	588	40.3
Santé	1 824	2 353	2 660	2 978	63.3	2 451	3 037	3 484	3 887	58.6
Bien-être sociale	1 085	1 369	1 781	2 187	101.6	1 122	1 486	1 841	2 096	86.8
Education	1 893	2 279	3 078	3 595	89.9	2 284	2 619	3 011	3 736	41.7
Habitation	65	65	67	80	23.1	97	215	167	105	67.3

*SOURCE: Statistique Canada, les finances des gouvernements provinciaux, fasc. 68-205
cited in Economie du Québec et choix politiques. (Les Presses de l'université
du Québec, 1979) n. 316

and intensify the tension between state employees and employers. In its efforts to centralize the planning and execution of state services, the PQ has found Public Service labour not so willingly disposed to comply with their national interests.

Granted, the PQ has pursued a very progressive and reform-oriented policy in its dealings with labour. Nevertheless, the government-as-employer has little choice but to secure its economic objectives before catering to the interests of union demands. It is quite natural for the Government not to concede to all the demands of labour. If this were done they would run the risk of alienating the general public, who are increasingly demanding that the government step-up restrictions on the right to strike. Thus, the PQ's priorities cannot, for all intents and purposes, be geared towards fulfilling its economic objectives as a social democratic party servicing the interests of labour. Trying as it does to maintain this image, it is practically impossible to remain a good government while pretending to be a party of labour. Conversely, if the PQ pretends too little, it will invite labour reaction. Hence, The government's ability to execute its economic objectives hinges, but does not solely depend, on the cooperation of labour.

Labour/Government relations require patience and compromise on both sides. There are no sure methods of bargaining and cooperation in disputes emerging between the two parties. Let us examine how this relationship has worked itself out, by looking at what occurred during the tri-partite conference of government, business, and labour in 1979.²¹ At this conference held at the Manoir Richelieu at la Malbaie, the FTQ (Quebec Federation of Labour), CSN (Confederation of National Trade Unions), and the CEQ (Quebec Teacher's Central) were in attendance, but with the greatest of reservations. A week prior to the Conference, on the occasion of the CSN's 48th National Congress, the activity of the PQ was denounced.²² Various speakers expressed the view that since November 15th the government had not delivered what it had promised the union movement. The government, they claimed, was profiting from a union leadership which was, by and large, sympathetic to maintaining a stable

investment-environment for government as well as for private business. The Economic Summit Conference as well as the mini-summits that followed seemed to confirm, in labour's mind, that the PQ was far from practising social-democratic politics. In a speech made to construction industry officials, a government spokesman, Bernard Landry, put it this way:

"We are going to set up a mechanism which would prove essential to the future of our collectivity . . . I am speaking here of consensus and collaboration . . . The objective is to begin to shed old ideas and eliminate old struggles in order to establish a climate of social peace in Quebec."²³

In real terms this statement is not shocking in the least, and did not provoke any reaction from the unions. All participants in the tri-partite Conference wished to reach a settlement, of one could be formulated to please the three parties involved. But in the course of the Conference it became apparent that the scales had been weighted against labour. Government and business presented an avalanche of depressing figures and scenarios; of climbing unemployment, troublesome strikes and wage demands, massive plant closures, and the like. And these issues were all discussed with the finger pointed at the now guilty labour representatives.

In essence the Conference was to serve the following functions: 1) to include labour in discussions of economic planning; 2) to establish a coordinated body for joint efforts in building secure and prosperous economy; and 3) to establish the government as a natural arbiter in these discussions.

In practice the labour representatives were asked, in the name of the national interest, to curb their demands so productivity would increase. Once the economy stabilized, it was only natural that all were to benefit in the long run. In exchange, the PQ promised to introduce laws facilitating unionization (Bill 45), and a number of safety and health measures in the workplace (referring specifically to the asbestos industry).²⁴

Given its turn, the government re-affirmed its commitment to business matters. Levesque promised that private enterprise would remain the key to

industrial development in Quebec, and that the PQ would increase the supply of subsidies. One reviewer observed that Levesque

"...also joined with the representatives of big business to predict an economic doomsday if unions did not play a role in restoring the social climate"

adding that

"Quebec would become a jungle if labour did not tone down its demands."²⁵

Since November 1976 the PQ has endeavored to coopt the trade union movement within its own stated national objectives. Measures, as I have indicated, have not all been undertaken to ensure labour loyalty to the national effort. Just as in the 1972 Manifestoes, union officials still seem to have few illusions, viewing the PQ and any other social-democratic party as a bourgeois facade constructed as a forget-the-back-to-work legislation and remember-our-interests-are-your-interests. Realizing this, the amelioration of government/labour or labour/business antagonisms appears quite impractical. As long as labour resists seeing the economic future of Quebec through the political and business elite's eyes little can be attained in the way of co-operative planning.

Differences over the type of economic strategies to be employed exist. In labour relations the PQ representatives want to replace Bourassa's confrontation tactics by giving labour a sense of participation in deciding the course of economic development policies. Yet, as was soon to be discovered, the PQ was not so neutral and compromising in these relations. The PQ will not desist in its efforts to keep Quebec abreast of the changing industrial tides rising over the rest of North America. Levesque and those in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development certainly do not wish to be excluded from the pleasures of empire building. One thing is certain, the PQ in its eagerness to keep pace has in the process alienated others from their share in the pleasures of such planning.

In Quebec, economic matters receive relatively little attention in the media. The media are alerted to cultural and linguistic issues. Laurin and Levesque are more frequently seen than Parizeau or Landry. As Charles Halory observes, if economic issues are not made known to the public a situation emerges whereby public service strikes, for instance are seen in a negative light.²⁶ Without adequate public knowledge in this area, perceptions of the Quebec economy become considerably narrow. Halory adds that:

"When you get right down to it, the root of the linguistic problem is economic and to deal with it at the level of effects (signs, notices, the school system, the language of administration...) this can only alienate from the Quebec national liberation movement the English-speaking workers and petit bourgeoisie who would otherwise be open to mobilisation within the framework of a struggle waged by the very essence of national socialism in Quebec."²⁷

Instead of dealing with the economic problems and labour resistance head-on, the PQ clings tenaciously to ethnic divisions in the form of differences in language. The war is waged against the Anglo with forked-tongue and bulging wallet. Whereas, as I have suggested, the real battle exists within the ranks of francophone elites and technocrats. Little can be gained from disregarding the underlying myths of the various language laws. It would do well to realize that those who support these laws, unequivocally, are deluding themselves into believing that a government through linguistic or cultural measures can legislate away the negative attributes of economic development. In practice, the language policy has served the purpose of buttressing the economic ego of the Quebec state in an attempt to offset Canadian economic and political domination.

In a rather far-fetched manner, Halory explains how the consequences of stringent nationalist policies invariably lead to the opposite of social-democracy. He draws the following scenario:

"The PQ is a long way from moving in such a direction (social-democracy). The unofficial weekly of the PQ, Le Jour, published an article of Alain Pontault (April 29 - May 5, 1977) entitled "Un Etat francais", which takes up the themes of the corporatist tradition of a Francois Angers of a Canon Groulx. It is this same political current which carried the Salazar regime to its heights in Portugal, supported the franco counter-revolution in the thirties, and which still exists today around the review L'Action nationale, which, in 1973, supported the fascist coup d'Etat against the Allende regime."²⁸

Although such an allegation is rather harsh, it does indicate a crucial point. The PQ as a party in power is presently steering a course according to its own navigational know-how, while disregarding crucial allies within the boundaries of Quebec. We have already noted that labour is one of these disregarded groups, so let us now consider whether business feels equally estranged.

Parti Quebecois members take special pride in their non-business origins. In 1976, sixty PQ candidates came from state middle class backgrounds; twenty of whom were closely affiliated with the trade union movement.²⁹ In fact, most shun the suggestion that they have any incusutuous relations with private enterprise elites. In an article, "War of the Elites: Two Factions Duel for Power in the New Quebec", Robert Collison provides a telling account of the sharp division within the elites of the French-Canadian middle class.³⁰ He draws the distinction between the Managers (of private and public sector employees, in the higher salary bracket) and the Intellectuals (the "handful of heads", as Bourque and Frenette call those in the government and related state institutions).³¹ His discussion challenges the conventional belief that the main struggle in Quebec occurs between the Anglo-Canadian bourgeoisie and the Francophone state middle class. Instead, he insists, top governmental and party officials presiding over the economic strategies of development meet their biggest challenge from those francophones directly involved in the management of the economy and the labour force.

Nowhere is this schism more pronounced than in the case of the Johnson and Laurin brothers. Daniel Johnson Jr., the francophone who made it in

the commercial sector, and Dr. Pierre Laurin, the director and dean of Les Hautes Etudes Commerciales, are the business-minded prototypes. Whereas their brothers, Pierre-Marc Johnson, Minister of Labour, and Camille Laurin, the PQ Minister who introduced the language laws in 1977, are the Intellectual-technocrat prototypes.

It is interesting to note that in 1977 when Camille Laurin introduced the language proposals, Johnson, the business one that is, was one of a three-man crew who drew up a letter of protest, signed by the 325.³² In it the three-man crew concluded that the legislation "in its present form is a reflection of 'a society of distrust' rather than 'a society of confidence'."³³ For all these men the most pressing issue was how to create a favorable economic climate for all Quebecers irrespective of origin. "Confidence" and "Optimism", these gentlemen wrote, were to be the secret words of success. For Daniel Johnson Jr., the secretary of Power Corporation, PQ Ministers seemed to have their intellectual eggs in all the wrong baskets; saying that:

"From my vantage point, those guys in Quebec City just don't know how Montreal works anymore. Half the time I operate in English, half in French. It's that way all around town. And for the English as well. The Government is fighting a war that's more or less being won."³⁴

Similarly Dr. Pierre Laurin's basic concern is with finding jobs for the graduates who stream out of his school every year. Collison remarks with reference to the director and dean of Les Hautes Etudes Commerciales:

"Traditionally they (the students) went into the bureaucracy and the state enterprises. 'If they did go into English-Speaking companies (says Laurin) they didn't stay because they didn't feel at home. . . . They want to work in their own language.' Most of his students are pequistes . . . 'If they weren't (adds Laurin) they would be rejected by their peers.' Whether Laurin's students settle down in their natural habitat among the Managers of drift into the camp of the Intellectuals, may be one of the last tests of Canada's adaptability, and its chance to survive."³⁵

In real terms, the Managers must concede the fact that their economic future is to a great extent determined by the expansive role of the state. The shift from the private to the public sector was slow and erratic; and occasioned by a very real need to increase the role of the public sector in order to ensure that economic growth proceeded in a resolute manner. Most private sector managers accept and respect increased state planning in the provincial economy.³⁶ But with this shift in emphasis, far greater influence falls into the hands of the technocratic-intellectual who administrates and plans the economic future of the Quebec economy.³⁶ And much to the chagrin of any anti-state business managers, this change of emphasis seems intractable.

Maurice Sauve, vice president of the pulp and paper giant Consolidated Bathurst Ltd. Compiled figures concerning French-Canadian ascension to economic power.³⁷ The findings points to a negative direction, and as Collison explains:

"They show plainly- painfully to Sauve - that the penetration of francophones into the upper reaches of corporate Montreal, though significantly increased, remains ludicrously small."³⁸

"in 1966" says Sauve, "there were thirty-seven French-Canadian senior managers among 764, or 4.8 percent. In 1976, there were eighty-five among a total of 989, or 9.5 percent."³⁹ Feeling a compulsion to add his two-cents to the analysis, Collison concludes: "The number of French-Canadians at the top has double-doubled from being next to nothing to almost nothing."⁴⁰

Others of the Managerial elite, well entrenched within the private sector, remain sceptical about the success of state endeavors. One anonymous francophone businessman complained:

"Some state enterprises are losing vast amounts of money, others are hardly turning a profit. Nationalism costs a lot of money and even the government has finite resources. Quebec and some of its creatures, such as Hydro-Quebec, are among the most debt-heavy institutions in Canada."⁴¹

On the whole, the francophone business community take a great pride in its practical realism Roger Peyrefitte in his book *Le Mal français*, vividly demonstrates the severity of the elite schism. Even greater is its respective outlook on strategies for encouraging the economic growth of Quebec. The technocrats, so those of the business school proclaim, have no God-given right to hold a monopoly over the type of strategy to be employed. In the end these two elites will always differ. The cadres of the PQ are the protectors of the French-Canadian technocratic system. René Levesque, one of the first of the Intellectual elites to articulate a stand, in a famous 1966 interview announced his vision.

"Our principal capitalist must for the moment - and for as long into the future as we can see - be the state. It must be more than a participant in the economic development and emancipation of Quebec; it must be the creative agent."⁴²

Presently the Quebec Liberals profess the alternative to state intervention; "that government must be the servant, not the embodiment, of the people".⁴³ To some extent the conflict between the elites has taken the form of competition between the provincial parties, although one should be cautious about assuming a rigid identification of support for a party. Germain Couresne, a member of the rising class known in French as the PME (small and medium sized enterprises), states

"I have found the PQ government very fair. But if the Liberals won, business would feel much more at home with them because we know them better."⁴⁴

With the recent re-election of the PQ to power, suffice it to say, the men of business must remain feeling uncomfortably at home with the Intellectuals. But the degree to which they have felt uncomfortable must be considered in greater detail.

Public statements as to precisely what PQ's economic objectives are, have been quite ambiguous and often contradictory. The Party Programme of 1977 stipulated in one section, that the objective of the part is;

"The setting up of an economic system eliminating all forms of worker exploitation and responding to the real needs of Quebecers as a whole rather than the requirements of a privileged minority."⁴⁵

However, this statement seems less reflective of the actual attitude of the PQ Government. Apparently at the Sixth Congress meeting, where the economic plans were being formulated, a serious party conflict emerged between the technocrat-politicos and the more radical wing.⁴⁶ It seems very possible that the above statement was spawned in an attempt by the governmental wing to satisfy the radical wing.

On other occasions, the PQ has been less obtuse in its statements. The Minister of State for Economic Development, Bernard Landry, stated the state will be the engine for getting the Quebec economy going again.⁴⁷ The concept of state intervention is based on four basic premises:⁴⁸

- 1) to regain control of all taxation against the Liberal party's policy of 'profitable federalism'
- 2) to bring the financial sector in line with governmental policy
- 3) to intervene on behalf of cooperatives and of small and medium sized French-Canadian business
- 4) to gradually enlarge the state-owned sector

Taken together, the overall objective is to mobilise state agencies, cooperatives, and funds to support the nationalist project. In order to even out the imbalance perpetuated by the "privileged minority" the state is to compensate and strengthen the underprivileged, small and medium sized business. Moreover they have as an implicit objective the strengthening of the local bourgeoisie, in particular the francophone contingent, small as it is. In effect, according to an observer,⁴⁹ the project of economic development is one instigated by a local state bourgeoisie to give itself an even stronger state to improve its position relative to the Canadian bourgeoisie. Yet as I shall indicate, the PQ has proven on the basis of actions rather than words that it intends on playing the game the Liberals had played previously, and that, despite its social democratic pretensions, it is business-as-usual in Quebec.

On the one hand, nationalist policy aimed towards small and medium sized francophone business has been maintained, according to the stated objectives. By creating the Societe de developpement cooperatif, the state-owned mining company Soquem, the state-controlled Asbestos Corporation, and a program for providing government subsidies and loans - the PQ has somewhat succeeded in introducing an alternative to private economic planning.⁵⁰ Quebec's productive capacity and economic infrastructure has also been promoted by injecting publicly-produced funds from various state-corporate investment agencies, like the Pension Fund and the Caisse-de-depot. This confirms Levesque's recent electoral promise to push Grown Corporations to stand on their own feet.⁵¹ The most concrete and comprehensive example of the party's efforts to promote small francophone business is Bill 48. Designed over a five-year period, it is an industrial development fund resource base, running at the cost of \$50 million with the intention of facilitating non-monopolistic companies.⁵²

Pierre Fournier, in his article "The Parti Quebecois and the Power of Business", takes issue with the non-monopolistic intent of the PQ.⁵³ He claims that

"like its predecessor, the PQ will put most of its financial resources and efforts into the development of monopolies, whether in the private, state, or cooperative sectors. . . the Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund, and the General Investment Corporation, for example, demonstrate, above all, the growth of the larger corporations."⁵⁴

To supplement this contention with a more recent event, it has just been announced that the federal and Quebec governments are jointly subsidizing the pulp and paper giant, Consolidated-Bathurst Inc. of Montreal, \$32.3 million.⁵⁵ Compared with the \$50 million subsidy to a five-year small business promotion programme (Bill 48), the PQ's subsidization of (16.2) is indeed a large sum of money being forwarded at one time and to one place.

Of course the PQ does not present itself in this monopolistic light, and furthermore, according to statements made by Jacques Parizeau, now Minister of Finance in Quebec, it is the express intention of the party not to do so. He states that the promotion of non-monopolistic economic planning,

"... is what gives the people the impressions that we are more to the left. If we had, in Quebec, 25 companies like Bombardier, and if we had more banks, the situation might be different. We have no large institutions, so we must create them."⁵⁶

Regardless of the province's economic deficiencies and limitations, in real economic terms Mr. Parizeau obviously felt the urgent need to fashion the economy according to some obscure notion of what can impress the people. As we shall see shortly, this tendency to the economy as fiction rather than fact, serves only to distort the sight of the image-makers, and detract them from devising solutions for the real problems at hand. It will also become apparent that the PQ has executed its four basic objectives in a wishy-washy manner, at times favouring the very elements and sectors it professes to oppose in the name of the national interest.

The first PQ budget, presented by Parizeau, proved to be conservative in spirit and deflationary in intent. It called for austerity measures, suggesting that the Quebec working public continue to bear the brunt of high taxation schemes without indexation or deferred incomes in the form of Pension Planning. According to plans, a significant amount of expenditure went to servicing the state technocratic apparatus (Table I), with the hope that in later years the public and para-public sector generate extensive sums of public capital to fund future expenditures for welfare, education and health.⁵⁷

To stave off rising unemployment rates, it was deemed necessary to sustain several unprofitable job-creating programmes. To offset the unemployment plight, the Government seriously considered the possibility of promoting programmes to preserve old production methods in the labour intensive sector.⁵⁸ In the private sector this option did not appear feasible, whereas in the public sector the attempt could be made by creating make-work jobs. Unfortunately, no real attempt was made in the direction of make-work jobs, nor were effort made to support labour intensive industries. Even if it was attempted the results would be disastrous. First of all, Quebec products would quickly be priced out of the external market. Secondly, the taxpayers would be the ones to

bear the burdening costs of such an endeavor.

In a study done by Casotguay-Nepveu in a 1971 Report⁵⁹, the conclusion reached was that as early as 1967 the proportion of manpower-employment distribution according to sector was extremely uneven in comparison to that of Ontario's. (Table II).

Table II

	Quebec	Ontario
<u>Primary Sector</u> (extraction of natural resources, cultivation of the soil, lumber, mining)	8.4%	7.8%
<u>Secondary Sector</u> (transformation of primary goods into production or consumptive goods)	30.3%	52.6%
<u>Tertiary Sector</u> (social services, exchange of goods, commerce, transportation, education, etc.)	61.3%	55.8%

Directly following the publication of these figures a CNTU document commented that according to its analysis, the fundamental problem facing any government, especially those in later years when the proportions grow more uneven, is the non-complimentarity of sectors.⁶⁰ Foreign ownership, recurring plant shutdowns contribute much to the problems and adds compensatory duties to the provincial governments. The PQ in comparison to Ontario, has closed the unemployment gap a little by compensating with the public sector. According to one set of figures, when the PQ first took office, 9.8% of the work force was employed, compared with 6.2% in Ontario. Latest statistics, although they vary greatly, indicate that unemployment in Quebec has been reduced by .3% while Ontario's has risen .3%.⁶¹ Exactly what the breakdown is according to sectors we do not know. It would be interesting if such figures could be obtained, since with it we could be in a better position to evaluate how well the PQ has fared in reducing unemployment and balancing the non-complimentarity of sectors and their

respective employment absorption quotas.

It is interesting to note that despite initial fears, the PQ has not thrown the provincial economy into economic straits. Much of the reason behind this has to do with the conservative nature of the first two budgets. When the 1976-77 budget was being brought down, the Finance Minister confirmed that in reducing Quebec's borrowing needs from \$1.4 billion to \$960 million, his government would have "a greater degree of freedom to manoeuvre vis-à-vis financial circles."⁶² Obviously, the fears that emerged in the financial community with the election of the PQ to office were ill-founded. The budgets turned out to be similar in many respects to Wall Street budgets, subordinating social programs somewhat. And although service sector expenditure increased, it was hardly indexed according to the total amount of government spending elsewhere.⁶³ Thus, as the vice-president of the Quebec Chamber of Commerce confirmed,

"We are pleased with the orthodoxy of the PQ spending estimates . . . especially because of the fact that the brakes have been put on state expenditures: the Chamber is particularly pleased with the restrictions on the social and education arena."⁶⁴

Other examples indicate, as well, that the PQ is not the wolf in lambs clothing that business thought it was. Two very important Quebec plants, Quebec steel and Wayaganck, were permitted to close down despite the PQ's solemn commitment to serve the "little man". A strong PQ militant segment waged a long and tiring opposition to this show of governmental despondency, but could not prevail in the midst of such rebuttals from the Economic Development Minister that they refused to intervene "because it would distort the market system."⁶⁵

The power of playing upon public desires is what every government dawdles in; except that in the case of the PQ, they know what they are doing, and they do it with such ardor and success. The image of the PQ as a social-democratic party is somewhat tainted by a reality pointing to the contrary. Since its inception, Bill 101 has been amended as a result of business pressure. In the section concerning language policy in head offices, stipulations were altered in such a way that in practice the legislation hardly resembled the original policy.

The stipulations were made deliberately vague, and according to the law, the particular circumstances of the head office in question were now to be submitted to the discretion of the Office de la langue française. Apparently, when business opposition was at its height, the president of the Office went out of his way to console the financial sector that the law would be enforced with a great deal of flexibility.⁶⁶

The case of the Payette proposal for automobile insurance is another instance where the government bended to business interests. According to one analyst, the legislation runs counter to the progressiveness of the PQ,

"by bringing under a state programme only the matter of personal injuries . . . (partial nationalism) By leaving to the private companies the very lucrative yield of property damage, by making it mandatory to take out an insurance policy for every vehicle, by socialising the losses from the unprofitable field of private injury, and by maintaining a high cost for premiums, the PQ government has chosen its side."⁶⁸

The Minister of this legislative creation, Lise Payette, is certainly closer to the financial sector than she is to the insured. She had at one point confessed that her main concern was with protecting a faltering Quebec insurance industry, and not the vulnerable uninsured.⁶⁹ This is not to suggest, however, that the Automobile Insurance Plan is simply serving the interests of business. Rather, it is to suggest that there does not seem to be any objective criteria as to which of the faltering industries the government is to rescue. In this case, the insurance industry was saved because it was troubled. Yet for untold reasons, except that it might distort the "market system", Quebec Steel and Weyganck were not resuscitated. Obviously the PQ was exercising its governmental prerogative of being inconsistent in its consistency.

The main contention here is that the general tax-paying population of Quebec is caught in these incongruous circumstances, having to pay for what the PQ deems necessary for the healthy functioning of business in Quebec. The lengths to which it uses this as a pretext for following through with some contradictory programmes is clear in another respect.

Take for instance a situation the PQ found itself in when elected to office: Money had to be obtained on the market in order to fulfill some of its economic objectives. The Canadian market having a tradition of boycotting Quebec bonds, forced the PQ to convince the American financial community to lend money at a favorable interest rate. As a result the state-owned steel complex, Sidbec, successfully floated a bond issue on the New York market.⁷⁰ Obviously, and for good reason, the PQ does not seek to confront American capital, but seeks rather, to absorb monies from outsiders and consequently create a substantial amount of dependence towards these financiers. Yet the present government's responsibility towards foreign investors appears, at first glance, to be somewhat less than that held by the Liberals, previously. To be sure, economic deals made by the PQ have not been entered into blindly. Cooperation with U.S. firms and investors is undertaken with the proviso that Quebec has much to gain in return. The Liberal government of the early seventies, however, was rather indifferent as to where and how much investment came from foreign or Canadian financiers. Under the Liberals the expansion of Sidbec was financed while massive subsidies were being provided to Questeel, a Canadian-owned competitor in the steel industry.⁷¹ Little, if any, economic nationalism was practised by the Liberals. The same incongruous economic diffidence took place in the pulp and paper industry. General Investment Corporation was permitted to build a \$400 million pulp and paper mill at St.-Felicien. Shortly after that, exclusive cutting rights over 51,000 square miles of forests, and wood-harvesting machinery were given away to ITT-Rayonnier to build a plant in Northern Quebec.⁷²

Obviously, a non-complimentarity of sectors was reinforced through these actions, with little attention being given to economic strategies. The Bourassa regime maintained strong ties with Quebec, American and Canadian capital, without distinction as to ethnic or geographical origin. The PQ, on the other hand, has exercised more enlightened discretion as to which capital it receives and where it is to come from. Consequently, it has been in a more favorable position to encourage the growth of Quebec based industries and financial networks, even at the expense of running

into deeper deficits (i.e. Tricofil). Efforts have been made to guarantee that foreign investment capital be injected in to politically determined areas. In sectors predominantly Anglo-Canadian, like steel, electrical equipment, and food processing plants, the Ministry of Finance takes a particularly aggressive stand in order to force them to comply with Quebec objectives.⁷³ In one attempt to do this, in 1979, plans were underway to put a ceiling of 25% on capital stock made available to non-residents of Quebec. To this end, the intention of the PQ was to buttress the cooperative and small-franophone business. This is not to suggest that it has in any definitive way executed these plans with absolute rigour. For the PQ is not exempt from some of the same criticisms waged against the Bourassa regime's nationalist diffidence. In December 1977, for instance, a \$92 million contract was awarded to GM for the construction of buses.⁷⁴ Ironically, one of the Quebec based "jewels" of French-Canadian capitalism, Bombardier - MLW, was overlooked . That this did occur, remarks Fournier,

"is not due to the government's desire to make a timely concession to U.S. capital in order to ensure its neutrality in the ongoing struggle between the Quebec and Canadian bourgeoisie. " (Rather) It is more likely, an implicit admission that the Quebec firm has neither the technological nor the market power to compete in the big league."⁷⁵

As I have shown, the PQ's track record with regard to business and the economy, has not been perfect. By evaluating the party's economic objectives measured against their actual effectiveness, we have seen that the PQ has deviated from its professed commitment to serve labour and indigenous francophone business. Its weakness can be seen to rest on several general points: 1) to follow a consistent policy of control over industry and over big monopolies, thus undermining the development of state economic planning according to plans; 2) as an intellectual elite it has intensified alienation felt by the francophone managerial elite, thus contributing to the deepened chasm already existing between the two elites, and creating greater resistance and less cooperation; and 3) by using enmity between Quebec and the Federal system as a pretext not to deal with the great problem posed by cooperation with the U.S.

On the positive side, the Quebec population has prospered, and stands to gain from the confidence exhibited by the government in dealing with the economy in those troubled times. It can be said the PQ has over-estimated its economic margin of manoeuvrability, and has on numerous occasions deviated from its stated line of intentions. Had the Government not been flexible, severe conflicts might have emerged. But the flexibility has thus far been a flexibility which shifts the weight of the scales against labour in the tri-partite relations of government/business/labour. In light of more recent events, the PQ's ability to meet its economic objectives may be seriously limited, and resistance, particularly labour resistance, threatens to thwart the realization of a grandiose economic empire.

THE MOST RECENT DILEMMA

The PQ still professes to be the party of Quebec nationalism. This election, was an election of the eighties. Several issues appeared on the Agenda which have never been present in any previous Quebec election. It is indeed odd that the issues predominant in other Western democratic elections have pivoted on the question of how to meet the challenge of the Second Industrial Revolution; and how to re-vitalize the economy through private means with a lessened role for the state bureaucracy. Recent events in the U.S. and Britain have shown the governments unable and unwilling to bear the burden of economic development alone, thus having to mobilise private business in its efforts to re-vivify the sickening economic situation of stagflation.

Quebec, due to its rather different character, could very well be damaged if such austere moves were taken. Clearly the Liberals' claim-to-fame, in this past Quebec election, was to be less interventionist in the economy. Unfortunately, how the Liberals were to achieve this was never expalined. In contrast, the PQ sees the need to push for a vitalized public sector, and still professes to be anxious to take over Quebec's largest Asbestos producer. In spite of Liberal claims, the present economic conditions in the province are not congenial with neo-conservative solutions. Quebec economic

development has always proceeded best when governments have taken positive and insistent steps.

Presently, a most pressing issue was raised by Levesque in his electoral announcement that the PQ is committed to two major industrial subsidy programmes, the second of which is in keeping with the present government's elite efforts to keep pace with the industrial times. This second programme is a proposed research and developmental project in the area of technology and office technology. According to the programme, up to fifty percent of all research and development costs involved in the investment and conversion of industries to new technologies will be subsidized, as well as seventy-five percent for those involved in high technology areas of electronics. In making these campaign promises, it is important to note that Levesque was addressing 600 economic and commerce students at the Université of Quebec, and may just have been playing upon the particular status of the audience. Nevertheless, this industrial subsidy plan is crucially important in view of the fact that the PQ, in so doing, has implicitly taken a stand on the contentious issue of technological development. The impact of microelectronics on industry and work has of recent been under serious scrutiny (i.e. the Gamma group at U of M). Sociologists, academics of various sorts, government officials from Ottawa, industrial relations groups, and trade union officials have taken the position that it is too early for any government to propose a comprehensive policy that concerns new technology.⁷⁶ It is felt that the impact of such a proposal has not been sufficiently assessed as yet. Consequently, words of caution have been issued to all concerned. But it seems the PQ, in its eagerness to keep pace, has adopted a potentially dangerous position.

A recent study on "The Impact of the Microelectronics Revolution on Work and Working" issued by the Science Council of Canada, was written in coordination with officials of various economic sectors from all around Canada. The study focuses on the implications of new technology on the labour movement and industrial organizations. Particular attention is focused on the public sector, where mechanization of work tasks have been quick and intensive. The paper points out both the

positive and negative impacts this may have on the labour market. Technological enthusiasts see the Microelectronics Revolution as a liberating force, which alleviates the tedious and monotonous work takes from the employees, increasing production and thereby stimulating economic growth. Technological pessimists concentrate on the use of the new technology as a substitute for labour, increasing unemployment and offering few compensatory benefits for either the displaced worker or the economy. The latter contend that government subsidization of technological conversion only serves to buttress capital intensive markets. IBM, Hewett-Packard and other electronics producers have much to gain from the encouragement of conversion. On the labour market, such high-tech industries tend to employ only the highly trained and specialized worker rather than the mid-level clerical worker, machine operator, or those in the labour intensive manufacturing sector.

Without conclusive evidence as to the exact impact such a programme will have, it is best to proceed with caution and care. Those on the labour union side raise the most serious doubts. Paul Philips expresses the general consensus held by union officials that "technological displacement has been a central importance to the creation, growth and militance of labour organizations." During the massive Common Front strikes in the early seventies, labour officials criticised state efforts in dealing with development and technology.⁷⁸ And union officials have maintained, up to the present, that the threat of an eventual labour backlash is imminent.

It is foolhardy for the PQ to assume that others are willingly disposed to sacrifice themselves and take the adverse working conditions accompanying work rationalization, all in the name of the greater good. The one union representative noted in the Science Council Report that in their general approach all governments in Canada have been negligent in appreciating the need to supply economic security, employment and acceptable working conditions.⁷⁹ Yet with an already uncertain economic environment in Quebec, the PQ still proceeds to draw up a policy line which attacks the very substance of current labour queries. Where government is the employer and the manager, as in the public service, the PQ appears to have

taken a very hard line position in promoting the introduction of new technologies without fully understanding or appreciating the likely impacts predicted by the Report.

A new dimension of labour-union negotiation was introduced with the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) strike of 1977. Uncertainty about the role of labour in the bargaining process occurred when the workers reacted with strike action to the introduction of automation in the Postal Service because they had not been conferred with. The demand was thus made for new adaptable bargaining procedures to deal with the conditions under which new technologies could be introduced. However, this has not been done. And unfortunately the little energy spent redefining working conditions is probably the greatest single impediment to the continued automation of the service sector or of the economy at large. Unless the PQ recognizes the need to include labour in this process of industrial conversion, the economy will be pervaded by confused and angry strikers, and a frustrated government unable to come to terms with the angered crowds.

Procrastination in altering bargaining procedures can only contribute to an intensified conflict, of strikes both legal and illegal. A recent article in the Financial Post,⁸⁰ by Claire Bernstein, raises the argument that the right to strike in the public sector may no longer be politically legitimate. As Chief Justice Jules Deschenes of the Quebec Superior Court has remarked, the legal tools have failed because they cannot be practically enforced; "no jail is large enough to house 1,600 defiant union members. And to incarcerate militant union leaders for any significant time could create social upheaval."⁸¹

Obviously every party involved in strikes, the union members, its officials and the public are all losing patience with the increased frequency of strikes. Labour union officials and government negotiators are both concerned about the very viability of present negotiating procedures. Very often strike action is employed as a response to the bureaucratic bottleneck of rules of procedure, colling-out time, and other regulations used to resolve contract disputes. None of the parties involved

can continue to ignore the source of the problem - traditional legal tools - and leave it to last ditch strike efforts to decide the outcome of faltering negotiations. At times, government and business, forced to take some plan of action, permit the union to call for strike action in hope of inspiring public indignation towards the strikers.

According to Bernstein's article, the "Citizens" frustration in Quebec has built to the point where - "like Peter Finch in the movie Network - the citizen 'is mad as hell and won't take it anymore.'" In Quebec, the citizens are now taking legal action and being awarded damages suffered during strikes. In Quebec, corporations and individuals have the right under the law to sue in the regular courts for damages received as a result of illegal strike action. In Quebec during the past years, citizen power has been used on numerous occasions. Two small claims courts recently awarded damages to individuals against the unions.

"One ordered a teacher's union to pay five collegiate students \$300 each . . . and while \$1,500 may not seem much, there are at least 45 other student actions awaiting to be heard."⁸²

The precedence has been set. Quebec courts are ruling in favour of citizens'. We have yet to see how other class action cases, such as that issued from hospital patients, ticket holders, and fire victims, will be decided. In the end, as Bernstein concludes, the increased costs incurred by the unions for illegal strikes will obviously put a damper on their recurrence.

Now, more than ever, labour relations are becoming political in nature requiring resolution by political means. Leaving the resolution of conflicts up to the courts, or, for that matter, public indignation, is indeed a short-sighted way of dealing with the problem. The Quebec Liberal Party has taken the offensive by entertaining the withdrawal of the legal right to strike. Such suggestions have sparked reaction not only from the unions, but also from concerned individuals who see this policy as detrimental to labour relations. The PQ and the Liberals should realize that it is at the stage of negotiation that the resolution of the conflict can be attempted and partially resolved. It comes as no wonder that Pierre Marois, the PQ Minister of State for Social

Development, officially declared "That man (Ryan) is dangerous". The PQ seem to be more sensitive to the complexities involved in labour relations.

A real danger exists if the PQ decides to take the opportunity to introduce subsidization projects for new technologies. And with labour unable to resort to traditional methods of negotiation, it will very likely be provoked to react to the introduction of new technology in a confused and erratic manner. The possibility that such a situation could emerge creates the need for the establishment of mechanisms whereby the new relations emerging from current industrial trends can best be dealt with. To offset what may possibly provoke another Common Front or CUPW skirmish, the Government should adopt the following strategy:

- 1) initiate talks on the prospect of re-structuring traditional legal methods of negotiation with the labour unions;
- 2) Cooperative with labour, as well as business, in the planning stages of economic policies as concerns the the introduction of new technologies, and working conditions.

In so doing, partial labour support can be mobilised and put to constructive use for future Industrial plans. Meanwhile, state involvement in business ventures, in the form of Crown Corporations or subsidization programmes for private business, should be undertaken in a consistent fashion, coherently devised and publicised.

If brave new plans for economic development are to intrude in the political arena of Quebec, then the PQ's relations with business and labour must shift to accomodate a new political wisdom. What is required is not the appearance that all is well, but brave political tactics. The challenge posed by the second Industrial Revolution provides the context in which the democratic political will can truly assert itself. This opportunity has yet to be taken by the present Quebec Government. If and when it does, the PQ will have proven itself worthy of its political and economic responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

In the course of this analysis it has become clear that the Parti Quebecois has demonstrated the continued need for a dynamic and positive role for government in facilitating the economic development of the province. Its performance has shown that the dimension of state intervention was not to assume such proportions that business could not operate as usual. In fact, the PQ made it clear that the business community had nothing to fear but fear itself. State efforts frequently proved to be beneficial, supplying public services, health and welfare programmes to maintain a healthy and productive atmosphere.

Labour relations have proven to be quite an enigma for the PQ. Part of the reason for this stems from the fact that the Government holds a particular vision of Quebec economic development appreciably different from those not of its elite group; namely, labour. There is, to be sure, a conflict of interests involved here, and the "handful of heads" in elected office are intent upon following through with the economic development of Quebec through politically prescribed means. Timely concessions will again be made to the business community, and hopefully the PQ will recognize the danger that exists if it continues to alienate the labour element.

In the coming years, the only consolation a Quebec government can expect under these circumstances is to deal with the labour problem in a manner I have suggested previously. Business needs some reassurance, but not as much as is needed by the labour movement. More than any other factor, the labour movement is posing one the greatest dilemmas to any government elected to office in Quebec. Public service employees have shown themselves to be adamant in their negotiations and stringent in their demands. Political competition for power and influence has not ended with the rise of the PQ to power. In fact, labour is fast becoming a political competitor, and a threat to the hopes and dreams of the governing elite. Economic planning must immediately incorporate the labour factor as a factor central to its developmental capacity. A governments' ability to meet these far-reaching proposals will be a decisive factor in its ability to come to grips with the

economic challenges of development today, and in the future.

Without a doubt, events from the 1960s onward illustrate how the project of self-affirmation has unfolded. The culmination of this affirmation has not ended with the PQ's rise and hold on to power as is commonly believed. During their stay in office they have shown that positive measures can be taken by the Quebec state to stimulate economic growth and social development. State intervention remains a reality, and a necessary reality to the continuance of the self-affirmation project. The Quebec Liberals, if elected to power, would be hard pressed if they over-stress the importance of government spending cutbacks. On the other hand, if the PQ wishes to survive it must convince the public that monies expended on government projects have not been spent wastefully, that they have been put to good use in stimulating both private and public enterprises.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dale Postgate & Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976) pp.100-110.
2. Ibid., p.118.
3. In an article, "French Canada: A Case Study in Sociological Analysis", Philippe Garique confirmed my view that franco-phone researchers deal predominantly with Quebec class structure questions. Most, he claims, are highly ideological and nationalistic, usually concluding with a political call to arms. The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. I. No.4, Nov. 1964.
4. There are no substantive facts at my disposal to qualify this statement, although there are numerous assertions that such was the case:
E. Jacques Brazeau; "Language Differences and Occupational Experience", pp. 297-299 - Jacques Dofny & Marcel Rioux, "Social Class in French Canada", pp.308-310, in French Canadian Society-Vol. I, Marcel Rioux & Yves Martin, eds. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968)

5. Referred to are the following proponents of the New Quebec middle class thesis:
Jacque Parzeau, "Quebec's Emerging Middle Class" in Canadian Dimension, 1963, pp. 30-34.
Herbert Guindon, "Changes in Class and Power Relations in Quebec" in Queen's Quarterly, LXXI, 1964.
Alex Macleod, "Nationalism and Social Class: The Unresolved Dilemma of the Quebec Left" in The Journal of Canadian Studies, vol.8, Nov. 1973, pp.3-15
Henry Milner, Politics and the New Quebec State, 1978
_____, "Social Unrest, Social Class & Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution" in Queen's Quarterly, LXXI; 1964, pp.150-164.
_____, "Canada and Quebec Sovereignty" in The Canadian Forum, vol. LVIII, no.681, May 1978, pp.11-15.
6. Herbert Guindon, "Changes in Class and Power Relations in Quebec" (revised and updated) in Social Stratification in Canada. James E. Curtis & Williams G. Scott, eds. (University of Waterloo: Prentice Hall, 1979) p.162.
7. Henry Milner, Politics in the New Quebec (McClelland & Stewart, 1978),
8. Ibid
9. Henry Milner, "Canada and Quebec Sovereignty" in The Canadian Forum, Vol. LVIII, no.681, May 1978, p.12.
10. Ibid
11. Examples drawn from Milner, "Canada and Quebec Sovereignty", op.cit., p.13.
12. Richard U. Miller and Fraser Isbester, eds. Canadian Labour in Transition, (Prentice Hall of Canada, 1971).
13. E.C. Hughes, "The Professions in Society" in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 26, no.1, Feb. 1960. pp.54061. Postgate and McRoberts, op.cit., pp.110-112.
14. Edouard Cloutier, in Industrialism, Technology and Contemporary French Canadian Nationalism, provides a lengthy discussion of the resentment held by many public service employees towards the Quebec state. (Macmillan Press, 1976).
15. The following information is drawn from the official texts of the Common Front publications:
Quebec Labour in Politics, CNTU Document, A.E. Leblanc and J.D.Thwaids, trans & eds., (Montreal, 1973)
Quebec - Only the Beginning, Collection of Manifestoes, Daniel Drache, ed.

16. Quebec - Only the Beginning, op.cit., p.41.
17. CNTU statement cited in B. Roy Lemoine, "The Modern Industrial State: Liberator or Exploiter?" in Our Generation, VIII, no.4, Oct. 1974, p.147.
18. Charles Halary, "The New Quebec State" in Our Generation, vol.12,1978 p.13.
19. The Federal Government invokes legislation for this purpose, usually on request of the Provincial Government.
20. Jennifer Robinson, "Labour Day: Years of Strife Looming?" in The Gazette, Aug. 30, 1980, p.1.
21. Pierre Fournier, in "The Parti Quebecois and the Power of Business" discusses this and other similar Conferences. Our Generation, Spring 1978, vol.12, no.3, pp.6-10.
22. Halary, op.cit., p.13.
23. Translated quote cited in Pierre Fournier article op.cit., p.6 taken from Le Jour, June 3, 1977.
24. Fournier, op.cit., p.7.
25. Translated quote cited in Charles Halory's article, op.cit., p.14 taken from R. Pelletier, "Levesque: l'Etat ne deviendra pas etouffant" La Presse, May 1977.
26. Halory, op.cit., pp.13-14.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Fournier, op.cit., p.12.
30. Robert Collison, "War of the Elites" in Saturday Night, vol.93, no.4, May 1978.
31. Gilles Bourques and Nicole Laurin-Frenette, "Social Classes and National Ideologies in Quebec" in Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, Gary Teeple, ed., (University of Toronto Press, 1972), p.208.
32. Collison, op.cit., p.24.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p.21.
36. Alex Macleod, "Nationalism and Social Class: The Unresolved Dilemma of the Quebec Left" in Journal of Canadian Studies, vol.8, Nov.1973, p.12.
37. Collison, op.cit., p.20.
38. Ibid
39. Ibid
40. Ibid
41. Ibid, (anonymous quote)
42. Quote cited in Collison, op.cit., p.24.
43. Gazette Editorial in an open proclamation of support for the Liberal Party, April 8, 1981.
44. Allan D. Gray, "Little Tension in Quebec Vote" in The Financial Times of Canada, April 11, 1981, p.16.
45. P.Q. "Le Programme, l'action politique, les statuts et reglements" (Montreal, 1977)
46. Macleod, op.cit., p.12
47. Le Devoir, May 26, 1977.
48. Halory, op.cit., p.9.
49. Fournier, op.cit., p.10
50. Ibid
51. Financial Post, "Parties in Tune on the Basics", April 11, 1981, p.7 .
52. Fournier, op.cit., p.11
53. Ibid
54. Ibid
55. Cited in notice of Financial Times of Canada, April 4, 1981. p.42.
56. Quote by Jacques Parizeau cited in "Au Quebec l'Etat doit intervenir", Quebec-Press, Feb. 5, 1970.
57. Halory, op.cit., p.70.

58. Don McGillivray, "Economy is More than Factories" in The Gazette, Jan. 28, 1981, p.69.
59. Edition Officiel du Quebec, Report, 1971.
60. CNTU Document, op.cit., pp.128-132.
61. Financial Times of Canada, April 6, 1981, p.8.
62. Quote cited in Fournier article, op.cit., p.7, fn.10
63. Ibid., p.6
64. Cited and translated by Fournier, op.cit., p.7
65. PQ Party Programme, 1977.
66. Fournier, op.cit., p.4
67. Halory, op.cit., p.11
68. Ibid., p.12
69. Ibid
70. Fournier, op.cit., p.8
71. Ibid., p.9
72. Ibid
73. Halory, op.cit., p.13
74. Fournier, op.cit., p.9
75. Ibid
76. Science Council of Canada, "The Impact of the Microelectronics Revolution on Work and Working in Canada", Proceedings of a Workshop, July 1980.
77. Quote by Paul Philips in Gary Teeple text, op.cit., p.128
78. Lemoine, op.cit., p.71.
79. Science Council of Canada, op.cit., p.11
80. The Financial Post, "Quebecers Fight Back Against Illegal Strikes", April 11, 1981, p.26.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.

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
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BOOKSTORE HOURS: 9 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE OR END OF SEPTEMBER

LOTO CANADA TICKETS
CONCORDIA T-SHIRTS
POSTAGE STAMPS
BUS TICKETS
TEXT BOOKS

ARTS
COMMERCE
ENGINEERING
FINE ARTS
SCIENCE

CALCULATORS (HEWLETT-PACKARD)
CONCORDIA SWEAT SHIRTS
PHOTO-FINISHING
STATIONERY
GRAD RINGS
SUNDRIES



**BEST WISHES of
the
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE
PARTY**

**COMPLIMENTS of
DEAN OF DIVISION II
FACULTY ARTS & SCIENCE**

**Wishing You SUCCESS
IN YOUR ENDEAVORS**

**DEAN OF STUDENTS
OFFICE
LOYOLA CAMPUS**

**Concordia
Guidance Services**

LOYOLA CAMPUS
2490 West Broadway
482-0320

SGW CAMPUS
H 440
879-2879

Services

Counselling

Personal, educational,
vocational. Individual
appointments and group
programs.

**Guidance
Information Centre**

Academic and career planning
information and assistance

**Reading and
Learning Skills**


Effective reading courses
and learning skills centre.

Canada Employment Centre

Job placement and career counselling. Full-time, summer, temporary.

SGW Campus
2070 MacKay St.
283-5177

Loyola Campus
6935 Sherbrooke St. West
489-3885



BELMORE HOUSE

Calendar of Events

Montée St. Benoît	Engaged Couples Weekend
Winter Montée	Antioch Weekends
Newman Conference	

Regular Programs

marriage preparation	spiritual direction
liturgy planning	third world issues
folk music	support to the elderly
banner making	celebrating Eucharist
Christmas baskets	picnics
prison visits	skiing
shared suppers	cycling
skating with blind children	guest speakers
skid row	

Loyola Campus Ministry
7141 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H4B 1R6
(514) 482-0320 Ex. 243

Robert Gaudet S.J., Robert Nagy, Ann Shore

**COMPLIMENTS OF
DEAN OF STUDENTS
OFFICE
S.G.W. CAMPUS**



CUSA